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ABSTRACT 
This thesis offers an inquiry into shame; in particular a reading of some women's 
lived experience of shame from a psychoanalytic and feminist perspective. This work 
also reflects critically on epistemological issues and tensions between the adoption 
of qualitative methods of research and psychoanalytic, feminist and post-structuralist 
readings of texts. 
The thesis starts with an outline of its contents, a reflexive history of the research, 
and a brief introduction on shame. Chapters one to three review the main body of 
literature on shame, critically reflecting on how shame is constructed within different 
theoretical frameworks. This investigation begins with the work of Sigmund Freud 
and the different constructions of shame in Freudian metapsychology (chapter one) 
and continues with a review of the literature on the role of shame in social and 
interpsychic dynamics (chapter two). Chapter three focuses on the literature arguing 
for a crucial link between shame and femininity. Epistemological and methodological 
issues are discussed in chapters four; while chapter five provides a detailed 
description of how the research was carried out and of the analysis of the text. 
Chapters six to ten are based on in-depth semi-structured interviews on women's 
experience of shame. The discursive analysis investigates the ideological function of 
the shameful subject position within the context of the themes identified in the 
thematic decomposition of the interviews. The conclusion summaries and reflects on 
the thesis as a whole; it also comments on some implications of the different readings 
of shame proposed in the thesis. 
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AN INTRODUCTION 
"Too many of us are paralysed by our histories to want to change them. In 
the result we perpetuate the power of those who make our histories - to make 
ourselves even more helpless. When that 'we' refers to those of us in 
institutions and academies of higher learning given to the study of social 
reality, our rejusal to change that reality makes us collaborators in the 
subjugation of the powerless by bringing credibility to power. 
"We do not have to be at the barricades to be revolutionaries; we do not have 
to be grassrootists to be radical. To apprehend the social consequences of 
what we ourselves are doing and to set out to change it - merely to be 
traitors to our class - is in itself a revolutionary act. " (Chris Mullard, 1974) 
i. 1 Introduction 
This chapter has the function of introducing the thesis as a whole and of clarifying 
some of the fundamental concepts and choices of frameworks adopted in this project. 
This chapter is divided in two parts. The first part contains sections in which I clarify 
why I have chosen shame as the topic of my inquiry, which psychoanalytic 
framework I have chosen and why. There is also a section to outline the argument 
underpinning this thesis and to explain the choice of social constructionism as a 
method of inquiry. This will be followed by a summary of the content of the research 
sections, the themes and the findings, a section giving an outline of the thesis and a 
reflexive history of it. The second part is a brief introduction to shame, where I give 
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a definition of shame and clarify the main concepts behind the working model 
adopted in this thesis. 
This thesis aims at investigating shame; in particular it aims at providing a 
psychoanalytic and feminist reading of women's lived experience of sharne. The 
research carried out for this project consists in the analysis of the inter-views with 
eighteen women about their experience of shame. 
The thesis is structured in two parts: the first contains the literature review (chapters 
one, two and three) which provides a background for the research contained in part 
two (chapters six to ten). The literature review and the research are bridged by two 
chapters: chapter four, on methodology and epistemological discussion, and chapter 
five which describes how the research was carried out; in addition there is this 
introduction and a final chapter on conclusions. 
i. 2 Why shame? 
There are a number of reasons why I chose to investigate shame, in particular 
women's experiences of shame. The most immediate and emotional reason is simply 
that I am a woman. I think that we all experience shame in ways that are peculiar to 
us as individuals - for example I am ashamed of my Italian accent - and in ways that 
are shared by us as members of a particular society - for example I would feel 
ashamed of walking in the street naked. However, I also feel that I have a specific 
way of feeling ashamed which is connected to my being a woman. The shame I am 
referring to has a more existential flavour than the specific feeling of exposure and 
embarrassment of the examples given above. It is a mixture of uncertainty about 
oneself, a sense of inadequacy, low self-esteem and pervasive shame. That this 
existential experience of shame is not just my lot has been confirmed by intimate 
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discussions with my female friends about the secret torture of a life lived under the 
threat of shaine and self-doubt. 
My experience as a psychotherapist also corroborated my suspicion that, beyond 
individual differences, there is something broadly shared in women's experience of 
shame and many of my female patients came to therapy in an attempt to find an 
individual solution to their crippling shame. The relevance of the analysis of shame 
in psychotherapy was turther confirmed for me -by Lewis (1974) who (also from a 
pattern observed in her clinical practice), had come to realize that shame in the 
patient-therapist relationship was a special contributor to the negative therapeutic 
reaction. She found that a group of patients who had terminated treatment with her, 
returned after a few years in even worse psychic condition than when they had 
originally applied for treatment. Specifically, the insights they had gained during 
treatment were now being used against themselves, with the addition of a vocabulary 
which had been increased by analysis. They had become even more self-critical than 
they had appeared to be at the start and their superego conflicts appeared accentuated. 
The area which seemed to have been worst affected was that of self-evaluation, i. e. 
the capacity to maintain at least a neutral self-evaluation. Lewis concluded that this 
was the result of the failure to properly analyze shame (Lewis 1974). 
Although I agree with Lewis that it is crucial to properly analyze shame in 
psychotherapy, I do not believe in the possibility of finding an exclusively 
individualistic solution to women's shame. The wish and commitment to reach a 
more global understanding of women's shame which pays attention to their historical 
position in a patriarchal society has motivated this research. 
Shame has the quality of being at the same time a very private emotion and a social 
experience, as in shame we see ourselves in the eyes of the other (Sartre 1943, Lewis 
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1971). It has been argued that shame has the crucial function of regulating the 
boundaries between what is public and what we want to keep private (Pines 1990). 
Because of this quality, shame functions as a social regulator. In particular shame is 
considered to play a crucial role in conformity to norms and standards which are 
socially acceptable in a particular society (Goffman 1959, Scheff 1990). Clearly then, 
this function must play a specific role in women's conformity to norms and standards 
in a patriarchal society. 
Another reason why the investigation of shame is important for women is the link 
in literature and popular culture between shame and femininity. I will address these 
issues in detail later in this introduction and in chapter three. 
DA Psychoanalytic Framework: Which and Why? 
A brief clarification is required on which psychoanalytic framework I have used and 
why. The specific psychoanalytic model I have chosen to use to investigate shame 
is Freudian/Contemporary Freudian. From here on I will refer to it as the 
psychoanalytic framework. 
i. 3.1 Why Freud? 
Recently feminist psychotherapists, particularly those influenced by the so-called 
'British School' of psychoanalysis, have neglected Freudian theory and focused 
instead on the role of the mother in the psychic development of the female child 
(Sayers, 1990). By contrast, I have chosen to focus on Freud for two main reasons: 
firstly, it was Freud who made a clear link between female identity and shame by 
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presenting women as shameful beings "par excellence" (1933: 132). Secondly, because 
Freud's formulation, by drawing our attention to women's lack of a penis/phallus, 
places the discussion of female identity firmly within the context of a patriarchal 
society. 
I have chosen this focus because, while acknowledging the immense contribution of 
post-Freudian theories to the understanding of women's psyche, I agree with the view 
that the focus of feminist therapy on the mother carries the risk of losing sight of the 
real inequalities of power, sex, race and class (Sayers, 1990). Furthermore it has been 
pointed out that Freud, virtually alone, took account of the way women's and men's 
psychology is determined by the similarities and differences of their biological and 
social lot (Sayers, 1986). 
i. 3.2 Why Psychoanalysis? 
For a long time psychoanalysis was viewed as the enemy of feminism. It was argued 
that Freud was sexist and that he repeated cultural ideology in a form that it could 
be mistaken for scientific findings (Chodorow 1989, Millett 1972); that he reified the 
notion of man as norm and woman as 'other' (Mitchell and Rose 1982); that he 
proffered a highly phallocentric theory which views the penis as having a unique 
importance in unconscious life (Temperley 1984, Mitchell & Rose 1982), and 
furthermore that Freud's theory of gender, based on anatomical differences, is loaded 
with relations of superiority and inferiority (Chodorow 1978). These views are 
certainly confirmed by Freud's overall view of women, which constructs them as 
shameful beings, narcissistic and vain, with less sense of justice than men and with 
no notable contribution to make to civilization (Freud 1933). 
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In contrast with this circumspect regard for Freud, many feminist authors have 
actively defended psychoanalysis on the grounds that it offers a unique insight into 
the psychic reproduction of oppression (Chodorow 1978,1980, Ernst & Maguire 
1987, Dinnerstein 1978, Mitchell 1974, Eichenbaurn & Orbach 1983, Oliver 1989, 
Sayers 1985,1986). These authors have advocated a fundamental role for 
psychoanalysis in the feminist struggle, due to the fact that no other theory of 
socialization has been able to give a sufficiently plausible explanation of the tenacity 
with which women repeat their pasts and thereby perpetuate their own oppression 
(Chodorow 1989). 
Psychoanalysis provides a theory of the organization and reproduction of sex and 
gender. Freudian theory in particular goes some way towards making sense of men's 
apparent contempt for women as the normal outcome of the masculine Oedipus 
complex; i. e. through their identification with their father's masculine superiority and 
the consequent view of women as penis-less (inferior) creatures. In this way Freud 
demonstrated the intertwining of psychological and social forms of gender oppression 
(Chodorow 1989). A similar point has been made by Eichenbaurn & Orbach (1983) 
who stressed the importance of understanding how social practices of a given culture 
are transmitted to its members and how the individual internalizes the power 
relations, sex roles and psychodynamics of the family. 
In conclusion, Freud's statement that woman is 'made', not born (Freud 1933) is 
pivotal to this thesis, as I take as my starting point that an analysis of shame for 
women must inevitably include an analysis of how woman is made, both internally 
and externally. Due to its unique contribution to the'understanding of the interplay 
of these two worlds, psychoanalysis has been selected as theoretical framework. 
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i. 4 My Argument 
I want to argue that shame does not exist in a vacuum or 'out there', neither is it 
exclusively an intrapsychic affect. This immediately precludes the positivistic 
approach, studying shame as a thing which can be directly observed and objectively 
measured. It also implies critiquing the psychoanalytic view of shame as residing 
within persons, and deriving from their intrapsychic conflicts or personality traits. 
Instead I want to look at how shame is constructed and negotiated in speech. I want 
to claim that the subjective position of 'shameful' is multifaceted, contradictory and 
constantly negotiated. 
My aim in this project is to discursively analyze interviews of women's experience 
of shame as text in order to reveal the ideological significance of the themes 
operating within it, how the subject position of shameful is constructed within those 
themes, what function that particular subject position serves and/or what it enables 
women to do, and/or the rhetorical devices that are used in the construction of the 
shame themes. 
i. 5 Why Social Constructionism? 
There are many reasons why, given the argument I intend to pursue, social 
constructionism and discourse analysis appeared as the most appropriate and fruitful 
methodological approaches. Here I will only briefly state some of these reasons as 
a full discussion of the subject is contained in chapters four and five. 
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Social psychology and psychoanalysis look for explanations of social phenomena 
inside the person, whether in terms of personality and attitudes or in terms of 
intrapsychic conflicts. Sociology on the other hand argues that social structures give 
rise to the phenomena that we see. Social constructionism rejects both these positions 
and focuses instead on the social practices people engage in, arguing that it is in 
those very social practices through which people actively construct and reconstruct 
reality, that we can find explanations of social behaviour (Burr, 1995). 
One important implication of this shift is that it questions the possibility of a 
unproblematic, unbiased observation of the world, because social phenomena are 
viewed as historically and culturally relative, constantly in the process of being 
negotiated between people. In other words, people construct versions of reality 
through their daily interactions. Social constructionists believe that these versions of 
reality are constructed through language which is therefore not only our main means 
of communication, but also a form of social action (Potter and Wetherell 1987). 
These constructions of the world, however, are not purely theoretical abstractions, but 
each carry different implications for human beings (Burr 1995) and have crucial 
repercussions on the way people view and value themselves and others (Burman and 
Parker 1993). 
i. 6 The Themes 
The research reported in this thesis focuses on the analysis of eighteen interviews 
exploring women's experience of shame. Out of these interviews I have extracted five 
shame themes. I will now outline the subject of each with a brief summary of the 
findings. The themes will be fully explored in chapters six to eleven. 
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The first theme, "Shame and the Ideal", looks at shame as deriving from the failure 
to meet an ideal. In this theme I highlight the fact that for the women interviewed, 
not meeting ideals had serious implications for their self-esteem and was expressed 
in terms of negative self-evaluation. I also explore the rhetorical devices and 
strategies used to construct this theme, in particular how the participants, in 
constructing their accounts, rely on a dualistic discourse which separates individual 
and society, victim and perpetrators. In this theme I illustrate first how the position 
of shameful is a negotiated product and second, that the subject positions made 
available by discourses are not equivalent, but carry different implications in terms 
of self-image and self-worth. 
In the second theme, "Femininity and Shame", I investigate how the participants' way 
of accounting for their shame experiences and their positioning themselves as 
shameful functions as 'practical ideology' and contributes to the reproduction of 
female stereotypes. I illustrate how these stereotypes rest on constructions of the 
female body and sexuality as shameful. I found, similar to the previous theme, that 
the whole construction of femininity is contradictory and that women employ specific 
strategies to make sense of these contradictions. I suggest that these strategies are also 
ways in which the participants struggle at an individual level to maintain a positive 
self-image in the absence of alternative, more realistic discourses of the female body. 
I also suggest and illustrate how women construct their accounts in a way that allows 
them to find some space for resistance to the negative evaluation implied in 
patriarchal discourses. 
In the theme "Defences against Shame: Withdrawal and Silence", I investigate 
whether women's positioning themselves as shameftil also plays an ideological 
function. I found that often women used these accounts to avoid alternative positions 
of being angry, competitive or powerful. Thus positioning themselves as shameful 
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warrants their withdrawal from having to otherwise face a situation of conflict. I 
suggest that although silence and withdrawal might provide the individual women 
with a temporary solution to conflict, these strategies also have serious implications 
in terms of women's complicity in reproducing an 'acceptable', but highly limiting 
and self-destructive norms of behaviour for women. The following two themes 
develop the argument that this type of strategy might not be very successful at an 
individual level either. 
The theme "The Shameful Self behind the Facade" looks further into self-protective 
strategies, particularly that of hiding behind a facade. This is presented as a strategy 
adopted to protect the participants from social and personal rejection; the possibility 
of rejection is then accounted for by positioning themselves as unlovable, shameful 
and inadequate. I remove this dilemma from the personal sphere and suggest a link 
with the social construction of woman as 'other' to man and how in the absence of 
a representation of her value 'per se', women might conform to roles and 
expectations which make them acceptable. 
In the final theme "Shame of the Victim", I argue that the solutions identified in the 
previous themes - ultimately that women construct shame as a reflection of personal 
faults - have a cumulative and damaging effect for their sense of well-being and that 
positioning oneself as shameful is highly disempowering and debilitating. For 
example, I found that in event of physical or verbal attacks, the women often tended 
to question their perception of reality, their responsibility or complicity in the event 
and finally turned their anger against themselves, rather than the attacker. 
i. 7 Outline of the Thesis 
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The thesis contains ten chapters plus an introduction and a concluson. The 
introduction provides a summary of the contents of each chapter and a reflexive 
history of the thesis as a whole. 
Part One contains chapters one, two and three and constitutes the literature review. 
This has three aims: a) to provide a historical view of the development of the concept 
of shame; b) to produce a multidisciplinary picture of the major contributions to the 
study of shame in order to clarify concepts and areas of main importance for this 
thesis and, c) to focus on the links between shame, feminism and psychoanalysis. 
These aims stem not only from the necessity of documentation when starting a 
research project, but also from the wider epistemological intent of illustrating how 
theoretical frameworks allow us to see very different things by constructing, rather 
than just describing the phenomenon. This multiplicity of constructions contributes 
ftirther to making shame a multifaceted and extremely complex phenomenon. 
Chapter one looks at the work of Sigmund Freud on shame and guilt. It addresses the 
different meanings attributed to these concepts according to the three models of 
Freud's metapsychology. This chapter has two aims: to provide a historical picture 
of the development of the concepts of shame and guilt and to make the 
epistemological point about the constructed nature of shame. To this purpose the last 
section of chapter one looks at the 'hidden concept of shame in Freud', i. e. at the 
conceptualisation of shame that Freudian models could not explain, but were still 
contained there in embryonic form. 
Chapter two moves away from an exclusively intrapsychic understanding of shame 
through formulations of shame as playing a role in social and interpsychic dynamics. 
Hence I review the literature on the role of shame in the 'self-other' interaction, in 
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motivating human behaviour, in social development and in conformity. In this chapter 
I also look at the other main psychoanalytic reading of shame, that of a failure of the 
ideal-self 
Chapter three applies the findings of the previous chapters to the specific context of 
women's shame in a patriarchal society. The chapter focuses on the discussion of 
women's shame and the theories which advocate a significant link between shame 
and femininity. This chapter starts with a discussion and critique of Freud's statement 
that shame was considered "a feminine characteristic par excellence" (Freud 
1933: 132), which attributes women's shame to their lacking a penis and continues 
through to Bartky (1990) who looks at women's shame as the emotional expression 
of 'being in the world' in a patriarchal society. 
Chapter four bridges the theoretical issues raised in the preceding chapters and the 
actual research with an examination of the epistemological and methodological issues 
involved. It discusses the contributions offered to social psychology by post- 
structuralism and the resulting epistemological issues. In particular it looks at the use 
of language, both in psychoanalysis and discourse analysis, as well as investigating 
issues of subjectivity, power and ideology. 
Chapter five picks up on issues discussed in chapter four, forming an introduction to 
the section on research. The chapter outlines the argument, method of analysis and 
also provides a summary of research questions and findings. The section on method 
follows the stages of the research from the design of the semi-structured interviews 
and the selection of the participants, through the coding of interviews, the selection 
and analysis of the themes, to a summary of the findings of the analysis. 
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Part two contains chapters six to eleven. These five chapters constitute the discourse 
analysis itself Each chapter addresses a theme which recurred in the interviews and 
links it to broader cultural issues. In each case I provide psychoanalytic and feminist 
readings followed by a discursive analysis. 
Chapter six looks at the theme of the ideal and its relation to shame in particular in 
connection to the concept of the ideal-self. In this chapter I question the exclusively 
intrapsychic nature of shame and look at how shame is constructed wit' -, jLr, a 
Chapter seven looks at femininity and the construction of the female shameful subject 
through issues concerning the female body and female heterosexuality and looks at 
how stereotypes of women are constructed in speech through women positioning 
themselves as shameful. 
Chapter eight looks at the defences (in particular withdrawal and silence), employed 
by women to protect themselves from shameful exposure. In this chapter I look at 
certain consequences entailed by adopting the position of shameful and what this 
allows women to do. 
Chapter nine continues some of the discussion initiated in the previous chapter and 
looks at the dichotomy between a true self and a 'fagade' self, as a strategy to protect 
one from feelings of shame and inadequacy. In this chapter I also look briefly at the 
some of the implications of adopting a modernist or post-modernist construction of 
the self. 
Chapter ten brings together most of the issues already addressed in the previous four 
chapters and focuses on the disempowering implications for women of adopting the 
position of shameful, especially in case of attack. 
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Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the content of this thesis and its main 
findings. It also addresses again some epistemological issues involved in adopting a 
psychoanalytic, feminist, post-structuralist approach in attempting to challenge 
existing constructions of shame as a thing 'out there' or as an intrapsychic affect. 
i. 8 A Reflexive History 
The start of this research on shame saw the convergence of three very important 
factors: my experiences as a woman, my interest in research and my profession as 
a psychoanalytic psychotherapist. These three aspects have all contributed to my 
research, but have also made it an extremely difficult process. 
i. 8.1 1, the Psychoanalytic Psychotherapist 
My knowledge of psychoanalysis and unconscious processes both as a therapist and 
as patient taught me that shame plays an extremely important role in human life both 
as a motivator and inhibitor. Less helpful at times was my second-nature attitude to 
approach any text as a reflection of the speaker's psyche. The problematic implication 
of this is that what can be instrumental to the expression of a repressed voice in the 
consulting room, can be repressive in discourse analysis by addressing the accounts 
exclusively as intrapsychic and individual conflicts. 
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On the other hand, although working from within a post-structuralist model, I am not 
completely convinced that it is exclusively beneficial to lose sight of people's 
biographies particularly if we believe, as post- structuralists do, that we do not exist 
in a vacuum, but that our identities are a historically and socially negotiated product. 
I will look at this issue in more detail in chapter five and nine, but in terms of my 
reflexive history the issue of text vs biography was one that I kept struggling with, 
due to my dual identity of psychoanalytic psychotherapist and researcher. Part of my 
difficulty was due to my reluctance to relinquish my interest in the central importance 
of the complexities of an 'inner world' with its own system of internal relations and 
how this relates to intimate relations with oneself and other persons. These 
dimensions, however, I had to ignore when reading women's interviews as text. 
i. 8.2 1, the Woman 
The shared belief (eg. Freud 1933, Lewis 1971,1987, Bartky 1990) that shame has 
particular significance for women is confirmed by my own experience; in particular, 
the pervasive, underlying feeling of inadequacy, of feeling 'wrong' and a disbelief 
in one's capacity - in other words, the very specific form of feminine shame 
examined by Karen Horney (1934). However, if attempting to find a voice to a long- 
suppressed experience is challenging and exciting, it can also be extremely painful 
when the search for new instruments of research creates the same type of conflict in 
terms of legitimation and approval that the content is concerned with. 
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i. 8.3 1, the Researcher 
Commitment to a reflexive account has been advocated as an essential part of 
Feminist Standpoint Research (FSR) (Hollway 1989, Burman 1990, Gill in press) and 
as an aid to accountability for analysis of text as it makes public the interpretative 
processes involved (Potter 1988). Reflexivity generally refers to the researcher 
making explicit and reflecting critically upon the position from which they are 
theorising. Furthermore this critical reflection rests on the realisation that, 
"'knowledge' and the whole process of research are structured by relations of 
dominance around gender, race, class, age and sexuality. " (Griffin 1995: 120) 
On the basis that the 'personal' or 'private' realm is also political, FSR also argues 
that a reflexive account looks at the way in which research is part of a knowledge 
validation process which tends to reflect the concerns of dominant groups (Griffin 
1995). 
Inevitably my personal history and my negotiation with power and validation 
processes cannot but have played a crucial role in the structuring of this thesis. I 
acknowledge that what I write stems from my personal beliefs and my experience as 
a woman. In agreement with Stanley and Wise (1993), 1 believe that feminism is 
deeply and irrevocably connected to a re-evaluation of 'the personal' and as a 
feminist I refuse to see it as inferior to, or even different from, 'science' (Stanley and 
Wise 1993: 21). 
Many trends can be identified within this thesis. Its multifaceted character has often 
felt to me like chaos. I have attempted many strategies to transform chaos into order 
with highly ambivalent reactions. When partly due to exhaustion I finally surrendered 
to its nature, I realised that some of my discomfort was caused by comparing what 
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had been my real experience of research to a 'hygienic research as it is described' 
(Stanley and Wise 1993: 153). 1 then realised that, mirrored in the multifaceted nature 
of my thesis was the complexity of the process of writing a Ph. D which attempts to 
struggle with and pull together various tensions and contradictions. 
Some of these pertain to the intricacies of the current philosophical debate in research 
and in social sciences (Henriques et al. 1984, Silverman 1993). These are represented 
in my thesis by the use of different methodologies: quantitative and qualitative; the 
overlap and conflict of different theoretical frameworks (positivism, post- 
structuralism, feminism); and explanations offered on my topic by different 
disciplines: psychology, psychoanalysis, anthropology, sociology and philosophy. 
Intertwined with the theoretical negotiation, my own historical and psychological 
negotiations played a central role in the varied and sometimes fragmented nature of 
this thesis. 
i. 8.3.1 How my 'Fragmented' History Affected my 'Fragmented' Work 
My academic education took place in Italy. I moved to this country at the age of 24 
with a so-called 'classical' or multidisciplinary education. At high-school I had 
studied ancient Greek literature and poetry as well as physics, chemistry and history 
of art. At University my first degree was in Philosophy, although I had also taken 
exams in Sociology, Anthropology, Criminology and Philosophy of Science. My 
Masters in Psychology was based on research carried out in Britain on the work of 
1 This refers to quantitative methodology used in 
the questionnaire study which is only referred to in this 
thesis. 
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R. D. Laing, in particular 'The Divided Self and therapeutic communities. I then 
trained as a Psychoanalytic Psychotherapist in London. 
My desire to enrol for a Ph. D stemmed from this fragmented identity and my 
inquisitive nature. Having started my studies in a purely theoretical area, I moved 
progressively towards the clinical/practical. I wanted to reconcile these sides of 
myself. I wanted to investigate further the theoretical and philosophical foundations 
of my clinical work, while at the same time exploring how theory is negotiated and 
affects people's lives in practice. This I had hoped to achieve through research for 
my Ph. D. 
When I arrived at University College London, I had no experience of a British 
academic institution and was unaccustomed to the tendency for specialisation. The 
whole of my work was carried out while registered in the Department of Psychology 
at UCL. This department excels in its contribution to empirical, positivist 
psychological research, with the belief in a 'unitary and cohesive self' at the very 
core of it. This has, at times, presented some difficulties in terms of the validation 
of alternative types of research and has given rise to a political polarization within 
the department. I was personally affected by this situation in many ways. 
The first, and perhaps most difficult to deal with, was the clash of my personal 
'weltanschauung' with that of the department, which at first I was quite unaware of 
and experienced as a feeling of deep personal inadequacy. Fundamentally, I spoke 
foreign languages: Italian while in Britain and the language of the unconscious where 
rationality and intellect had validity. I was a woman in a male-dominated institution. 
I had a fragmented/multidisciplinary self where cohesion and specialisation was the 
norm. I felt exposed, inadequate, different and often ashamed. 
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Partly due to ignorance and partly out of desire for self-protection, my first reaction 
was to look for allies. I enroled in the Psychoanalytic Unit at UCL which at least 
allowed me to share one of my otherwise 'foreign languages'. However, this 
presented me with another contradiction: the fact that the Psychoanalysis Unit was 
part of the empirically based Psychology Department wa's given as the justification 
for the necessity in research for conventional empirical evidence. This implied that 
while all the students of the unit were studying to a large degree unconscious 
phenomena, we had to translate our hypotheses into the foreign language of specific 
quantities and percentages, predictability, replicability. Despite my desire to 
investigate specifically women's experience of shame, out of the need for 'neutrality 
and objectivity', I was firmly requested to also investigate shame in men. 
I will not address the considerable practical and epistemological difficulties this 
involved, I only want to highlight how the resulting disempowerment and confusion 
was experienced by the group (all women with a male supervisor, hence with an 
inbuilt gendered hierarchy of power which was never questioned or discussed), as 
personal failure and often despair. The power battle for authority and validation 
between the department and the unit, between male supervisor and female students 
was individually negotiated. Stanley and Wise (1993: 153) stress the great 
vulnerability of women researchers, how this pressures on them to conform and how 
often failing to conform to ideal standards is experienced as personal inadequacy. 
More than ever I could understand the experiences of shame described by the women 
I interviewed who, like myself and my fellow students, attempted individually to find 
a solution to a shame which is socially/interpersonally constructed. 
i. 8.3.2 The Search for a Method 
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My strategy involved using a questionnaire to explore the various dimensions of 
shame and the difference between shame and guilt. What is now obvious to me is 
that the questionnaire was the best 'compromise formation' I could find at the time. 
Unfortunately, like symptoms or dreams, the compromise often describes the conflict 
but does not successfully resolve it. As a consequence, I found myself exploring 
shame through a questionnaire which, although based on psychoanalytic literature, 
could not address any of the unconscious aspects of shame nor explore the inter- 
subjective and psychodynamic construction of it. 
A few years after I started as a part-time Ph. D student my initial supervisor retired. 
Apart from one student who in the meantime had completed her Ph. D, all the other 
students dropped out. The group disintegrated and silently we went our own ways; 
our feelings of loss were never addressed. It was a time of great crisis for me. I had 
completed the questionnaire study, carried out a pilot study, designed the semi- 
structured interviews and carried them out with eighteen women and (grudgingly) 
with three men. 
In other words, I was half-way along my journey, having learned and adjusted to the 
situation and the rules. I was determined not to give up and I was extremely anxious 
at having to start a whole new negotiation with a new supervisor. Much time was 
spent preparing myself for the necessity of having to abandon many firmly held 
beliefs in order to complete my Ph. D. Luckily this was largely avoided upon my 
acceptance into another group: again all women (but this time including the 
supervisor). 
This new group was open to the discussion of feminism and was addressing head-on 
issues of methodology. The structure helped in many ways: I didn't have to justify 
being a feminist or wanting to explore exclusively women's experience of shame. 
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The additional factor that all the women, including the supervisor, were able to 
validate my understanding of shame from their own experience of it as women was 
certainly a source of great comfort and support'. I was encouraged to salvage the 
work I had done, but also to explore what methodology I ideally wanted to adopt to 
analyze the data. This explains why although the semi-structured interviews were 
designed with predictions and numbers in mind (see Appendix four and five) the 
planned content analysis was never carried out. 
Instead I read, analyzed, coded and re-read the transcripts many times over in the 
process described in detail in chapter five. I finally came to the decision to use a 
discursive analysis. As will become clear in chapter five, I admit to being a beginner, 
still grappling with some of the difficulties involved. Other issues also interfered with 
my analysis of the text; I often failed to make certain crucial connections between 
myself and the text. 
For instance, when I went back to my first draft of analysis, I realised that although 
I reiterated that I was using a psychoanalytic framework, I neglected to say that I was 
a psychotherapist and that the majority of my interviewees knew that. Why was I 
hiding and denying my psychoanalytic self? Having to ask myself this question gave 
me a much deeper insight into the research process. I realised I was trying to use the 
'right' language, to say the 'right' things - in other words, I was aspiring to a 
positivistic notion of objectivity. Resorting to accredited and established criteria, I 
was attempting to contain my anxieties in the uncertain journey of my research. (This 
21 am not implying however, the existence of a unitary 
%woman's experience'; not in our group, nor among women in 
general. In fact, I think that the uncritical assumption of such 
a thing feeds into the fantasy that one might have a priveleged 
understanding of women's fundamental experiences simply by being 
a woman, at the risk of neglecting differences of class, race, 
sexual orientation etc. (see ch. four for further discussion) 
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also brought to my attention the possibility that the participants may have felt under 
similar pressures to say 'the right things'). 
Phillida Salmon speaks of the Ph. D author as the "pioneer within this new landscape" 
(Salmon 1994: 9). 1 often felt like a pioneer without a compass. At times I felt excited 
and energetic, at others despairing and exhausted. I often cursed myself for having 
even started the journey. The process felt, as very aptly described by Salmon as "a 
long, chaotic, often seemingly fruitless inner struggle, in which no one can help and 
for which there is no guaranteed outcome... " (Salmon 1994: 15) 
Having so much investment in the outcome was, at times, the greatest hindrance. The 
subject of the thesis itself was certainly very alive for me, as I was constantly 
confronted by the awareness of my shame as a result of comparing my work with 
that of others and feeling different and inadequate. This is why the moment of 're- 
making the link' with what is the source of the shame can be liberating, powerful and 
can produce 'new ideals' and feelings of pride. It is in this respect that I looked at 
my work and I have drawn some conclusions. 
The first reflection focuses on wider epistemological issues. From the turn of the 
century there has been great interest in the social factors - both within and without 
the scientific community - that shape scientific changes and determine the success of 
one scientific theory over another (see, for instance, Feyerabend 1975). This 
unprecedented approach has developed within the critique of science into an 
innovative and potentially revolutionary view of scientific progress. The main shift 
hinges on looking at scientific concepts as mediated social products. It has been 
argued that a science separate from the social environment is as impossible to 
conceptualise as a social environment separate from people's thought, which 
36 
Introduction 
nonetheless people inevitably incorporate into their thoughts (Sohn-Rethel 1975, 
Diamond 1986). 
Although I had rationally believed and absorbed this way of thinking, I still felt 
uneasy looking at the fragmented nature of my work; I realised that I had expected 
myself to go through such changes and negotiations and yet remain untouched by it 
all. Or perhaps I expected that somehow my work could and should stay untouched 
by what was -happening to me, if it were to be 'truly scientific'. Furthermore, despite 
my fascination with philosophy of science and the belief in what it taught me, I 
discovered I had an underlying, ingrained belief in positivism and the existence of 
a 'method' which stood out there, separate from the practice of it and the social 
circumstances which had generated it. Feyerabend (1975) describes science and its 
methods as the new religion in Western society and certainly I approached it as such. 
My experience, because it has implied enormous adjustment, has faced me with 
contradictions which under easier circumstance I perhaps would not have had to face 
and reflect upon. My choice of method has been a constantly negotiated product, 
between different parts and languages in myself and environmental pressures and 
beliefs. 
The other point of consideration, which reflects the fragmented nature of research, 
is the fragmented/multiple nature of myself as researcher, psychotherapist, woman. 
My work has been a learning process of negotiation within that fragmentation. I 
started by hiding and denying it and to a certain extent continued to do so in different 
measures. I then began to examine it and to view it as complexity rather than chaos 
and finally I am starting to value it. In Diamond's words: "Useful as it may be as an 
analytic construct, there is never a wholly consistent social/mental reality. It is that 
lack of total consistency that creates political openings for us. " (Diamond 1987: 9) 
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In spite of these insights, I do not wish to fall into abstract idealism; It must be 
acknowledged that the failure or success of a Ph. D thesis has enormous repercussions 
for the researcher and that the investment in it is bound to be reflected in the level 
of conformity present in the text. The complex negotiations and the painful emotional 
process involved in doing research have constituted the main lessons I have learnt in 
writing this thesis. 
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L9 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SHAME. 
This section provides a brief introduction to shame with the aim of providing a 
definition of the word and a clarification of the concepts at the basis of the working 
model of shame adopted in this thesis. 
i. 9.1 Defining Shame 
The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition of shame: "Painful 
emotion arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring, ridiculous or 
indecorous in one's conduct or circumstances or of being in a situation which offends 
one's modesty. " 
Shame has also been described as an irrational, primitive, wordless reaction, 
experienced largely 'visually' and through autonomic activity (Lewis 1978). 
Certainly there is total agreement in the existing literature that shame is a distressing 
feeling (Freud 1900, Goldberg 1957, Lewis 1971, Pines 1987); that it is an early and 
prominent affect in human experience (Lear 1987, Scheff 1990, Yorke 1988); and 
that, generally speaking, it involves a perception of what is improper or disgraceful 
(Lewis 197 1). 
The word shame derives from a Germanic root skanzIskem (Old High German skama, 
Anglo-Saxon scamu), meaning 'sense of shame, being shamed, also schande, 
meaning disgrace. This can be traced back to the Indo-European root kamlkem: 'to 
cover, to veil, to hide'; the prefixed 's' (skam) adds the reflexive meaning: 'to cover 
oneself. This can also be seen in the Old High German sceme, 'cover' or 'mask'. 
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'It was as if I wore a mask' is a metaphor often used to describe shame experiences 
(Wumser 1981). This is consistent with the fact that covering oneself is a natural 
expression of shame and that hiding is a spontaneous reaction to shame (Freud 1900, 
M. Lewis 1992). 
The experience of shame can be triggered by a number of different situations, 
however in most cases, it seems to involve exposure in circumstances where the 
subject is perceived as weak and failing, dirty or defective (both physically and 
psychologically) and/or having lost control (either in terms of feelings or body 
functions) (Wumser 1981). 
i. 9.2 The Shame Family of Feelings 
A number of affective states have been related to shame, some being used almost 
interchangeably with it, while others have been considered as more distinct, both 
popularly and academically. For example: embarrassment, humiliation, and modesty 
(Lewis 1971, Darwin 1904); shyness (Lewis 1978, Wumser 1981); feelings of 
inferiority (Gilligan, 1976), low self-esteem, a sense of degradation (Wumser 1981); 
narcissistic mortification (Gilbert 1976); being outcast and helpless (Cooley 1922); 
ridicule and chagrin (Lewis 1971). Collectively, these affective states have been 
called 'the shame family' (Lewis 1971) and all are considered to express some 
element of shame, with variation in the object, aim, intensity of the affective 
experience (Morrison, 1989). 
It is very difficult to clearly differentiate between the feelings listed above. This is 
for two main reasons. The first reason is that, in common parlance, some feelings 
may be referred to interchangeably with shame, while others describe the experience 
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of shame under specific circumstances. The difference between embarrassment, 
humiliation and self-consciousness might help to illustrate this point. 
Embarrassment, is considered to be a mild form of shame proper (Wumser 1981), 
and is associated with loss of face, occurring when an individual is 'caught out' in 
an interaction, i. e. inadvertently revealing to another something which should stay 
hidden. The same feeling can be evoked by witnessing another person being thus 
'caught out'. 
Humiliation is believed to be a strong form of that described above and humiliation 
itself is a shame inducing situation (Lewis 197 1). Humiliation specifically reflects the 
social and interpersonal as well as the intemalised representation of the 'humiliator' 
(Morrison, 1983,1984,1986,1987). Although humiliation is taken to be the 
manifestation of shame (in this case the product of action perpetrated against the 
self), it does not require the actual external action for humiliation to be experienced, 
as it is often the effect of the intemalised, attacking objects (Morrison, 1989). 
Disgrace, dishonour, degradation and debasement are terms closely related to, if not 
largely synonymous with, humiliation (Wumser 1981). 
Embarrassment, like humiliation, is a manifestation of shame in a social context and 
although it is less intense than humiliation, it always requires an 'embarrasser' and 
underscores the special relationship of seeing and being seen (Morrison 1989). 
Goffman (1967) considered embarrassment to play a crucial role in the regulation of 
interactions between people. 
Self-consciousness describes an accentuated state of awareness of the self, 
accompanied by the assumption that the same exaggerated amount of attention is 
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being paid to one's person by others (Reich 1960, Tomkins 1963, Kaufman 1989). 
This is a particularly intense form of anxiety, mostly internalized (Wumser 1981). 
The definitions of humiliation, embarrassment and self-consciousness show some of 
the subtleties of the experience of shame and how the shame family of feelings 
describe different emotional states but also have areas of overlap. For example, while 
self-consciousness and embarrassment are mainly experienced in social situations, 
humiliation can be experienced in isolation. Also embarrassment is often used 
synonymously with shame, while there are aspects of the experience of humiliation 
which are not related to shame. Therefore one could experience shame in a situation 
which does not involve humiliation. 
The other difficulty in differentiating between the shame family of feelings is that 
their use in language is much more fluid than in academic definitions. Two people 
might use the same word to mean very different things and use different words to 
describe very similar experiences. This is why, as will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter five, having started the research interviews with an invitation to describe an 
experience of shame, I took the participant's account to be a description of shame 
even though they might be describing an experience involving, for example, 
humiliation or inadequacy. 
This point is particular relevant where feelings of inferiority and decreased self- 
esteem are concerned. These feelings, often associated with shame, have been 
considered an expression of a discrepancy between self-expectations and self- 
experience (Wumser 1981, Piers and Singer 1953). They lead to shame only if other 
characteristics of shame, eg. elements of exposure and rejection, are associated with 
them. Gilbert (1994) has postulated an important link between shame and 
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inferiority/powerlessness as expressions of subordination as means of avoiding 
possible attack. 
Inferiority feelings and low self-esteem are not necessarily synonymous with shame 
and yet seem to play a significant role in women's experience of shame, as will be 
examined in greater detail later. 
L9.3 The Observable Shame 
The body gestures and attitude typical to the experience of shame include: the head 
bowed, closed eyes, covering of the face, the body curved in on itself making the 
person as small as possible. In contrast to this apparent desire to 'crawl through a 
hole' or 'sink through the floor' (Lewis 1971), the shamed person has to deal with 
an excess of autonomic stimulation (blushing, sweating, increased heart rate etc. ), 
which conspires to draw attention precisely when one wishes to hide (Ekman 1982, 
1983). This flood of sensations can be so powerful that it has been likened to an 
'implosion of the self' (Laing 1960), and can literally hinder ego functioning (Lewis 
1971). 
The gross bodily arousal which heightens the intensity and painfulness of the 
affective experience, can make shame reverberate over a period of time (Lewis 197 1). 
This is an important factor contributing to the power of the experience of shame, 
making it particularly difficult to overcome even after the passing of months or even 
years. 
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This observation leads directly to an examination of shame as anxiety, based on past 
experiences of 'undischarged or bypassed shame' (Lewis 197 1, Wumser 198 1, Scheff 
1990). The sudden nature of its onset (Freud 1900, Lewis 1978, Wumser 198 1), may 
also increase the anxiety of finding oneself suddenly out of control, adding to the 
pre-existing experience of helplessness stored up unconsciously. Wumser (1981) 
listed various defences employed to cope with shame: clowning, narcissistic imagery 
in the form of grandiosity or idealization, depersonalization, lying, masochistic 
flaunting of degradation, passive humiliation turned into active humiliation of others 
(externalization). Conflict can also be internalized through introjection i. e. 'I take into 
myself the judgement and punishment by others'. Displacement might also be 
employed. 
i. 9.4 The Causes of Shame: Reaction-formation and the Ideal-self 
Psychoanalytic literature refers to two main causes of shame: Shame functioning as 
reaction-formation and shame due to having failed to realize one's ideal-self. The two 
types of shame will be explored in more detail in the next two chapters where the 
epistemological implications of the two will be investigated; here I will only give a 
brief definition of the two. 
A reaction-formation has been defined as a psychological attitude or habitus 
diametrically opposing a repressed wish and constituted as a reaction against it: eg. 
bashfulness countering sexual and exhibitionistic tendencies (Laplanche and Pontalis 
1985). 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the view of shame as reaction-formation 
began with Freud and has subsequently filtered through the psychoanalytic literature. 
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Shame, like some personality traits, is the antithesis of childhood sexual activity in 
which the subject has taken pleasure during the first period of so-called 'childhood 
immorality' (Freud 1896). On similar lines, others hold that any form of shame is a 
derivation of sexual shame, voyeurism and exhibitionistic wishes (Abraham, 1913, 
Nurberg 1955) and that shame is the servant of morality (Freud, Anna Freud 1963, 
Nurberg 1932, Jacobson 1954). This is supported by many references in literature of 
the word shame to sexual parts and sexuality. 3 Prohibition against exhibitionism 
drives the ego to create a shame teeling which obliterates the awareness ot torbiciden 
wishes. 
It is important to bear in mind that in this formulation, shame's significance lies in 
its psychological function, not in its experienced content. The negative statements 
about the self are not taken to be true statements of self-evaluation, but are taken 
instead to be psychic decoys that divert a person away from exhibitionism. 
The opposite happens with shame experiences explained in terms of the self, where 
the negative statements in shame are taken to be true statements of self-evaluation, 
as is the case when shame is the affect deriving from the failure to live up to one's 
ideals (Sandier et al. 1963, Lewis 197 1). There is agreement on how low self-esteem 
is correlated to conflicts in the self-representation (Sandler 1986, Pines 1987, Lewis 
197 1, Wumser 198 1, Silberstein et al. 1987) and more specifically, how loss of self- 
esteem derives from a discordancy between wishful self-images and a self that 
3 For example one obsolete meaning of shame is "the privy 
parts or parts of shame,. The Bible (Rev. XVI) says: "Lest 
he walk naked and they see his shame. " The word Ipudenda' 
stems from the Latin pudere, to be ashamed. Similarly, the 
German word for genitals is shamteile, which shares a 
similar etymology as the word shame, discussed above. The 
connection is also observed in the English word modesty,, 
which means both 'a low estimate of oneself' and 'observing 
the proprieties of sex' (Lewis 1978). 
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appears to be failing, defective, inferior, weak and contemptible by comparison 
(Lewis, 1971). These conflicts are apt to evoke feelings of inferiority and sharne 
(Sandler 1986, Wumser 1981). 
i. 9.5 The Shame Scenario 
I want to conclude this section by giving the working definition of shame that I will 
be using in this thesis. Because shame is a very complex and multilayered experience, 
I find the idea of a shame scenario more useful than a single definition, as it looks 
at the shame experience as a whole, as well as the multiple facets of it. This is my 
working model of what shame is: 
- Shame is a complex emotional state and a variety of feelings belong to the shame 
experience and can be used to describe its different gradations and qualities (e. g. 
embarrassment, humiliation, feelings of inadequacy, low self-esteem). Additionally, 
shame is seldom experienced in isolation but is accompanied by many other feelings 
such as anger, depression, anxiety. 
- The shame affect is traumatic, although to varying degrees and can be experienced 
as momentarily incapacitating. Shame is often accompanied by powerful 
physiological reactions. 
-A shame experience has a reason and a cause. By 'reason' it is meant the specific 
event which triggered the reaction of shame. By 'cause' it is meant the intrapsychic 
conflict from which shame stems. 
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- The experience of shame requires an audience, as suggested by the multiple 
references in shame to exposure and hiding. However there is no consensus on 
whether the presence of a 'shaming' internal audience is sufficient to provoke shame 
or that the presence of external audience is essential for this to take place. 
- The shame experience can be remembered for a long time afterwards and the 
related affects can be re-experienced with virtually the same intensity. This has led 
to shame being discussed in terms of 'shame anxiety', based on the accumulation ol 
shameful experiences. 
- Different coping strategies and/or defences are employed to deal with shame. 
Reparation to the emotional damage is made, in reality or fantasy, by gaining 
acceptance. As in the case of audience, there is no agreement on whether the 
acceptance by internal objects is sufficient. 
The 'shame scenario' underpins the section in the semi-structured interviews which 
focuses on the experience of shame (see Appendix 1,2,3 for more details) and the 
analysis of the interviews (see in particular the analysis of an extract from Rita in 
ch. 11). 
LIO Conclusions 
This chapter is divided in two parts: In the first I have summarised the content of the 
theses as a whole. I have also clarified why I have chosen shame as the topic of my 
inquiry and which psychoanalytic framework I have chosen and why. I have outlined 
the my central argument and explained the choice of social constructionism as a 
method of inquiry. I have then summarised the content of the research sections, the 
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themes and the findings; I have given an outline of the thesis and a reflexive history 
of it. In the second part, I have given a brief introduction to shame, defined it and 
clarified the main concepts behind the working model of shame adopted in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
The Work of Sigmund Freud on Shame and Guilt 
1.0 introduction 
Psychoanalytic theories of shame originate from the work of Sigmund Freud, which 
forms the logical starting point for its examination. This chapter attempts to follow 
the development of the concept of shame in Freud's work through the development 
of Freudian metapsychology. It is here that we will find the origin of what can 
possibly be considered as the two, exclusively intrapsychic, types of shame: that of 
reaction-formation and that of the ideal-self. There is a commonly held belief that 
Freud adhered to the former concept, however, I propose to examine the evidence for 
the latter type of shame as well. It is therefore argued that it is inaccurate to talk of 
a single Freudian theory of shame. 
It is also in this chapter that an epistemological inquiry into shame begins. In 
agreement with Diamond (1986), 1 believe that theories allow us to see certain things 
at the expense of others which are obscured or made invisible. Freud's theory of 
shame offers an invaluable example of this. 
Freud's metapsychology is divided into three phases: the Affect-Trauma Model, the 
Topographical Model and the Structural Model. The first phase can be thought of as 
ending in 1897, the second as lasting from 1897 to 1923 and the third from 1923 to 
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Freud's death in 1939. As Freud's concept of sharne developed and changed during 
these three phases, it is necessary to begin with a brief description each. 
1.1 The Affect-Trauma Model 
In 1885, in collaboration with Joseph Breuer, Freud published 'Studies on Hysteria'. 
In this work, the patient's symptoms were regarded as the manifestation, in disguised 
form, of emotional forces which had been dammed up and held back by some form 
of pressure. Symptoms arose when a quantity of emotional energy, too great to be 
assimilated, was forced away from consciousness (repressed) and had to find an 
indirect expression. The causes were considered to be real traumatic experiences. The 
memories and emotions associated with these experiences were, in neurotic patients, 
unacceptable to their normal standards of morality and conduct and therefore could 
not be absorbed or discharged in a normal way. The proposed 'talking cure' consisted 
of bringing memories into consciousness cathartically in order to release the affects. 
In this model, the mental apparatus functions as a regulator for adaptation to demands 
from both internal and external sources (although in this phase adaptation to external 
reality is emphasized), to maintain a 'steady state' (homeostasis) in the face of 
constant disturbance. The concept of conflict then, is seen as a source of 
disequilibrium and the resulting defences, as particular adaptive manoeuvres of the 
mental apparatus. 
Other key functions performed by the mental apparatus are the control and discharge 
of excitation and that of defence against distressing affects and 'incompatible' ideas - 
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those which are rejected as being unacceptable to the conscious standards, beliefs 
and wishes of the individual. This is very important with regard to shame. 
If the energy and the associated ideas are experienced as incompatible or threatening 
to the ego, in order to protect consciousness, the ego employs the basic defence of 
repression. This consists of 'pushing away' unacceptable ideas and associated 
emotions, so that these are relegated to the unconscious part of the apparatus. 
Another key defence is that of substitution. This consists of the displacement of a 
certain affect from an 'Incompatible idea' to one which can be tolerated in 
consciousness. For instance, in the case Freud reported of a girl who reproached 
herself for absurd things when underneath she felt guilt and shame for her secret 
masturbation (in Lewis 1978). 
Freud argued that it was important to distinguish between current traumas - those 
which represent a relatively immediate response to a real situation or event - and 
retroactive traumas, which differ in their time relation to the significant 
environmental event. The latter stem from events which, although exciting, were not 
experienced as traumatic at the time of their occurrence, eg. sexual seductions. 
A retroactive trauma consists of the apparatus being overcome by a combination of 
the revived excitement of the past and strong affective reactions such as shame, 
disgust, self-reproach and anxiety. A state of conflict arises, because what had 
previously been acceptable now assumes a different significance and represents 
something which is unacceptable to the person's current standards of morality and 
conduct. 
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1.1.1 Shame in the Affect-Trauma Phase 
The first observation in a study of shame in Freudian theory, is how it starts from 
being quite a central concept in the initial phase and then slowly loses this role to 
become, in the Structural Model, not even a concept in its own right, but synonymous 
with guilt. 
This shift was due largely to a change in focus from the 'interpsychic' to the 
'intrapsychic' functioning of the human mind. That is, in Freud's early work, the 
psyche is studied in its exchange with the external world, whereby external events 
become the direct causes of pathology. After the abandonment of the first phase, his 
view of the human mind becomes gradually more isolated and its working is 
understood increasingly in intrapsychic terms. 
In the Affect-Trauma phase Freud talked about shame in two specific contexts. 
Firstly, as a central component of the trauma, which is considered as the symptom's 
primary cause. This is exemplified in the following extract, from 'Psychotherapy of 
Hysteria' in "On Hysteria" (1895). In it Freud talked of shame and disgust as 
retroactive traumas. He does not yet clearly differentiate, as he will do in the 
topographical model, between shame as part of a traumatic experience which has to 
undergo repression itself to protect the ego and shame as the repressing force: 
"[... ]I had to overcome a psychical force in the patients which was opposed 
to the pathogenic ideas becoming conscious (being remembered). [ ... ] What 
kind of force could one suppose was operative here, and what motive could 
have put it into operation? I could easily form an opinion on this. For I 
already had at my disposal a few examples of ideas that were pathogenic, and 
had been forgotten and put out of consciousness. From these I recognized a 
universal characteristic of such ideas: they were all of a distressing nature, 
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calculated to arouse the affects of Shame, of seýflreproach and of psychical 
pain, and the feeling of being harmed; they were all of a kind that one would 
prefer not to have experienced, that one would ratherforget. From all these 
arose, as it were automatically, the thought of defence. " (emphasis added: 
Freud 1895: 268-269) 
Secondly, shame was understood as a defence, already directly connected to sexuality. 
In 'Draft K. The Neuroses of Defence' from "Extracts from the Fliess Papers" Freud 
clearly talked about shame this way: 
"[ ... ] There 
is a normal trend towards defence - that is, an aversion to 
directing psychical energy in such a way that unpleasure results. ... ] We shall 
be plunged deep into psychological riddles if we enquire into the origin of the 
unpleasure which seems to be released by premature sexual stimulation and 
without which, after all, a repression cannot be explained. The most plausible 
answer will appeal to the fact that shame and morality are the repressing 
forces and that the neighbourhood in which the sexual organs are naturally 
placed must inevitably arouse disgust along sexual experiences. Where there 
is no shame (as in a male person), or where no morality comes about (as in 
the lower classes of society), or where disgust is blunted by the conditions of 
life (as in the country) there too no repression and therefore no neurosis will 
resultftom sexual stimulation in infancy. (emphasis added: Freud 1896: 221- 
222) 
Generally speaking, in this phase, Freud considered shame to be a deeply painful 
feeling which is either avoided or used to avoid unacceptable, painful memories. 
Shame is either repressed as retroactive trauma or used defensively as a repressive 
tool. 
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And yet the accompanying feelings seem to draw our attention to the complexity of 
what Freud is describing. In one case shame is listed together with morality and 
disgust, while in other places he links it with defences and psychic pain. It would 
seem that he was describing two different types of shame or perhaps shame in terms 
of its causes and its function as defence. 
Additionally it can be argued that there is a third way in which Freud talked of 
shame, or at least of shame as we understand it now in the light of recent 
understanding of the self and narcissism. Those are the instances when Freud in 
talking of 'self-reproach' seemed to be describing feelings which today we would 
consider as belonging to the shame Family. Lewis (1971) argued that when such 
instances were taken into account, it became clear that shame was an important affect 
for Freud, even central to his aetiology of hysteria. 
For example, in 'Studies on Hysteria' (1893-1895) Breuer and Freud had assigned 
to 'mortification' (a member of the shame family), a central role in symptom 
formation. Breuer and Freud described hysteria as the result of 'strangulated affect'. 
The hysterical symptom they said, was the mnemic symbol of an unbearable affect. 
Any experience which elicits distress - fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain - can 
be regarded as traumatic. Shame, then, was specifically included in the first list of 
traumatic affects (Lewis, 1971). 
In 'Studies on Hysteria' there are several references to shame: in the case of Anna 
0., in that of the Swiss servant girl Katharina, in the case of Caecilie and in the case 
of Miss Lucy R., the English governess (Lewis 1971). The latter in particular shows 
interesting connections which Freud did not develop. For instance, Lucy describes her 
shame as resulting from an inequality of status, i. e. inferiority. She also describes the 
mortification of unrequited love and more generally feelings which nowadays would 
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be categorised as shame anxiety (Lewis 1971). None of these experiences can be 
described in terms of reaction-formation in the way that Freud understood shame. 
In summary, Lewis states that her re-examination of Freud's case material with a 
focus on shame, suggests that he considered shame as an important factor in the 
genesis of symptoms. In the case of hysteria, the patients were coping with overt, 
unidentified shame. Lucy R. was coping with the mortification of unrequited love. 
Dora was coping with the humiliated tury evoked by being personally betrayed. in 
the case of the Rat Man, by-passed shame could be identified in connection with each 
outbreak of obsessional symptoms (Lewis 1971). 
1.2 The Topographical Model 
With the topographical model, Freud's attention shifted from external events to 
internal forces. This phase of theorising started with the abandonment of the 
hypothesis of actual childhood sexual seduction. Trauma was now seen in terms of 
resulting harm to individuals having been hurt, rejected or punished to an intolerable 
degree (perceived threat of castration or of loss of Parental love). Conflict was seen 
as arising from the discrepancy between the urge to gratify instinctual wishes on the 
one hand and the threat of being traumatically overwhelmed on the other. 
In this phase both normal and pathological processes are described in terms of 
internal psychological (intrapsychic) adaptation to the pressure and demands of the 
drives. Dreams, daydreams, symptoms, character traits, works of art are regarded as 
compromise-formations between the instinctual wish and all the forces which opposed 
instinctual gratification. 
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The second phase was described as the 'Topographical Model' because of the 
division of the mind into three systems, arranged in layers: the unconscious being the 
deepest, followed by the preconscious and the conscious on the surface; the names 
of the first two indicating their relationship to the third. Boundaries were thought to 
exist between these systems. At times of relative psychic equilibrium the dividing 
lines must be regarded as being blurred, while at times of conflict the systems are 
sharply defined. The concept of defence was intimately linked to the idea that these 
boundaries had the function of censorship. Censorship is seen as functioning to 
protect consciousness from the awareness of those instinctual wishes which would 
represent a threat if they were permitted surface expression. This censorship takes 
place completely outside consciousness. 
1.2.1 Shame in the Topographical Model 
It follows from the above concept of boundaries and censorship in the form of 
repression, that shame was to play a central role in this phase. Freud stated clearly 
in the 'Three Essays on Sexuality', the repressive forces are "disgust, shame and 
morality. " This is elaborated in following three quotes from the first essay, 'The 
Sexual Aberrations': 
"[ ... I This 
is especially so where (as, for instance, in cases of licking 
excrement or of intercourse with dead bodies) the sexual instinct goes to 
astonishing lengths in successfully overriding the resistances of shame, 
disgust, horror or pain. " (Freud 1905: 161) 
"Our study of the perversions has shown us that the sexual instinct has to 
struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances, and of which 
shame and disgust are the most prominent. It is permissible to suppose that 
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these forces play a part in restraining that instinct within the limits that are 
regarded as normal. " (Freud 1905: 162) 
"[ ... ]The character of 
hysterics shows a degree of sexual repression in excess 
of the normal quantity, and intensification of resistance against the sexual 
instinct (which we have already met with in the form of shame, disgust and 
morality)... " (Freud 1905: 164) 
Again the function of shame is clarified in the second essay 'Infantile Sexuality'. 
This is also where the function of shame as reaction-formation is introduced and 
explained: 
"It is during this period of total or only partial latency that are built up the 
mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, 
like dams, restrict the flow - disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of 
aesthetic and moral ideals. [... ] in reality this development is organically 
determined and fixed by heredity, and it can occasionally occur without any 
help at all from education. 
With this statement Freud clarifies his construction of shame as an exclusively 
intrapsychic phenomenon. This construction, rooted in biological determinism, 
excludes the external world from having any relevant influence beyond that already 
prescribed by biology. 
"Education will not be trespassing beyond its appropriate domain if it limits 
itself to following the lines which have already been laid down organically 
and to impressing them somewhat more clearly and deeply. " (Freud 1905: 177- 
178) 
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This epistemological approach leads Freud to view shame as the result of opposing 
reacting impulses and the formulation of shame in terms of reaction formation: 
"Reaction formation and sublimation 
[ ... 
] the sexual impulses cannot be utilized during these years of childhood, 
since the reproductive functions have been deferred -a fact which constitutes 
the main feature of the period of latency. On the other hand, these impulses 
would seem in themselves to be perverse - that is to arise from erotogenic 
zones and to derive their activity from instincts which, in view of the 
direction of the subject's development, can only arouse unpleasurable feelings. 
They consequently evoke opposing mental forces (reacting impulses) which, 
in order to suppress this unpleasure effectively, build up the mental dams that 
I have already mentioned - disgust, shame and morality. " (Freud 1905: 177- 
178) 
This is reiterated in the same essay: 
" There is consequently little resistance towards carrying them out, since the 
mental dams against sexual excesses - shame, disgust and morality - have 
either not yet been constructed at all or are only in course of construction, 
according to the age of the child. " (Freud 1905: 191) 
Freud's formulation of what a human being is and what motivates human action has 
very important consequences. First Freud constructs human beings as self-enclosed, 
self-energized entities. The male individual is the focus of attention and action, in 
line with the subject of the Enlightenment. Second, as a consequence of the first 
point, the function of the object is primarily to act as a vehicle to satisfy the 
instinctual drives. The object therefore has no role to play in the formation of identity 
and subjectivity. Finally, from the abandonment of the affect-trauma model and in 
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particular in the topographical model, the influence of the external world is reduced 
to its bare minimum. When some attention is paid to societal influences, Freud 
always resorts to a dichotomy between the individual striving for self-gratification 
and society which limits and frustrates these desires. 
These considerations in turn justify the commonly held belief that in Freudian theory, 
shame was exclusively considered within the reaction-formation (Pines 1987, Piers 
and Singer 1953, Lewis 1971), and that only when psychoanalysis became interested 
in concepts of self and narcissism, could shame also include feelings of humiliation, 
inadequacy and lowered self-esteem. However, I want to argue that those dimensions 
were already present in Freud's early theorising. The following dream, for example, 
which Freud analyses in terms of conflicts around sexuality and exhibitionism, could 
also be read as a case of narcissistic mortification in which the dreamer's experience 
of himself changes from that of feeling powerful and self-satisfied, to that of 
paralysis at finding himself exposed. 
"I was very incompletely dressed and was going upstairs ftom a flat on the 
groundfloor to a higher storey. I was going up three steps at a time and was 
delighted at my agility. Suddenly I saw a maid-servant coming down the stairs 
- coming towards me, that is. Ifelt ashamed and tried to hurry, and at this 
point the feeling of being inhibited set it: I was glued to the steps and unable 
to budge ftom the spot. 
The feeling of shame at not being completely dressed is no doubt of 
a sexual nature" (Freud 1900: 239) 
This is reiterated later on where he describes a feeling of shame arising from a 
'defect' (i. e. an inadequacy or inferiority) 'in the dreamer's toilet', rather than from 
unacceptable instinctual drives. A few lines later we read: "[.. ] nakedness is often 
replaced by some break of the dress regulations. " (Freud 1900: 242-243) That is, 
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rather than being actually naked, the dreamer's shame stems from a mere irregularity 
in his dress, which the onlookers have failed to even notice. Freud would seem to 
imply that the dreamer's anxiety stems from being seen in an inferior, inadequate 
state. 
There seem to be no doubt that Freud was clear that these dreams were about 
exhibitionistic drives and shame as the repressive tool of censorship. And yet I would 
argue that Freud was also struggling with another sort of shame which could not find 
expression in his theory. He continues: 
"[... ] One of my friends has drawn my attention to the following passage in 
Gottfried Keller's 'Der Grune Heinrich': 'I hope, my dear Lee, that you may 
never learn from your own personal experience the peculiar and piquant truth 
of the plight of Odysseus when he appeared, naked and covered with mud, 
before the eyes of Nausicaa and her maidens! Shall I tell you how that can 
happen? Let us look into our example. If you are wandering about in a 
foreign land, far from your home and from all that you hold dear, if you have 
seen and heard many things, have known sorrow and care, and are wretched 
and forlorn, then without fail you will dream one night that you are coming 
near to your home; you will see it gleaming and shining in the fairest colours 
and the sweetest, dearest and most beloved forms will move towards you. 
Then suddenly you will become aware that you are in rags, naked and dusty. 
You will be seized with a nameless shame and dread, you will seek to find 
covering and to hide yourself, and you will awake bathed in sweat. This, so 
long as men breath, is the dream of the unhappy wanderer; and Homer has 
evoked the picture of the plight from the deepest and eternal nature of 
man. '(Freud 1900: 247) 
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In this passage we have a very clear description of the function of shame as 
reaction-formation: we have a situation of conflict between unconscious 
exhibitionistic impulses (considered by Freud as sexual instincts, by definition innate 
and present since very early childhood) which press for expression in the dream and 
a reaction of the second system which represses these impulses by accompanying 
their evocation with the very distressing feeling of shame. 
The depth of Freud's understanding of shame is striking, despite the common belief 
that he never properly investigated shame as an independent affect. Here we find a 
quite clear description of the phenomenology of shame, the defences employed to 
deal with it and the fear behind shame. Freud talked of a 'distressing feeling' which 
comes 'suddenly'. He connected shame with embarrassment, of the attempt to 'escape 
or hide' and finally of 'anxiety' and rejection, some of the key characteristics of the 
experience of shame. 
However, Freud, still deeply rooted in his theory of the instincts, could not take his 
speculations any further. Within that theory, he could only conclude that the feeling 
of shame is the result of unresolved childhood conflicts. 
Nevertheless, in Freud's analysis there was already an embryonic link between shame 
and the ideal-self For example, Freud talked of 'inadequacy' caused by a 'breach of 
the dress regulations'. In other words, he is implying the existence of a standard 
compared to which one finds the clothing inadequate. It can be argued that the plight 
of human kind, exemplified by Odysseus, is for one's most private self to be exposed 
'naked and covered in mud', i. e. in a position of humiliation, powerlessness and loss 
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of status. In 1900, Freud lacked the theoretical framework to develop the 
understanding of this 'expulsion from Paradise' beyond the theory of reaction- 
formation. 
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1.3 The Structural Model 
One of the reasons that Freud abandoned the topographical model, was its inadequacy 
in dealing with issues such as conscience, morality and, what was becoming 
increasingly apparent through his clinical practice , unconscious feelings of guilt. 
These issues could not be properly addressed without taking into account the 
influence of the external world which, within the topographical model, was iargeiy 
neglected. 
Another important point was the growing awareness of other factors which motivate 
human beings, in particular the child, which are not connected with drives, such as 
the development of the ideal. Freud's concept of the ego-ideal however, remained 
relatively un-examined until attention was redirected to it by Piers and Singer (195 3), 
Erikson (1956) and Lynd (195 8). Lewis (197 1) suggests that perhaps one reason was 
the relatively late acknowledgement in Freudian psychoanalytic writings of the 
importance of the concept of the self, as distinguished from the ego. Freud made no 
distinction between the ego in the sense of life-preserving force and in the sense of 
a 'self-preserver', when 'self' means self-esteem or self-regard. 
Freud described the change in his thinking as resulting from a shift in interest from 
the repressed to the repressing forces in the mind. The movement to a functional 
study of the mind or more precisely, the study of the interactions between the parts 
of the mind which inaugurate mental conflict, made the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious less and less relevant. 
The third phase can be considered as starting with the publication of 'The Ego and 
the Id' in 1923, and it is usually referred to as the 'Structural Model'. The shift to 
63 
Freud 
this third phase, was based on Freud's diminishing interest in the qualities of 
experience in favour of the study of organised functional systems and the agents 
operating within them. Hence he put forward a model which represented a tripartite 
division of the mental apparatus into the major structures (from which the name 
Structural Model), of the id, ego and superego. Freud refers to shame as an ego 
4activity'. 
in the 'Outline of Psychoanalysis' (1940), written some forty-five years after the 
'Studies on Hysteria', Freud again refers to the role of mortification in neurosis. He 
uses the metaphor "mortification suffered in silence" as in the first case, but this time 
mortification is placed in the context of the superego turning against the self (Lewis 
1971). 
The above sections have followed the development of the concept of shame in the 
three phases of Freudian metapsychology. Reference, however, has been made 
exclusively to direct mentions of shame. The following section suggests the existence 
of another, hidden form of shame. 
1.4 The Hidden Concept of Shame in Freud 
In the following section it will be argued that alongside the explicit references to 
shame as a reaction-formation, there exists in Freud's work another form of shame 
connected to such phenomena which later would be conceptualised in terms of the 
ideal-self and narcissism. The implications of the existence of this form of shame for 
the development of the concept of shame will be also discussed. 
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There are ninety instances in Freud's work where the word shame appears: nine of 
these examples connect shame to morality, thirteen to disgust and the majority of the 
examples to either sexuality, sexual organs or bodily functions. 
By comparison, there are 367 instances in which the word 'guilt' is mentioned 
(excluding guilty and guiltless), demonstrating the relative importance of these two 
concepts. Bearing this in mind, there are some important considerations to be made. 
For example, there are instances where Freud used the word guilt to describe what 
one could argue was more an experience of shame. For instance: 
"An interpretation of the normal, conscious sense of guilt (conscience) 
presents no difficulties; it is based on the tension between the ego and the 
ego-ideal and is the expression of a condemnation of the ego by its critical 
agency. The feelings of inferiority so well known in neurotics are presumably 
not far removed from it. In two very familiar maladies the sense of guilt is 
over-strongly conscious; in them the ego-ideal displays particular severity and 
often rages against the ego in a cruel fashion. The attitude of the ego-ideal in 
these two conditions, obsessional neurosis and melancholia, present, alongside 
of this similarity, differences that are no less significant. " (Freud 1923: 50) 
Here Freud talks of the feeling which results from the tension between the ego and 
the ego-ideal which later came to be considered as shame (Piers and Singer 1953, 
Pines 1987). Secondly, he links this to a feeling of inferiority, a sensation strongly 
connected with shame, whereas guilt is accompanied moreover by a feeling of 
powerfulness, albeit conflictual. (Lewis 1971). Finally, Freud attributes a strongly 
conscious sense of guilt to both obsessional neurosis and melancholia, whereas Lewis 
(197 1) states very clearly that while obsession is the thought disorder accompanying 
guilt, shame is coupled with depression. 
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The other case of a hidden sense of shame in Freud's writing has been further 
developed by Lewis (197 1) and relates to instances where he refers to neither shame 
nor guilt and yet, under closer scrutiny it becomes clear that what he is describing 
is shame. Mortification, as pointed out above, is one of these examples. 
It is open to question whether this problem was then repeated in later literature, 
where the problems of clear and uniform definition on the one hand and of the usage 
of synonyms of shame or feelings belonging to its family on the other hand, made 
shame even more invisible than it actually was. 
This confusion in terminology is very evident, for instance, in 'The Ego and the Id', 
particularly in the chapter 'The Ego and the Superego'. Here there is confusion about 
the use of the term 'ego-ideal' in contrast to the superego, as well as in what Freud 
defines as guilt. (Some space has been given to the debate on the difference between 
these terms in the Introduction). In order to introduce the concept of ego-ideal he 
says: 
"But now that we have embarked upon the analysis of the ego we can give 
an answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked and who have 
complained that there must surely be a higher nature in man: 'Very true', we 
can say, 'and here we have that higher nature, in this ego-ideal or superego, 
the representative of our relation to our parents. When we were little children 
we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them; and later 
we took them into ourselves. ' 
r ... ] As a substitute 
for a longing for the father, it contains the germ from 
which all religions have evolved. The self-judgement which declares that the 
ego falls short of its ideal produces the religious sense of humility to which 
the believer appeals in his longing. As a child grows up, the role of father 
is carried on by teachers and others in authority; their injunctions and 
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conscience, to exercise the moral censorship. The tension between the 
demands of conscience and the actual performances of the ego is experienced 
as a sense of guilt. " (Freud 1923: 37) 
It is now widely accepted that one of the main distinguishing factors between shame 
and guilt is that while guilt is caused by breaking moral prohibitions (which can also, 
however, cause shame), only shame is caused by falling short of one's ego-ideal 
(Lewis 1971, Jacobson 1965, Pines 1987). Hence, by today's definition, it could be 
argued that Freud was often discussing shame, though referring to it as guilt. This 
makes researching Freud's view of shame highly problematic. If only the 'visible' 
mentions of shame are considered, there is the risk of missing potentially interesting 
contributions, which appear under different headings. 
1.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has looked at the changes the concept of shame has undergone in the 
development of Freud's metapsychology. An in-depth examination of the 
development of shame as a reaction-formation as well as the relationship between 
shame and guilt within that model has been attempted. Alongside the examination of 
shame as reaction-formation it has been suggested that the existence of another view 
of shame is present in Freudian writing, albeit in embryonic form; that connected 
to the ideal-self with narcissistic undertones. The debate around these two forms of 
shame will be discussed further in the following chapters. 
This chapter has also highlighted the importance of shame in human emotional life, 
its connection with pathology and with motivation. However, this is done within 
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Freud's metapsychology which views shame exclusively as an intrapsychic 
phenomenon. One of the aims of this thesis is to argue against this model of shame; 
the next chapter contains a review of the literature which goes beyond the 
construction of shame as connected to exclusively intrapsychic conflicts. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Beyond the Intrapsychic 
2.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the different constructions of shame within Freudian 
metapsychology. The chapter followed the development and changes in meaning and 
function attributed to shame in the three phases. Shame as reaction-formation was 
examined in detail because it still is one of the two main formulations of shame 
within psychoanalytic thinking. 
As discussed at the beginning of chapter one, in looking for the causes of shame, 
Freud moved from a focus on the external world to a formulation of shame as an 
exclusively intrapsychic phenomenon. 
In this chapter I will take a reverse route and move away from the exclusively 
intrapsychic understanding of shame towards an investigation of its role in social and 
interpsychic dynamics. The focus of this chapter is on shame as the primary social 
emotion, generated by the constant monitoring of the self in relation to others (Scheff 
1990). 1 will look at the role of shame in the 'self-other' interaction, as a motivator 
of human behaviour, in social development and in conformity. In this chapter I will 
also examine shame as failure of the ideal-self, the other main psychoanalytic 
formulation of shame. 
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In order to look at shame in the self-other interaction and its relation to the ideal-self 
I will start with a brief clarification of the concept of self. 
2.1 The Self 
It has been argued that shame cannot be fully understood within the context of 
structural (conflict-defence) psychology, but that further investigation into a broader 
psychology of the self and its deficits, in particular the self-other relationship, is 
necessary (Adler 1912,1929, Morrison 1989, Kohut 1971,1977,1984, Kernberg 
1975). In line with this, some authors have attributed the increase of interest in shame 
to its role in the development of the self (Hartman 1950, Thrane 1970, Tantam 1990, 
Mollon 1984). 
Freud used the term Was ich'to refer to both the person's self as a whole and to the 
ego as a part of the mind; a psychological organization or 'structure' (Sandler 1986), 
although some authors distinguished between the ego as structure and the self as 
referent of one's person as a subjective, experiencing agent (Hartman 1950, Jacobson 
1954). 
This confusion has continued in later writing and has inevitably affected the 
conceptualisation of conflicts leading to shame. For example, shame has been 
described as: a tension between the ego and superego (Wumser 1981); tension 
between the ego and the ego-ideal (Piers and Singer 1953, Lynd 1958, Chasseguet- 
Smirgel 1985, Archer S. 1993); a perceived discrepancy between the self and the 
ideal-self (Sandler et al. 1963), or as a defect in the ideal-self (Morrison 1983) which 
also produces the affective state of lowered self-esteem (Jacobson 1954, Sandler et 
al. 1963, Chasseguet-Smirgel 1985). Considering the importance of these crucial 
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differences, a brief clarification of the terminology and its theoretical implication is 
necessary at this stage. 
The superego concept describes the special, internal monitoring agency by means of 
which people evaluate themselves and their behaviour. The term ego-ideal was first 
introduced by Freud in 'On Narcissism' (1914), in which the ideal is the substitute 
for the lost narcissism of childhood. This was clearly differentiated from the 
conscience, which had a more censoring function. In 'The Ego and the Id' (1923), 
conscience was identified with the superego (although at this stage Freud used the 
two concepts synonymously). 
Generally speaking, although both concepts underwent many contradictory changes 
during the development of Freud's thought (see Sandler et al. 1963 for a review), the 
ego-ideal, as the 'loving function of the superego' (Schafer, 1960), contains the ideals 
towards which the individual strives, whether they come from identification with 
previous narcissistic states, identification with idealised parents or from society. The 
superego, on the other hand, tends to have a more critical, punitive and censoring 
function (Schafer, 1960). 
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be agreement on whether they are to be 
considered different aspects of the same agency with different functions (Hartmann 
and Lowenstein 1962, Piers and Singer 1953), or totally different agencies (A. Reich 
1954). They are, nevertheless, crucial concepts in regards to this thesis, because they 
introduce the influence of external factors in intrapsychic life. 
In particular, as is argued throughout this thesis, ideals and superego introjects, are 
of crucial importance to women due to their current position in a patriarchal society. 
Lewis (197 1) approached this issue from the point of view of the development of the 
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superego in men and women and how this might justify women's higher proneness 
to shame. She argued that if we accept that a strong sense of self is partly based on 
the identification with positively cathected internal objects, then: 
"Since women have no penis, the castration threat as a route to identification 
with parental values is absent. Little girls, having had at first a wish to be like 
mother, go through a developmental period when they devalue mother and 
their own wish to be like her, in favour of a wish to be like father, who 
possesses a penis. This identification route, however, leads women into an 
inevitable attitude of disappointment in themselves for the absence of a penis. 
Men, in contrast, when they identify with their fathers, do not meet with this 
particular intrinsic disappointment. [ ... ] It is tempting to speculate that this 
difference between men and women might be formulated as the difference in 
proneness to shame or guilt. Women, who enter the Oedipal conflict and 
leave it with the "scar" of inferiority, might be thought to be more prone to 
shame or feelings of failure to live up to an ego-ideal. Freud's observations 
about the more personalized superego of women are in keeping with the 
formulation that the characteristic superego state of women is shame, while 
the corresponding state for men is guilt. " (Lewis 1971: 430-1) 
2.1.1 The Self and the Ideal 
In psychoanalytic literature there is a strong consensus on shame being the affect 
deriving from the failure to live up to one's ideals (Sandler et al. 1963, Lewis 1971). 
There is also agreement on how low self-esteem is correlated to conflicts in the self- 
representation (Sandler 1986, Pines 1987, Lewis 1971, Wumser 1981, Silberstein et 
al. 1987) and more specifically, how loss of self-esteem derives from a discordancy 
between wishful self-images and a self that appears to be failing, defective, inferior, 
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weak and contemptible by comparison (Lewis, 1971). These conflicts are apt to 
evoke feelings of inferiority and shame (Sandler 1986, Wumser 1981). 
The working definition of self used in this thesis is based on a concept first put 
forward by Jacobson (1954). The self is said to contain a 'non-experiential' 
psychological structure which exists outside consciousness ("self schema") and an 
'experiential' self-representation which is the image and subjective experience of 
ourselves that we have at any given moment. 
The concept of self-representation is crucial to the concept of ideal-self as formulated 
by Sandler (1986) and has important implications for shame: "The self-representation 
can assume a wide variety of shapes and forms, depending on the pressures of the id, 
the requirements of the external world and the demand and standards of the 
introjects. " (Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1963: 152). 
One of these forms is that of the ideal-self, which is the most desirable at any one 
time: 'the-self-l-want-to-be' (Sandler et aL 1963). It is within this connotation which 
the term ideal-self will be used in this thesis when referring to conflicts between self 
and self-representations which provoke shame. This choice has been made because 
of the importance given to the constant interaction between the internal 
identifications/introjects and the external world in the building of the self- 
representations. The great emphasis placed on experience suggests that if a certain 
behaviour or response has been reinforced by the outside world, it is likely to become 
part of the ideal states with which the individual can identify. Of particular interest 
is the link suggested by Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) between the ego-ideal and self- 
esteem which depends greatly on other people's responses to us. She considered the 
'loss of society love' as a narcissistic injury and shame as the product of the 
discrepancy between ego and ego-ideal. She, like Sandler (1963), stressed the 
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importance of peers in the 'checking out' of our ideals in the external world and the 
impossibility of doing so in isolation. 
2.1.2 Field-dependency 
The understanding of the relationship between shame and the self in a social context 
has been furthered by the exploration of field-dependency, a phenomenon which also 
carries important gender-related differences in the experience of shame and guilt. 
Field-dependence is a term used to describe a person's relative difficulty in 
perceiving an item as separate from its embedding context: 
"[ ... J low self-esteem and high need for approval, reflecting a devalued self- 
concept, are characteristics which have been linked to field dependence. 
Field-dependent perceivers are likely to be more influenced in their 
judgements by the opinions of others; they are also more likely to be other- 
directed in their social relationships. " (Lewis 1971: 49) 
Lewis found that women are more field-dependent than men, and more prone to 
shame than men. In one of her studies, she found that field dependent perceivers are 
more likely to produce drawings of the human figure which are lacking in articulation 
and differentiation of the body parts. To the extent that a drawing of the human 
figure represents both the self-concept and the image of the body, these people may 
be said to have a less differentiated self-concept and body-image. Another important 
observation was that while field-independent patients were more successful in 
directing their hostility outward, field-dependent patients were more prone to self- 
directed hostility. This phenomenon will be illustrated and discussed in detail in the 
chapter "Shame of the victim". Lewis (1971) also establishes an empirical link 
74 
Beyond the 'Intrapsychic, 
between field-dependence and depression and further suggests that proneness to 
shame is one route to the development of depression. 
One of the conclusions which can be drawn from this study is that when the 
environment fails to support one's perception of oneself and the world, the solidity 
of one's own internal sense of self becomes crucial in maintaining a continuity of 
experience and a sense of value and self-esteem. As will be discussed later in detail, 
1 would argue that this phenomenon is especially problematic for women due to their 
position in a patriarchal society and because of the internal construction of feminine 
identity. 
Shame has been described as an experience in which an external source appears to 
scorn, despise or ridicule the self, producing a sensation of acute self-consciousness 
(Lewis 1971,1987). This complicated, divided activity of the self makes it extremely 
difficult to function effectively. Very interesting from a feminist viewpoint is Lewis's 
analysis of this phenomenon as 'sharne-based rage', which describes a state of 
paralysis where the subject is placed in a double-bind: one feels humiliated and 
enraged by the scorn and the hostility coming from a relevant 'other', but is unable 
to direct the rage against it because that would mean losing a love object. Shame- 
based rage is readily turned back against the self, both because of the self s passive 
position vis-a-vis the 'other' and because of the value the self places on the 'other'. 
This is very similar to Carol Gilligan's (1982) argument that women are very often 
caught in the dilemma between having a voice and staying in a relationship; that in 
order to maintain a relationship, women give up their voices. Some of the 
implications for women of shame-based rage and the related conflicts will be 
discussed in chapters eight, nine and ten. 
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2.2 Shame in Social Development 
In the previous chapter I have examined the role played by shame in Freudian 
metapsychology. Although Freud paid some attention to morality and social norms, 
shame functioned primarily as a 'dam' for intrapsychic conflict. Later theorists, in 
looking at the function of shame in development, have paid more attention to its 
social component. 
Erikson (1950,1956) in particular was concerned with the process of social 
development of identity. In Erikson's theory shame appears very early in life - earlier 
than guilt - belonging to the second phase of human development. Erikson believed 
that, as the environment encourages the baby to 'stand on his own feet', both literally 
and figuratively, firmness must protect him against "... meaningless and arbitrary 
experiences of shame and early doubt" (Erikson 1950: 226). If the child is denied the 
experience of the autonomy of free choice accompanied by supportive guidance, he 
will turn against himself all his urge to discriminate and manipulate and will develop 
a precocious conscience: 
"Shame supposes that one is completely exposed and conscious of being 
looked at: in one word, self-conscious. One is visible and not ready to be 
visible; which is why we dream of shame as a situation in which we are 
stared at in a condition of incomplete dress, in night attire, 'with one's pants 
down'. Shame is early expressed in an impulse to bury one's face, or to sink, 
right then and there, into the ground. But this, I think, is essentially rage 
turned against the self. He who is ashamed [ ... ] would like to destroy the eyes 
of the world. Instead he must wish for his own invisibility. " (Erikson 1950: 
227) 
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Therefore, in line with Lewis (1971), Erikson also looks at the likelihood that a 
person in a disempowered or helpless position, might turn anger against oneself This 
dynamic is explored by Erikson in developmental ten-ns: shame can develop as the 
child first stands up, gaining an extra awareness which permits him to note the 
relative measures of size and power. Shame then, is accompanied by a sense of being 
very small. 
Because of the child's first reahsation of its relative smadness and poweriessness, this 
stage is decisive for the development of the child's ratios of love/hate, 
cooperation/wilfulness, freedom of self-expression and its suppression: 
"From a sense of self-control without loss of self-esteem comes a lasting 
sense of good will and pride; from a sense of loss of self-control and of 
foreign over-control comes a sense of lasting propensity for doubt and 
shame. " (Erikson 1950: 228) 
Erikson's contribution is important and thought provoking, but he makes no gender 
differentiation; he talks of a supposedly 'neutral' human being, although he only 
makes reference to male children. However, in reality, gender is a crucial factor in 
human development and has fundamental consequences. It is important to bear in 
mind, for example, that gender determines the kind of responses a child is likely to 
elicit even from its own mother (Chodorow 1978, Dinnerstein 1978), particularly as 
far as the mother-daughter relationship is concerned. This difference then, must have 
important consequences at the stage of shame-doubt that Erikson describes, as this 
is the phase when the foundations for self-worth, self-reliance and autonomy are laid. 
The implication from a gender point of view is that what is laid down is likely to be 
more shame and doubt for women than for men. This issue will be explored further 
in the next chapter. 
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2.3 Shame and Motivation 
The previous section suggests that avoidance of shame in order to preserve a feeling 
of self-worth can be considered as motivating human conduct in itself and that the 
sense of self-worth has to be negotiated with other people. This is because: 
" ... no other affect 
is more disturbing to the self, none more central for the 
sense of identity. In the context of normal development, shame is the source 
of low self-esteem, diminished self-image, poor self-concept and deficient 
body-image. Shame itself produces self-doubt and disrupts both security and 
confidence. It can become an impediment to the experience of belonging and 
to shared intimacy. Shame always alerts us to any affront to human dignity. 
It is the experiential ground from which conscience and identity inevitably 
evolve. " (Kaufman 1989: viii) 
This attributes a very different role to shame and the emotions in human motivation 
from what Freud suggested. 
Already with Anna Freud (1936), affects are granted a much more fundamental role 
in people's intra and interpsychic lives. Anna Freud introduced the idea of defence 
against affect as opposed to defence against instinct. She argued that affects are not 
only drive derivatives but also motives for defence (A. Freud 1936). In agreement 
with this, Sandler maintains that any motive must be indissolubly linked to the affect 
that accompanies it and that it is ultimately the affect and not the drive which is 
defended against (Sandler 1985). The implication of this is that people do not defend 
themselves against the cause of the feeling, as was thought in the past, but against 
the feelings themselves, which can then be regarded as causes. This has great 
implications for the affect of shame, the focus having shifted from the cause of 
shame, to the fact that shame is itself defended against and is in itself a motive for 
behaviour. 
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Very much in agreement with this point of view, but taking it to very different 
consequences is Tomkins whose ground-breaking work has been the basis of all 
contemporary research on the nature of the emotions (Nathanson, 1987), and has 
deeply influenced the psychoanalytic understanding of affects particularly in 
childhood (Brenner 1974, Basch 1976, Emde 1980, Demos 1988, Stem 1988). 
According to Tomkins, affects are the primary biological motivating mechanisms, 
more urgent than drive deprivation, pleasure or physical pain. He argued that what 
we take as the most basic drives - hunger, sex etc. are powerless if not accompanied 
by the appropriate affects; it is the affect that gives us the sense of urgency. 
The affect works as the amplifier of the drive. A simple example would be that we 
breathe, not because we are directly aware of the need for air, but because otherwise 
we would panic. If one did not feel panic when lacking air, but instead experienced 
euphoria, death would occur. It is the experience of panic which forces/motivates us 
to breath. Both drives and affects require arousal, but without affect, the drives have 
insufficient strength to work as motivators. 
Tomkins turned around Freud's notion that the emotions are derivatives of the drives 
and instead postulated that what we see as facial display, is the actual source of what 
we call emotion (Nathanson 1987). According to Tomkins, there are nine primarily 
facial responses -'Innate Affects' - which are in operation from birth: three positive; 
interest/excitement, enjoyment/joy, surprise/startle and six negative; fear/terror, 
shame/humiliation, dismell, disgust, anger/rage, distress/anguish. 
Until the development of speech as a symbolic communication, facial affect display 
is the major means of conveying information between infant and caregiver and 
remains a significant form of non-verbal communication throughout adult life. 
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Tomkins identified shame/humiliation as the posture of lowered eyes, lowered head, 
possibly with the face covered. 
He argued that shame is an auxiliary to the affects of interest/excitement and 
enjoyment/joy, much as disgust is an auxiliary to the drive hunger. In this sense, the 
trigger producing the shame affect is any experience requiring rapid decrease in the 
affects of interest/excitement or enjoyment/joy in situations where the organism 
wishes to maintain the pre-existing affect state. Failure ranks high as such a trigger. 
Tornkins obviously looks at shame within the context of social behaviour, but in my 
opinion, uses a biologically-deterministic approach which constructs shame as a 
'thing' inside of people. The 'other' is, very similarly to Freud, construed as an 
external, separate stimulus. 
2.4 Shame as Social Feeling 
Other authors have studied shame as a social feeling as a much more sophisticated 
and complex phenomenon. These authors have emphasised how vital is the sense of 
shame to our individual and collective emotional, moral and spiritual welfare 
(Schneider 1977), how shame has the crucial function of demarcating what we 
consider social and what we want to keep private (Pines 1992), and the fundamental 
role of shame in social development as it teaches the child about right and wrong 
(York 1990). 
Shame as a 'social feeling', particularly as a means of social control, is at the core 
of Scheff s "Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion and Social Structure" (1990) where 
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the suggested link between conformity, shame and self-esteem is very thought 
provoking and especially relevant for women. 
Scheff s focus on the significance of emotion in human social relations gives a 
central place to pride and shame in the sustaining of self-identity. Pride and shame, 
he argues, serve as intense and automatic bodily signs of the state of one's bond to 
others. Pride is the sign of an intact bond; shame, of a severed or threatened bond. 
For example, the clearest outer marker of pride is holding up one's head in public 
and looking others in the eye, while indicating respect by taking turns at looking and 
looking away. In overt shame, one shrinks, averting or lowering one's gaze, casting 
only furtive glances at the other. It is argued that both shame and pride come from 
the self's perception of its evaluation by others. 
Scheff s 'deference-emotion system' refers to a compelling conformity to norms 
exterior to the self by informal but pervasive rewards and punishments. Outer 
deference to these norms is 'rewarded' and induces a feeling of inner pride; lack of 
deference or non-conformity is 'punished' and induces shame. Specifically, it is 
argued that when we present ourselves to others, we risk either overt or subtle 
rejection. Rejection usually leads to shame and its related emotions, while acceptance 
leads to pride. 
Perhaps the most famous study on conformity is the Asch's study on conformity in 
group decisions (1956). The study tested the hypothesis that a majority of the subjects 
will find group standards compelling even though they are exterior and contradictory 
to their own individual standards. The essential question was: what difference existed 
between those who maintained their independence from the group and those who 
yielded? Scheff suggested that the subjects who yielded to the majority were those 
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who attempted to avoid the embarrassment (shame) of appearing different from the 
group. 
Asch reported that some of the subjects found the experience extremely painful, 
fearing that they were suffering from some 'defect' which the study would disclose. 
Typical comments were: 'I don't want to seem different'; 'I don't want to seem an 
imbecile' etc. Asch commented further: 
"They were dominated by their exclusion from the group which they took to 
be a reflection on themselves. Essentially they were unable to face a conflict 
which threatened, in some undefined way, to expose a deficiency in 
themselves. They were consequently trying to merge in the group in order not 
to feel peculiar. (italics added) 
"[ ... ] Our observation suggests that independence requires the capacity to 
accept the fact of opposition without a lowered sense of Personal worth. The 
independent person has to organize his overt actions on the basis of 
experience for which he finds no support; this he can do only if he respects 
his experiences and is capable of claiming respect for them. The compliant 
person cannot face this ordeal because he translates social opposition into a 
reflection of his personal worth. Because he does so, the social conflict 
plunges him into pervasive and incapacitating doubt. " (Scheff. 1990) 
Asch's experiment was arranged to rob the individual of his or her own view of 
reality, but in a covert way. Scheff interpreted this process by linking it to self- 
esteem. He thought that the subjects who remained independent, although they 
experienced shame, had sufficient high self-esteem that they acted on their own 
judgements despite their feelings of shame. Those who yielded had low self-esteem, 
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they sought to avoid further feelings of sharne by acting contrary to their own 
judgements. 
As it will become clear in the research section, the women interviewed repeatedly 
reported similar experiences. In particular in the section on 'withdrawal' and 'facade' 
I will explore further women's accounts of their actions as a way of avoiding shame 
experiences 
According to Scheff, low self-esteem might be conceptualized as a tendency towards 
endlessly recursive shame. Under this model, persons with high self-esteem would 
be those with the ability to manage shame in a way that it is acknowledged and 
discharged. Although shame is a painful emotion for them, it is not overwhelming. 
Persons with low self-esteem are unable to manage shame in this way. In this 
instance Scheff positions self-esteem as a personality trait, as a characteristic which 
resides in the individual. 
However, he also links it with the puzzling phenomenon of disadvantaged class, race, 
or sex tolerance and compliance with a system which is patently unfair and 
ineffectual. He argued that members of subordinate groups or classes may have a 
specifically problematic experience of shame, in that it is generated both by outer 
scorn or ridicule and by interior events. Low status persons must not only face a lack 
of deference from the outer world, but must very often intemalise the view of the 
dominant group and view themselves through the eyes of a scornful other. The result 
of this dynamic is that the dominated class develops shame over its members' 
characteristics and idealises the characteristics of the elite. 
This is a powerful source of self-generated shame. Faced with both internally and 
externally generated shame, low status persons may be particularly susceptible to the 
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shame-rage feeling trap. This cuts two ways at once: it legitimizes their superiority 
and their political power and, in a subterranean way, reaffirms the shame and 
inferiority of the underclass in that its members regard themselves as lacking 
'glamour'. If the members of a dominated class are ashamed of their own putative 
characteristics and this shame is not acknowledged and dispelled, it can result in a 
permanent under-valuation of self and overvaluation of the other, i. e. the ruling class. 
In the next chapter I will attempt to put these observations in context, in order to 
analyse women's experience. 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have looked at shame as a social emotion, and its role in social and 
interpsychic dynamics. Shame, it has been argued, functions directly and indirectly 
as a powerful agent of social control, either through the accompanying feeling of 
uncertainty (Lewis 1971, Erikson 1962), the subtle deference emotion system (Scheff 
1990), or through the human need for acceptance which motivates behaviour (Sandler 
1985). However, shame has been looked at either through patriarchal frameworks 
with its male-centred analysis of the psyche (Lewis, Erikson, Sandler) or through 
positivistic frameworks (Tomkins and Scheff) which rest on the individual-society 
split by either constructing shame as a stimulus-response phenomenon or by locating 
it in the external world which exercises pressures on the individual to conform. 
However, this chapter has also highlighted the importance of the context in the 
experience of shame. In the following chapter I will look at women's experience of 
shame within the specific context of patriarchy. 
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In chapters one and two I have highlighted the constructivist nature of the theoretical 
frameworks illustrated by the diversity of meanings attributed to shame. Additionally, 
chapter two has shown how the shame experience is a negotiated product within a 
historical and social context. All of these will be developed in relation to women in 
the discourse analysis of interviews (chapters six to ten). 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Women and Shame 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews some essential contributions to the investigation of women's 
shame, attempting to pull together strands from the literature on shame in general, 
plus psychoanalytic and feminist sources. With Freud as its starting point, this chapter 
reviews the literature on how shame contributes to the perpetuation of women's 
inequality from within and without. 
In this thesis, the view is taken that although the emotion of shame is not specific to 
women, it is, in some aspects, gender related. More specifically, it is rooted in 
historical constructions of femininity within a patriarchal society. Therefore, in this 
context, an investigation of shame will also look at issues of power and self-esteem. 
In other words, what precisely does it mean that women are more shame-prone than 
men, how can it be understood and what are the implications for women. This 
chapter aims at providing a theoretical framework for the further investigation of the 
phenomenon of women's shame and the associated low self-esteem. 
3.2 Different Readings of Women's Shame 
"A woman is born psychologically into shame and must develop out of shame 
before she can become a feminine being" (Anthony 1981: 197). 
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Many authors have highlighted the important link between shame and femininity 
(Freud 1925, Lewis 1971, Irigaray 1974, Bartky 1990, Silberstein et al. 1987). Some 
have considered women to be more shame-prone than men (Freud 1925, Lewis 197 1, 
Bartky 1990). Although clearly agreeing on the general principle, the above 
mentioned authors differ in the way they give meaning to shame and how they 
connect it to women. Three groups can be identified: 
1. Authors (including Freud himself, 1933), who accept, or at least do not question 
Freud's general formulation of identity formation for women in terms of penis envy 
and the centrality of the Oedipus Complex. By doing so these authors seem to have 
accepted Freud's formulation as neutral and objective, but have explored Freud's 
statement that women are more shame-prone than men and thus offer useful insight 
into women's psychology (Lewis 1971, Jacobson 1954). 
2. Those who also started from Freud's position, but take a very critical view of it. 
Particularly influential among these have been Mitchell (1973), and Irigaray (1974). 
They view Freud and the whole of his theory as rooted in a patriarchal society which 
deeply coloured his view of the formation of female sexual identity and shame. Their 
main focus is on the political representation of women proposed by Freud and only 
reflect on shame for women in sofar as it is part of that representation, but do not 
specifically take a position on whether women are more shame-prone than men, nor 
do they explore the significance of shame for women. 
3. A third group of authors have focused much more on shame as relevant to issues 
of gender and women's position in a patriarchal society. They have therefore 
concentrated on aspects of shame connected to women's sense of inferiority and 
uncertainty, their relationship with their bodies and with eating (Bartky 1990, 
Silberstein et al 1987, McFarland and Baker-Baumann 1990). The most extreme 
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position is taken by Bartky who elevates women's shame to the level of philosophical 
discourse. She claims that women not only experience shame more than men, but that 
shame is the female emotion in a patriarchal society. 
3.2.1 Freud on Femininity and Shame 
This section looks at Freud's representation of women as shameful and inferior 
beings, followed by an examination of the implications of this representation and its 
critique. 
As early as 1897 in 'Extracts from the Fliess Papers, Letter 75', Freud had attributed 
to shame a special role in the female development: 
"From this we can see that, with the successive waves of a child's 
development, he is overlaid with piety, shame, and such things, and how the 
non-occurrence of this extinction of the sexual zones can produce mental 
insanity as a developmental inhibition. [ ... I But the main distinction between 
the sexes emerges at the time of puberty, when girls are seized upon by a 
non-neurotic sexual repugnance and males by libido. For at that period a 
further sexual zone is (wholly or in part) extinguished in females which 
persists in males. I am thinking of the male genital zone, the region of the 
clitoris, in which during childhood sexual sensitivity is shown to be 
concentrated in girls as well as boys. Hence the flood of shame which 
overwhelms the female at that period, till the new, vaginal zone is awakened, 
whether spontaneously or by reflex action. Hence too, perhaps the anaesthesia 
of women, the part played by masturbation in children predisposed to hysteria 
and the discontinuance of masturbation if hysteria results. " (Freud, 1897: 270) 
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Already this extract pathologises and belittles women, who either see their female 
sexuality 'extinguished' (in the form of loss or abandonment of the clitoris as an 
erotic zone, the clitoris being regarded as the "male genital zone" in females) and are 
flooded with shame; the proposed alternative is to retain their attachment to their 
clitoris and masturbation, thus paving the way to hysteria. The implication of this 
quote is that shame is constructed as a natural and healthy response due to the 
intrinsic inferiority of women. 
Another significant statement about women is contained in 'Infantile Sexuality' from 
the 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality' (1905). Here Freud discussed an 
alleged innate predisposition in children to polymorphous perversion: 
"There is consequently little resistance towards carrying them out, since the 
mental dams against sexual excesses - shame, disgust and morality - have 
either not yet been constructed at all or are only in course of construction, 
according to the age of the child. In this respect children behave in the same 
kind of way as an average uncultivated woman in whom the same 
polymorphously perverse disposition persists. Under ordinary conditions she 
may remain normal sexually, but if she is led on by a clever seducer she will 
find all sort of perversion to her taste, and will retain them as part of her own 
sexual activities. Prostitutes exploit the same polymorphous, that is, infantile, 
disposition for the purposes of their profession; and, considering the immense 
number of women who are prostitutes or who must be supposed to have an 
aptitude for prostitution without becoming engaged in it, it becomes 
impossible not to recognize that this same disposition to perversions of every 
kind is a general and fundamental human characteristic. " (Freud, 1905: 191) 
In this quote, average uncultivated women, children and prostitutes are put in the 
same category. This construction positions women as infantalised, criminalised and 
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pathologised'. However, from Freud's argument it would follow that shame in 
women, far from being stronger than in men, is in fact lacking, as if, like in 
childhood, it hasn't been ftilly constructed. This view contrasts starkly with the one 
expressed in 'Femininity' (1933) in 'The New Introductory Lectures on Psycho- 
Analysis', which has been the subject of great controversy and has earned Freud the 
label of misogynist. Freud's position can be summarised by the following quotes: 
"Thus, we attribute a larger amount of narcissism to femininity, which also 
affects women's choice of object, so that to be loved is a stronger need for 
them than to love. 
"[... ] The effect of penis-envy has a share, furthermore, in the physical vanity 
of women, since they are bound to value their charms more highly as a late 
compensation for their original sexual inferiority. 
"[... ] Shame, which is considered to be a feminine characteristic par 
excellence, but is far more a matter of convention than might be supposed, 
has as its purpose, we believe, concealment of genital deficiency. 
"[... ] Women have made few contributions to the discoveries and inventions 
in the history of civilization; there is one technique which they may have 
invented - that of plaiting and weaving... Nature herself would seem to have 
given the model which this achievement imitates by causing the growth of the 
pubic hair that conceals the genitals. The step that remained to be taken lay 
in making the threads adhere to one another, while on the body they stick into 
4A graphic representation of this construction of women can 
be found in a famous poster of the suffragette movement which 
portrayed women along with the two other groups of adults who did 
not have the right to vote at that time: mental patients and 
criminals. 
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the skin and are only matted together ... we should be tempted to guess the 
unconscious motive for the achievement. " (Freud, 1933: 132) 
"The fact that women must be regarded as having little sense of justice is no 
doubt related to the predominance of envy in their mental life. 
"[... ] We also regard women as weaker in their social interests, and as having 
less capacity for sublimating their instincts than men. The former is no doubt 
derived from the dissocial quality which unquestionably characterizes all 
sexual relations. 
"[ ... ]A man of about thirty strikes us as a youthful, somewhat unformed 
individual ... A woman of the same age, however, often frightens us by her 
physical rigidity and unchangeability. Her libido has taken up final positions 
and seems incapable of exchanging them for others. There are no paths open 
to further development; it is as though the whole process had already run its 
course and remains thenceforward insusceptible to influence - as though 
indeed, the difficult development to femininity had exhausted the possibilities 
of the person concerned ... As therapists we lament this state of things, even 
if we succeed in putting an end to our patient's ailment by doing away with 
her neurotic conflict. " (Freud, 1933: 134,135) 
Women then, are represented/constructed as passive beings, shame-ridden due to their 
lack of and envy for a penis. From the desire to conceal this deficiency came 
women's most significant activity and only contribution to civilization: weaving. 
The concept of penis-envy and its symbolic meaning, has been at the centre of a lot 
of discussion among feminists. Of particular relevance is Irigaray's critique (1974, 
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1985) in which she focused on the penis as the only guarantor of sexual exchange. 
The woman who is "amputated, humiliated, mutilated" therefore desires 'it' and has 
to either have 'it' or act 'as if she has it'. She says: 
"There is one problem, however; acting as if one had 'it', pretending to have 
'it', in this kind of business, is a transaction that undercuts all the rates. Now 
woman cannot mime, pretend, any relation to her own sex organ(s) because 
she has been cut off from any access to idea, ideality, specula(riza)tion, and 
indeed a certain organic 'reality'. (Irigaray 1978: 1 14) 
She connects this strategy to "the cosmetics, the disguises of all kinds that women 
cover themselves with, [which] are intended to deceive, to promise more value than 
can be delivered. " (Irigaray 1978: 114) 
Irigaray argued that the pretence gives women only a very fleeting reassurance, 
because of the constant fear of being discovered value-less; a discovery very similar 
to 'shame exposure' where one is constantly anxious of being found out as 
inadequate. The importance of this way of looking at the phenomenon is that it 
expresses how the internalisation of women's position in a patriarchal society has 
great effect on women's sense of value and identity. The very foundations of 
women's sense of identity as lacking a phallus are built on a sense of being second 
class and inferior. The trouble, however, with Irigaray's position is that it fails to 
provide a basis for challenging these stereotypes as, exactly like Freud, it locates their 
essence in biology (Sayers, 1986: 48). 
The other major work by Freud on femininity is 'Some Psychical Consequences of 
the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes' (1925), where Freud defines the 
"normal path to womanhood". Here he introduced the importance of identification 
with the mother and its influence on womanhood. Freud stressed certain complexities 
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and difficulties in this process, although it was left to later authors to develop and 
explore the full implications in terms of maternal introjection and identification. 
Although this work was written before 'Femininity', it is discussed later because 
logically it follows and expands on the ways in which girls attempt to 'obtain a 
phallus': 
"The girl must shift from mother-attachment to a sexual desire for the father. 
[ ... ] She makes the shift from mother-love to father-love because she has to, 
and then with pain and protest. She has to, because she is without the phallus. 
No phallus, no power. [ ... ] The girl's entry into her feminine 'destiny' is 
characterized by hostility to the mother for her failure to make her a boy; it 
is an entry marked by penis-envy. [ ... ] After her recognition of castration, the 
girl has three courses open to her, only one of which is 'normal'. With her 
self-love already shattered by her 'lack', her hostility to the mother (who was 
supposed to be phallic but who was discovered to be likewise castrated) can 
make her turn away from women and womanhood altogether; in which case, 
debasing and despising women, as men do, she is liable to become inhibited 
and neurotic. Or she can refuse to abandon the pleasures of her clitoris; if so, 
she remains at the pre-Oedipal 'masculine' phase. Finally, if by exploiting 
'her passive instinctual impulses' - that is, the passive aims of her sexual 
drive - she can transfer her sexual attention from her mother to her father, she 
can want first his phallus, and then by the all-important analogy, his baby, 
then the man again, to give her this baby. Thus she becomes a little woman. " 
(Mitchell 1974: 96,97) 
Freud clearly states the symbolic significance of the phallus and equates it with 
power. He also maintains that the girl is hostile towards her mother because she did 
not give her a penis. She can resolve this difficult situation in three ways: she can 
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refuse to identify with her mother and turn neurotic; she can refuse to give up her 
clitoris and remain 'masculine'; or she can chose normality. This implies turning 
passive and desiring first, her father, then, to have his children. If we translate this 
message using 'phallus' as a symbol of power, the representation of a healthy woman 
is one whose only power derives from having a man and being a mother. 
The other question which Freud did not pursue and is fundamental to female identity, 
is what happens to the devalued, penis-less mother and what kind of object of 
identification can she offer? Furthermore, what are the implications of identifying 
with a devalued mother for the female sense of identity? Perhaps Freud was 
attempting to find an answer when, in 1916, talking of the 'Richard III' in all of us 
and our resentment for wounds to self-love, he concluded that there is one general 
instance of people being born with the crippled King Richard's winter of discontent: 
if ... we may point out that the claim of women to privileges and to exemption 
from so many of the importunities of life rests upon the same foundation. As 
we learn from psycho-analytic work, women regard themselves as having 
been damaged in infancy, as having been undeservedly cut short of something 
and unfairly treated; and the embitterment of so many daughters against their 
mother derives, ultimately, from the reproach against her of having brought 
them into the world as women instead of as men. " (Freud 1916: 315) 
Freud did not pursue the matter further and the basic representation of woman here 
is that, after becoming aware of the wound to her narcissism, she develops, like a 
scar, a sense of inferiority. It could be argued that Freud was struggling to make 
sense of a difference not just of sexual identity and sexual objects, but of a more 
basic sense of identity. 
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As has been pointed out, he tried to do this within a theoretical framework which 
described male development as the norm (Millett 1972, Temperley 1984). However, 
if Freud's theory of penis-envy is read in a descriptive rather than prescriptive sense, 
his view describes (and at the same time re/constructs) the 'female being-in-the 
world', i. e. castrated, represented by lack of a phallus and lack of power. 
Equally important is that he traced this process back to pre-Oedipal phases, stating 
very clearly that the Oedipus complex concludes the process ot castration, which is 
partly operated by upbringing and intimidation from outside which threatens them 
with loss of love (Mitchell 1974), in this way recognising the disempowering process 
of upbringing and intimidation which threatens them with shame. Freud had to 
acknowledge the role of society and external values in the formation of female 
identity. From this point of view he is implying a sense of inferiority which has been 
slowly built into women's sense of identity right from the beginning of their lives. 
For the present purposes, in this theory women are constructed as more shame-prone 
than men because of their lack of a phallus which roots their identity in inadequacy, 
inferiority and powerlessness. Freud's observation that women attempt to have access 
to some 'phallic' power through relationship with men and motherhood is very 
consistent with the observation that often heterosexual women feel empty and failing 
if they are not in relationships (Bickerton 1983). The centrality of romantic love in 
women's lives (Hite 1987, Homey 1967) and a special cathexis in motherhood even 
when other alternatives are available (Coward 1992), further confirms this. However, 
there has been very little research in these areas, particularly using this kind of 
framework. 
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3.2.2 Sandra Lee Bartky: A Feminist View of Shame and Women 
After Freud there followed a long period of silence on the subject of shame and 
women. Lewis was the first to break the silence about shame, followed by others, but 
none of these made shame and women the main subject of their inquiry. As discussed 
in chapter two, Lewis claimed that women are more shame-prone than men because 
they are more field-dependent and more prone to self-directed hostility. The main 
thrust of her theory was that proneness to shame might be one route to the 
development of depression, which more often affects women. 
Lewis did attempt to address the difficulties of identification with a devalued mother, 
but there is no evidence in her writing that she considered the absence of a penis as 
symbolic of absence of power, nor did she question in any way Freud's phallo-centric 
formulation of female development. Therefore, although her contribution draws 
attention to the links between shame, depression, self-esteem and field-dependency 
and attempts a connection between internal world and external influences in the 
experience of shame, she does not question the foundations of the patriarchal, 
biologically based, psychoanalytic discourse on women. In fact, it could be argued 
that because of her uncritical attitude to the Freudian model, her linking of higher 
proneness to shame with depression pathologises women. 
The various authors who have addressed the subject of shame and women since 
Lewis, have generally found that shame was detected while investigating other 
phenomena. For instance shame has been found to figure prominently in women's 
relation with their bodies and with food (Silberstein et al 1987, McFarland and 
Baker-Baumann 1990) and in survivors of child sexual abuse (Andrews, 1995). 
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What casts Bartky's 'Shame and Gender' (1990) in a category of its own is, apart 
from the sharpness of the insights it offers, is that she addresses shame for women 
as a feminist issue, whereby shame is the expression of women's oppression. In 
agreement with existential philosophy, Bartky maintains that affective states have a 
cognitive dimension: 
if knowing cannot be described in ways that are gender-neutral, neither 
can feelings. Shame is the feeling disclosive of women's 'being-in-the- 
world'. " (Bartky 1990: 84) 
"The shame of some of these women was not a discrete occurrence, but a 
perpetual attunement, the pervasive affective taste of a life" (Bartky 1990: 96). 
Bartky's argument hinges on few basic assumptions: firstly, that women are situated 
differently than men within the ensemble of social relations; secondly, that women 
are more shame-prone than men and further, that the feeling itself has a different 
meaning in relation to women's total psychic situation and general social location 
than has a similar emotion when experienced by men. 
Women's shame, Bartky holds, is manifest in a pervasive sense of personal 
inadequacy that is profoundly disempowering and reveals the "generalized condition 
of dishonour" which is women's lot in a sexist society. Within this framework, shame 
is not so much a particular feeling or emotion, as a pervasive and constant adaptation 
to the social environment; women's shame is more than merely an effect of 
subordination but, within the larger universe of patriarchal social relations, a profound 
mode of disclosure both of self and situation. 
Following on from Sartre (1943), shame requires two essential elements: an actual 
or intemalised audience with the capacity to judge and, more importantly, the 
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recognition that one is, in some important sense, the way one is seen to be. It follows 
that women recognise themselves as inferior. Bartky does not develop this point and 
does not explain why and how women do collude with a diminished representation 
of themselves. In this respect Bartky's argument has a mechanistic flavour which fails 
to pursue a crucial point in the perpetuation of women's oppression. 
Bartky focuses on the representation of women's worth (and related low self-esteem), 
arguing that these are not just determined by their achievement measured against their 
ideals (as argued by Rawls 1971) but in fact might be more significantly determined 
by their status in the social hierarchy. This is a very valid point, however, Bartky 
does not consider the internalisation of societal ideals which unconsciously contribute 
to the perpetuation of women's position. It could be argued that she has introduced 
a false dichotomy between what are the individual's ideals and the ideals that come 
from their position in a hierarchy, as both influence each other and exist in a 
continuum. 
If we accept that shame is such that one is ashamed of oneself before the 'other, ' the 
'other', Bartky argues, is over-determined in a sexist society as women are subjected 
to demeaning treatment by a variety of 'others'. She concludes that women are more 
shame-prone than men because they are made to feel shame in the major sites of 
social life. However, because this is an external imposition, it never reaches the level 
of belief-, her students, for example, felt inadequate and sensed a general inferiority, 
without really believing themselves to be inadequate or inferior. 
However, Bartky's explanation does not explain the high levels of self-doubt and 
uncertainty even in situations of obvious success and runs contrary to others' who 
have claimed that women's success and achievement never really reaches the level 
of belief (Walkerdine 1990). Examples have been given of women succeeding and 
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at the same time disbelieving that the success had anything to do with themselves 
(Horney 1967, Walkerdine 1990). Regardless of the differences, what is highlighted 
is the existence of a deep sense of confusion and uncertainty about women's own 
value. Bartky's explanation of this phenomenon is: 
"Female self-awareness in the situation I describe is importantly constituted 
by a certain contradiction between appearance and reality: on the one hand, 
the presumption of equality on the part of all actors in this drama, on the 
other hand, its actual though covert and unacknowledged absence. An 
ambiguous situation, affirming women in some ways and diminishing them 
in others [ ... ] tends to produce in women a confused and divided 
consciousness" (Bartky 1990: 94) 
It has been argued that shame and guilt have positive roles in maintaining a moral 
equilibrium (Taylor 1985); Bartky on the contrary stresses the painful and destructive 
effect of shame, particularly (as is the case for women), when it is a continuous 
disclosure of inferiority to a denigrated subject: a pervasive, emotional reminder of 
their position in the world: 
"Better people are not made in this way, only people who are weaker, more 
timid, less confident, less demanding, and hence more easily dominated. [ ... ] 
In all these ways, shame is profoundly disempowering. The need for secrecy 
and concealment that figures so largely in the shame experience is 
disempowering as well, for it isolates the oppressed from one another. [ ... 
] 
Under conditions of oppression, the oppressed must struggle not only against 
more visible disadvantages but against guilt and shame as well. It was not for 
nothing that the movement for black empowerment called not only for black 
civil rights and economic advancement, but for 'black pride'. " (Bartky, 
1990: 97) 
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It is the insights summarised in the above quote that make Bartky's contribution so 
unique. What has been observed phenomenologically is considered in its function as 
instrument of oppression. The power of shame is acknowledged in isolating women, 
in making them more timid, less demanding, weaker human beings, i. e. easier to 
oppress. It could be argued that the disempowering capacity of shame is increased by 
the contradictory messages women are given about their worth. 
There are, however, some areas in which Bartky's position is problematic. Firstly, it 
positions women as passive victims and the explanation of their oppression is one- 
dimensional and one-directional. There is a lack of acknowledgment of the complex 
interplay between individual and society and in particular no reference is made to the 
role of ideology and its more subtle workings in women's oppression. This links with 
the other element which gives a one-dimensional quality to the representation of 
women: the absence of insight into the role played by women's internal world in the 
perpetuation of their own oppression and their collusion with it. 
Bartky's contribution nevertheless has filled a gap in the understanding of the 
function of shame in women's oppression and has elevated shame to the level of a 
political statement on women's social condition. 
3.3 Summary and Conclusion 
The literature on shame suggests the existence of an important link between shame 
and femininity. Some authors have considered shame as a manifestation of passivity 
and dependency which was inherently feminine (Freud 1933, Lewis 1971,1987). 
Other authors, on the contrary have attributed the higher shame-proneness in women 
to their historical position in a shifting, patriarchal society (Anthony 1981, Bartky 
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1990). Others authors found both the above positions to be oversimplifications and 
argued that shame exists equally strongly in women and men; in the latter, in 
connection to the experience of "feminine" feelings such as the need for intimacy and 
attachment (Morrison 1989). 
I find that all the readings of shame and femininity discussed so far suffer from the 
same problems (although in different forms), which makes them very limited and 
unsatisfactory: they all look at women's shame as a thing 'out there5 or as mainly 
intrapsychic. Secondly, they all use dichotomies to explain how women feel more 
shameful than men, relying on splits between male and female qualities, between the 
powerful and the powerless, between oppressors and victims. In this way they all 
provide a very narrow view on shame which does not explain how it is that women 
do take on the position of being shameful. In other words, the discussed readings 
have a mechanistic attitude which leaves out the lived experience of women's shame. 
It is the capturing of this lived experience that chapters six to ten have as their aim. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
From Theory to Method 
"If we labelled all punishable sexual behavior as sex offence, we wouldfind 
ourselves in the ridiculous situation of having all oj - our male histories consist 
almost wholly ofsex offenders, the remainingfew being not only nonoffenders 
but nonconformists. [j to label him a sex offender would be to reduce our 
study to a ludicrous level. " 
Rather than "reduce [their] study to a ludicrous level", which would be 
unthinkable, the honorable scientists chose to sanction as normative the male 
commitment to the use of force documented by their study. " (Dworkin 
1981: 53) 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter has the multiple aims of providing a historical description of the 
development of the research and of looking at some of the issues and tensions in 
using a reflexive, feminist approach in a psychoanalytic framework. In this chapter 
I will also discuss some methodological issues connected to the use of different 
research methods in the social sciences and a discussion of discourse analysis. 
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4.1 History of the research 
In this section I will outline a history of the development of the research. This serves 
two purposes: it describes how the research unfolded and developed and creates the 
opportunity to explore some general epistemological issues. 
4.1.1 The Pilot study 
The pilot study consisted of prolonged exploratory interviews with three women 
(friends of the researcher), with no rigid structure. During these interviews we 
explored the concept of shame generally as well as other issues which surfaced. The 
three interviews were carried out at different times, with a progressively more 
developed structure. 
In all three there was plenty of space for feedback from the participants on what 
areas they had experienced as difficult or emotionally provoking. I encouraged the 
participants to tell me as much as possible about their responses. Suggestions were 
gathered as to what might have enabled them to talk more freely. They also gave 
feedback on what other areas they felt should be included in the interviews and in 
what order they would have preferred to have been asked the questions. 
Altogether, each meeting including the interview, the immediate feedback and the 
gathering of thoughts and considerations (which were sometimes offered days later), 
took at least two to three hours. 
I conceptualize the process of constructing the research instruments (interviews and 
questionnaires) as being similar to the drawing of a map. After extensive reading I 
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had absorbed the general boundaries and configuration of the territory I wanted to 
explore. Therefore I did not come into the interview process, even at its initial stages, 
as a blank screen. However, I did start by asking the interviewees to set their own 
boundaries and define what the territory of shame was for them. This I did by asking 
them to tell me about an experience of shame. I did not tell them what I thought 
shame was. From then on I kept comparing and adjusting our two maps. Each time 
I reviewed my 'map', reducing it in scope and focusing on details with the aim of 
combining theory and practice without prioritising either of the two. 
I used the results from the pilot study as the basis for the semi-structured interview. 
The semi-structured interviews in their final form (see Appendix I for the interview 
schedule), were divided in two: one, more contained, started with the same invitation 
to describe an experience of shame and aimed at investigating the 'shame scenario'; 
the other was more loosely based and contained some general questions on self- 
esteem, women's experience of themselves and how these related in shame. 
The decision for a more unstructured section in the interview rests on some important 
methodological issues. Firstly, in the tradition of feminist research (Henwood and 
Pidgeon 1995b), doing researchfor women rather than on women, was the priority 
(Harding 1987,1991, Griffin 1995, Stanley and Wise 1993). It has been argued 
(Smith 1974, Stanley and Wise 1993), that the traditional social sciences, rooted in 
patriarchy, alienate women not only from theory but from experience itself This is 
because the social sciences don't merely justify and rationalize the power 
relationships which oppress women, they also provide the concepts, models and 
methods by which experience can be translated and transformed (Stanley and Wise 
1993: 162). As a result, what is often examined in research are what social scientists 
define as problems, not the issues and concerns of women's everyday experience. 
Therefore rather than testing specific hypotheses, this study was designed as a 
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preliminary investigation with the aim of exploring the relationship of shame with 
different areas of female psychology and finally develop some hypotheses which 
would require further studying. 
It has been pointed out that hypotheses are worth testing only in areas where a good 
deal is already known and that before this stage most research is of exploratory 
nature (Stacey 1969); however, this attitude increases the danger of hypothetical 
deductive research examining and perpetuating problems actually created by their 
own models (Widdicombe 1992, Hollway 1984a). Although there have been many 
contributions in psychoanalytic literature on the link between shame and femininity 
and some empirical studies on shame, empirical data is generally lacking in 
psychoanalytic research (a relatively new area) and particularly in 
psychoanalytic/feminist research into shame. 
Using an interview method to gather the data, allowed a closer degree of involvement 
between myself as woman and researcher and the participants. It also allowed space 
for the women to express and explore what was connected to their experience of 
shame, instead of constraining them within the boundaries set by the traditional 
questionnaire method. If, for instance, a woman having been asked to talk about her 
experience of shame told me about her feelings of inadequacy at work and her 
migraines, even if she did not mention the word shame, I accepted that nevertheless 
she was talking about shame. In Salmon's words: "It is perhaps only when 
researchers are able to provide an attentive and respectful place for first-person 
accounts that research can hope to offer human illumination. " (Salmon 1990: 168) 
The feedback to the pilot interviews allowed a further insight into the participant's 
personal experience. This in return enriched and added complexity to the exploration 
of women's experience of shame; it also allowed for increased closeness to their 
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everyday life rather than just the intellectual exploration of it. Furthermore, this 
exchange of feedback acknowledged and capitalized on the interrelationship between 
the subjectivities of both researcher and participants, whereby the subjective 
experience of the researcher as a woman was taken into consideration. The 
assumption behind this type of approach is that both researcher and interviewees 
participate to the social construction of knowledge (Wetherell 1992, Henwood and 
Pidgeon 1995b). 
Finally, my investigation was not value-free. From the researcher's standpoint, 
women's experience is viewed within the context of a patriarchal society. The 
intrapsychic and interpsychic processes of socialisation are therefore considered 
crucial for the understanding of women's lives. The investigation aimed at creating 
a space where women's experience could be explored and taken seriously. 
4.2 Method: Why Qualitative Research 
Qualitative methodology (semi-structured interview, grounded theory and discourse 
analysis) was employed to explore shame as a discourse of oppression for women. 
In the following section I will discuss the implications of using a 'new paradigm' 
research strategy (Harr6 and Secord 1971, Reason and Rowan 1981) Particular 
attention is paid to the relevance of discourse analysis to feminist research (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987, Hollway 1989). 1 will start by briefly mentioning points of 
divergence between quantitative and qualitative methodologies and their 
epistemological underpinnings. 
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Quantitative methodologies have their basis in positivism and Newtonian methods of 
inquiry (Henwood and Pidgeon 1992,1994,1995a, Silverman 1993, Hollinger 1994). 
Adherents of positivism believe in 'realism' and measure only directly observable 
phenomena, aiming to remove all biases and subjectivity in order to produce abstract, 
universal principles within the Newtonian concept of cause and effect. Within this 
framework, 'quantification' is seen as the sine qua non of the natural science 
paradigm because it renders theoretical concepts 'observable' and testable (Henwood 
and Pidgeon 1995a). 
Alternatively, some qualitative methodologies and in particular those resting on a 
post-structuralist framework, hold that direct perception is impossible because the 
way in which we see the world is always a product of the way we interpret it and the 
historical, social, political models or systems we adopt to make sense of it. 
Consequently, perception is always relative and a product of a complex set of 
interpretations. Hence, it is impossible for the researcher to come up with universally 
generalizable facts: our analysis is always a product of the tools by which we 
measure the world (Hollinger 1994). 
Quantitative data gathering and analysis is based on an 'a priori' assumption of what 
may or may not be found. The attempt to predict and control behaviour and to 
repress the exploration of experience - in particular the experience of the researcher - 
has been at the core of social psychology since the beginning of the century (Parker 
1994). 
Instead, qualitative methods privilege the search for 'verstehen' (understanding) and 
meaning. They look at the ways in which knowledge is generated within networks 
of social activities and systems of socially constituted meanings (Hollway 1989, 
Henwood and Pidgeon 1995a, Hollinger 1994). 
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The adoption of a post-structuralist view-point implies the abandonment of the belief 
in human nature as governed by natural, deterministic universal laws. As a 
consequence of adopting this framework, psychology must abandon its Newtonian 
model and its criteria of measurement, prediction and control (Hollinger 1994). The 
deterministic view that human behaviour is formed by social forces or history also 
needs modification, as it is based on a dichotomy between individual and society. 
4.3 Post-structuralism and Post-modernism: a Brief History 
In this section I will look briefly at the origins and foundations of post-structuralism 
and post-modernism with a reference to the philosophical debate between 
Structuralism, Humanism and Critical Theory in order to clarify some of the 
founding principles of qualitative methodology and discourse analysis. 
Generally speaking, post-structuralism and post-modernism take their name from the 
two schools of thought they derived from and were both critical of, namely 
structuralism and modernism. Post-structuralism and post-modernism overlap in many 
of their fundamental philosophical basis and are often used synonymously. 
It has been pointed out that 'post-modem philosophy' is not itself a unified discourse, 
rather the so-called post-modem philosophers are heterogeneous in regard to style, 
content and concerns (Flax 1990). Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault are perhaps the 
most influential post-modem writers. The unifying concerns are a shared interest in 
contemporary Western culture, knowledge (its production and its relation to power), 
language, power, subjectivity and the self and finally, how to conceptualize, preserve 
and rescue difference (Flax 1990). In this thesis I will focus on three of the above: 
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power, language and self/subjectivity and I will explore their relevance in the analysis 
of text. 
Crucial to post-modernism and post-structuralism is structuralism itself, which 
developed out of the ideas of Comte and Durkheirn and has its object of enquiry a 
formal logic notion of 'structure' which is believed to regulate, and have primacy 
over, human behaviour and society (Hollinger 1994). This principle was central to 
Saussure's linguistic theory which proposed that there existed in language a pre- 
given, fixed structure prior to its realization in speech (Hollway 1989). 
Due to the belief of a pre-existing structure which can be investigated beyond its 
multiple expressions, structuralism holds on to objectivity, strongly opposes 
humanism and aims at distinguishing science from philosophy (Hollinger 1994). 
However, some structuralist principles are fundamental to post-structuralism; for 
instance Saussure's theory of sign and the arbitrary connection between the sign's 
components: 'signifier' (sound or written word) and 'signified' (meaning) (Weedon 
1987). Because their use of language is somehow based on these ideas, both Freud 
and Lacan have been considered structuralists (Hollway 1989, Hollinger 1994). 
Critical Theory flourished in the Frankfurt School in the 1930s. Adorno, Fromm, 
Horkeimer, Marcuse and more recently Habermas, defended humanism, philosophy 
and history as the keys to understanding and changing modem societies. These 
authors, less interested in formal static structures, view the social world and the 
individual as always in a dynamic situation and in a constant process of 'becoming' 
(Hollinger 1994). 
Post-structuralism takes Saussurean philosophy as a starting point. Saussure believed 
that there is no natural relation between signifier and signified and that the sign is 
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totally arbitrary (Potter and Wetherell 1987). He consequently disputed the claim that 
language can reflect the intrinsic meaning of a 'natural' world, instead believing that 
meaning is always constituted within language (Weedon 1987). Post-structuralism is 
generally applied to a range of theoretical positions developed by the work of 
Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva and Althusser (Weedon 1987). It deconstructs the subject-as- 
agent and the unitary individual (Hollway 1987). 
Considering its origins, it is not surprising that language and issues of power are 
central to post-structuralism and methodologies derived from it. They are particularly 
crucial in discourse analysis. Another discipline where language plays a central part 
is psychoanalysis - the talking cure. It is due to their common focus on language and 
their belief in a fragmented self that psychoanalysis and post-structuralism have 
highly influenced current discourse analysis, albeit with crucial differences and 
tensions. 
4.4 Psychoanalysis, Language and the Self 
From Freud's metapsychology it transpires that the idea of self is historical, multi- 
layered and in constant process of dynamic change (Holloway 1987,1989, Flax 
1990). Freudian theory challenges the idea of a unitary self through the notion of the 
dynamic unconscious (Hollway 1989) and its primary role in determining human 
action (Frosh 1987). The central concept of Freudian theory is conflict. Both in the 
topographical and in the structural model (see chapter one), human action is 
conceptualised as the constantly negotiated result of varying pressures and counter- 
pressures; in the former between the conscious and the unconscious and between the 
ego, superego and id in the latter. Rationality, represented by the reality principle, the 
ego and pressure from society, plays a part in determining human action, but only a 
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part. In this way the Freudian view offers an alternative to the unitary rational subject 
(Hollway 1989). 
It was Lacan however who paid particular attention to the self in relation to the role 
of language (for a review of the role of language in Lacan see Henriques 1984 and 
Mitchell and Rose 1982). Lacan also rejects the modem idea of a unified self as 
being a dangerous illusion and replaces it with the idea of a multiplicity of transitory 
selves. According to Lacan it is in the pre-Oedipal play of desires that it is possible 
to identify the potential basis for resistance to capitalist society (Hollinger 1994). The 
self is not independent of language, rather it constrains the self in ideological ways. 
Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida agree with Lacan in defining the self as multiple, not 
fixed, and always under construction (Hollinger 1994). 
These are all in opposition to traditional social psychology, according to which the 
self is a unitary entity and a relatively autonomous agent in the world which can be 
described in the same way as a physical object. The assumption behind these theories 
is that the self is the centre of experience and initiator of action; a coherent whole, 
separate from other distinct selves. Post-structuralism, on the other hand, questions 
the dichotomies between individual and society, subject and object. 
Despite their increasing popularity, the adoption of post-structuralist ideas in the 
social sciences has caused much controversy. Two areas are of particular interest to 
me: the first concerns the danger of political paralysis, particularly in respect of 
Foucauldian ideas of power and resistance (Smart 1985, Hollinger 1994) and their 
specific application to feminist issues (see Weedon 1985, Ramazanoglu 1993, Flax 
1990). While the Foucauldian idea of power and resistance (Foucault 1971,1977, 
1979), has been criticised as abstract, vague and lacking a unified agency of social 
change (Smart 1985), it has also been argued that a post-modem approach can foster 
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greater awareness of how power is both constraining and enabling, thus providing a 
"greater range of human possibilities for self-constitution and control. " (Hollinger 
1994: 117) 
The second point is more specifically concerned with issues of validation in research 
and dangers of solipsism (Silverman 1993, Burman and Parker 1993). The shift from 
quantitative to qualitative methods of analysis within a post-structuralist framework, 
immediately implies the abandonment of positivistic criteria of validation. The 
question then becomes whether renouncing positivism does away with the idea of 
validation itself or if this should be replaced with new criteria. Considering that 
objectivity and replicability are off the agenda, the question is how to distinguish 
'good' qualitative research from 'arbitrary' conclusions (Henwood and Pidgeon, 
1992). 
From a post-structuralist perspective, the search for validation is highly problematic 
as it is in danger of implying a return to absolute foundations of knowledge 
(Henwood and Pidgeon 1995). On the other hand the neglect in qualitative 
methodology, of issues of validity and reliability has been strongly criticised and the 
need for qualitative research to produce generalisable data has been re-affirmed 
(Silverman 1993). On similar lines, Miles and Huberman (1984) advocate the need 
for reliability and validity in qualitative research without, however, having to 
compromise the special contribution of qualitative methodologies in terms of 
flexibility, contextual sensitivity or external reality (Henwood and Pidgeon 1994). 
Henwood and Pidgeon (1995) consider the following as important indicators of the 
validity of qualitative research: Generativity, which considers whether certain research 
ideas generate theory and new questions for research; Rhetorical Power, which 
considers how persuasive and convincing the presented argument is. More specific 
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to discourse analysis, four techniques (coherence, participants' orientation, new 
problems, fruitfulness), have been suggested to validate the findings of this type of 
research (Potter and Wetherell 1987). The criteria of consistency in the explanation 
of events across accounts has also been put forward to guarantee validity (Brenner 
1985). This has, however, been disputed, suggesting that the consistency could be the 
product of the accounts sharing the same function (Potter and Wetherell 1987). 
4.5 Discourse analysis: One or many? 
One of the most commonly used working definitions of discourse is "a system of 
statements which constructs an object" (Parker 1992: 5). The term 'discourse analysis', 
although very recent, has already splintered in many, sometimes quite different, ways 
of analysing text. Burman and Parker (1993) warn against the danger of pretending 
that there is a simple method of gathering data and of glossing over the differences 
between discourse analysts. 
These differences are immediately evident when looking at the different terminology 
used: repertoires, discourses, thematic decompositions are only some of what 
discourse analysts look for in the text. Are they the same thing or does the 
employment of one over another carry important implications? I think it must make 
a difference 'what' the analyst is looking for and for what reason; beyond the purely 
semantic, some important political implications can derive from these differences. At 
this stage I will limit myself to examining the common ground between the various 
approaches, focusing on three issues which I think constitute the main sine qua non 
of discourse analysis: the role of Language, Subjectivity and Power/Ideology. 
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4.5.1 The Role of Language 
Following post-structuralism, discourse analysts believe that language is not a neutral, 
transparent medium between the social actor and the world, nor a blank window 
through which the researcher regards the psyche of the subjects (Potter and Wetherell 
1987). Discourse analysis makes language the object of enquiry, paying attention not 
only to the position of statements but also to the function that statements perform 
beyond the simple communication of information (Wetherell and Potter 1992). 
Contrary to positivistic methodologies which look solely for consistencies, discourse 
analysis attributes great significance to variation and contradiction in the accounts 
given (Potter and Wetherell 1987, Wetherell and Potter 1992, Hollway 1989, Burman 
and Parker 1993). These accounts, constructed out of existing resources, provide the 
speaker with the possibility of taking various, sometimes contradictory, subject 
positions within the same text (Hollway 1987). As a consequence, discourse analysis 
assumes that experience, the self, social and psychological phenomena are all 
inseparable from the ways they are described within the interactional context. It is 
assumed that they and their significance, are constructed through the culturally 
available resources and practices and may vary according to the purpose of the 
speech (Widdicombe 1993, Burman and Parker 1993). 
4.5.2 Subjectivity 
From the above, it follows that attention is not on the self-as-entity which performs 
actions (the 'subject' of the enlightenment), but on the construction of the self. The 
subject-position the speakers take within these accounts will determine their self at 
that given moment. Subjectivity, however, cannot be equated with 'individual', nor 
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with 'self' or 'identity'. I am referring to this term as it has been postulated by 
Henriques et al (1984): 
"We use 'subjectivity' to refer to individuality and self-awareness - 
the condition of being a subject - but understand in this usage that 
subjects are dynamic and multiple, always positioned in relation to 
discourses and practices and produced by these - the condition of 
being 'subject'. " (Henriques et al. 1984: 3) 
and to the illuminating definition by Harrd and Davis: 
"A subject position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location 
for persons within the structure of rights for those that use that repertoire. " 
(Harr6 and Davies 1990: 43) 
4.5.3 Power and Ideology 
The centrality of power, ideology and knowledge and their relation to discourse is 
well-known in Foucault's writing (as critiqued by Smart 1985). Foucault did not 
conceptualize power as an institution nor as a structure, but as a 'multiplicity of force 
relations'; simultaneously 'intentional' yet 'non-subjective' (Smart 1985: 77). 
He also argued against privileged sites of opposition to power (eg. the proletariat in 
Marxist theory), instead he held that where there is power there is resistance and that 
power depends for its existence on the presence of a 'multiplicity of points of 
resistance' (Smart 1985). The parallel existence of a network of power relations and 
forms of resistance does not imply that any resistance is already colonised by power 
and therefore hopeless, but that resistances constitute an irreducible opposite to power 
relations. Power for Foucault is exercised over free subjects whose conduct exists 
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within a field of possibilities (Smart 1985: 133), which implies that the subject has 
the possibility of staying out of these power networks and being free. 
This voluntarism has been heavily criticised (Henriques et al. 1984), particularly 
within feminist circles. Discourse analysis and psychoanalysis (although using very 
different frameworks), offer the possibility of looking at what factors militate against 
change and at the dynamic interplay between resistance to power and resistance to 
change. This is done in discourse analysis by looking at the meaning and values 
attached to a person's practices and the power and constraints offered by different 
subject positions, which allow the person to position themselves in relation to others 
(Hollway 1984). 
From the rejection of a single locus of power or resistance, Foucault's interest moved 
to investigating the techniques which legitimize power and how these work "at the 
level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, 
govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours, etc. " (Foucault as quoted by Smart 
1985: 79) 
Central to a discourse-analytic type of research is the notion that power finds 
powerful expression in forms of internal regulation, i. e. when forces from 'outside' 
work as self-discipline from 'within'. Through this form of regulation, discourse 
produces subject-positions. To follow the production of these discourses and the 
subject-positions created within them, is to understand the way power unfolds and 
oppression is perpetrated, as studying ideology is to study the ways in which meaning 
(signification) serves to sustain relations of domination (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). 
4.6 Feminist Research 
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It has been argued that in so far as politics is a struggle around the power to either 
perpetuate a given order or to transform it, "all research work is 'political' to some 
extent" (Griffin 1986: 188). However, the crucial question is not whether a specific 
study is defined as political or not, but whether it concerns different notions of 
objectivity and value-free research (Griffm 1986). Feminist researchers, in agreement 
with post-structuralism, believe that it is impossible to operate as an objective and 
value-free researcher (Griffin 1986, Stanley and Wise 1990, Hawkesworth 1989, 
Harding 1987), in fact a fundamental goal of feminist theory is to analyse gender 
relations (Flax 1987). This is one of the reasons behind the widespread view that 
there is a special affinity between feminist research and qualitative methods 
(Henwood and Pidgeon 1995b). 
However, in the same way that it is impossible to use the term 'feminist' as a unitary 
category reflecting a consistent set of beliefs or even a coherent social identity 
(Griffin 1989,1995, Ussher 1991), even less can one assume of a coherent category 
when talking about feminist researchers. I will briefly address some of the issues at 
stake in order to clarify my own feminist standpoint. 
To start with, three major types of feminist epistemology have been identified 
(Hawkesworth 1989, Harding 1987,1991, Henwood and Pidgeon 1995b): feminist 
empiricism, feminist standpoint theory and feminist post-modernism (see Allen and 
Baber 1992 for a review). Feminist empiricism does not question the mainstream 
positivistic practices, but argues for a critical reconsideration of the androcentric 
interpretations made (Harding 1987). 
Feminist standpoint theory claims that class, race, and gender structure a person's 
understanding of reality (Allen and Baber 1992). Feminist standpoint research (FSR), 
pivots around three major points: 1) it focuses on women's experience as a basis for 
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the research; 2) it argues that the 'personal' is also political; 3) it includes a reflexive 
perspective which considers all research as a part of a knowledge validation process 
which has tended to reflect the concerns of dominant groups (Griffin 1995). 
Standpoint theorists also advocate the intrinsic liberating potential of an uncritical 
acceptance of women's ways of knowing and being (Harding 1987). 
Feminist post-modernists on the other hand are sceptical about claims of a single 
truth or reality and question the existence of a unitary category of woman (Allen and 
Baber 1992, Henwood and Pidgeon 1995b, Flax 1987); hence they reject the notion 
of one privileged standpoint and do not consider gender as the only factor 
determining women's experience and identity (Allen and Baber 1992). 
I agree with the overall political attitude held by FSR and support the need for a 
greater awareness of gender issues (as well as those of class, race, sexual orientation 
and disability). I also agree with the need for research for women instead of on 
women which will create space for women's voices to be expressed. However, I am 
also sympathetic to some criticisms of FSR. My main contention is regarding the 
proposal to 'see through women's eyes' which implies the existence of a reality 
existing outside the observer, as if there were some truth that could be discovered. 
One of the implications of this stance, it could be argued, is that positivism is not 
problematic as long as the observation is carried out from a 'politically correct' 
stance. 
In this respect I would identify myself as a post-modem feminist in that I view with 
suspicion any claim to an intrinsically privileged or 'truer' viewpoint. Nonetheless, 
I share a concern for the risks of relativism inherent in post-modemism and the 
possible fragmentation of any sense of solidarity and group struggle; I also have 
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reservations about the post-modern denial of history which makes these things 
possible. 
In conclusion, I strongly agree with the need for a deconstruction of the category 
twomen' as a unitary and coherent entity, but I do advocate for 'women' as a 
socially and politically constructed category based on a common experience of 
oppression (Henwood and Pidgeon 1995b), albeit constructed from multiple and 
differing material circumstances for different women (Stanley and Wise, 1990). 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
I have used this chapter to bridge the theoretical framework of this thesis (as outlined 
in part one), with the actual research and analysis which will follow (chapters six to 
ten). I have illustrated the personal, theoretical and epistemological foundation of the 
research as a whole. In the following chapters I will look at each stage of my 
research separately and in depth: in the next chapter I will give a detailed outline of 
the stages of the analysis, in chapters six to ten I will discursively analyse women's 
reports of shame through a thematic deconstruction using principles from grounded 
theory. I will be looking at a selection of extracts to investigate issues of power and 
resistance, subjectivity and the exciting tension between a psychoanalytic and a 
discourse-analytic reading of text. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
Thematic Decomposition: A Discursive analysis 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter bridges the issues raised in chapter four on methodology with the 
discursive analysis of the interviews, deconstructed into themes. The chapter outlines 
my argument, my method of analysis and also provides a summary of research 
questions and findings. The section on method follows the stages of the research from 
the design of the semi-structured interviews and the selection of the participants, 
through the coding of interviews, the selection and analysis of the themes, to a 
summary of the findings of the analysis. 
This chapter also discusses some of the difficulties encountered in the analysis; for 
example, how to reconcile important biographical details of the participants with an 
approach to people's accounts as text; how to conduct a discursive analysis without 
clear guidelines; how to reconcile an intrapsychic psychoanalytic reading with a 
deconstructive approach and finally, how to address issues of power in a feminist 
research on women. 
5.1 My Argument 
Contrary to a positivistic or psychoanalytic approach, I maintain that, a) shame does 
not exist in a vacuum or as a measurable thing 'out there', and b) that neither is 
shame exclusively an intrapsychic affect. 
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Instead I want to claim that the subject position of 'shameful' is multifaceted, 
contradictory and constantly negotiated. This negotiation takes place intrapsychically 
and within the context of speech. This happens, a) within different, socially 
constructed discourses or 'ideological themes' (e. g. being naked on a beach can be 
constructed as source of pride within a feminist-militant discourse or as shameful 
within a catholic discourse), b) within the mutual interaction between interviewer- 
interviewee and c) can vary at different points within the same interaction. In other 
words shame, like identity, is negotiated through speech (Widdicombe 1993). 
Broadly speaking, the aim of my analysis is to reconnect the shame themes to 
existing social discourses. In this way I intend to remove the interviewee's accounts 
from the personal sphere and reposition them within a social, interpersonal 
framework, thereby making evident the 'ideology in action' latent in the accounts 
(Wetherell and Potter 1992, Hollway 1989). 
5.2 METHOD 
5.2.1 The Semi-structured Interviews 
I have already described in chapter four the stages of development of the interview 
schedule' and its genesis in the pilot study. As is evident from the interview 
schedule, the hypotheses and the rating instructions, my original idea was to conduct 
5 (see Appendix 3 for the list of interview questions, 
Appendix 4 for the list of hypotheses underpinning the 
questions and Appendix 5 for the instructions to 
raters. ) 
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a content analysis of the text which would result in measures and quantities (see 
Introduction for a reflexive history of this research). 
Following the Pilot Study, while designing the final interview schedule, I focused on 
three factors: a) to design questions in such an order and style that the discussion 
would flow logically and would be as relaxed as possible, b) to move back and forth 
between the literature, the transcripts of the pilot study interviews and the questions, 
so that the questions would be both theoretically and experientially grounded, and c) 
to design a way of rating which did not just count words, nor took the text at simple 
face-value but was rooted in and took seriously what the women had said (Griffin 
1986). 1 found Brown et al. 's work (1986,1990a, 1990b) on depression and self- 
esteem in women extremely useful for their approach to interview style and 
measurement issues. 
I told the participants that I was carrying out research on shame, that the interview 
would be taped. To reassure them of the confidentiality of the process, I stressed that 
I would use pseudonyms in the transcriptions and, that when appearing in my thesis 
the interviews would be in the form of extracts which, once extrapolated from the 
main text, would make the identification of the participant virtually impossible. 
I also told the participants that they could stop the interview or the tape if and when 
they desired. I told them before starting the recording that the interview would last 
between 40 minutes and one hour, depending on how much they wanted to tell me 
and that I would start with some general questions about themselves and their lives 
and would then move on to some questions about shame. I also told them that we 
would have some time after the interview to discuss their experience and that I would 
welcome any feedback they would like to give me. 
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The pilot interviews, where the participants were friends of mine, were conducted at 
either their or my house. The interviews with friends of friends took place at their 
houses with the exception of two which were carried out at the common friend's 
house. The interviews with post-graduate students were carried out at UCL, in a 
quiet, sound-proof room with a 'Do not disturb sign on the door'. 
5.2.2 The Participants 
The participants were eighteen women between the ages of 25 and 36 years old, with 
the exception of one who was 47. Two participants were black, six were non-British, 
three of whom came from non-english speaking countries. All of the women were 
able-bodied and when talking about their sexuality, exclusively made reference to 
themselves as heterosexual. 
Although some of the participants were from working class backgrounds, their 
various occupations (two social-workers, art therapist, musician, accountant, clerk, 
journalist, film-maker, teacher), indicated a level of education typical of the middle 
classes. All the others were post-graduate students, mostly in psychology. 
The first participants who took part in the pilot study were close friends. The others 
were either friends of friends or post-graduate students at UCL. Most of them 
volunteered to be interviewed because they were interested in the subject. 
5.2.2.1 The Pseudonyms; Biography or Text? 
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Having committed myself to using pseudonyms, the issue of what to call my 
participants turned out to be no simple task. I first used names which were selected 
for practical reasons; i. e. they bore some resemblance to the real names to help me 
recognise the extracts once they were isolated from the whole interview. My concern 
that I wasn't sufficiently approaching the extracts as text (as I felt I should), made 
me later abandon the names altogether and number the extracts. This was motivated 
by a desire to explore shame not as a personal experience, but through its 
construction in language via ideological repertoires or accounts which we all share. 
Therefore I wanted the accounts, rather than the individual experience, to be the 
focus of my investigation. Furthermore, by making the accounts the focus of my 
analysis I would leave no doubt that the interpretive reading of them was mine and 
not the participants'. 
However, once I had done that, I felt that the participant as a real person and her real 
suffering was lost. I finally settled for pseudonyms which either conveyed some 
personal detail - like reference to non-British origins - or carried some association for 
me which would bring the person to life. 
The question of names however, raises a much wider epistemological issue: if I take 
the stance that language is not a transparent window into the participant's psyche and 
that a discursive analysis has to be conducted at the level of text, what space is left 
for the participants' histories and biographies after 'the death of the subject' 
(Foucault 1972,1973b, 1984)? As I have mentioned in the Introduction and will 
discuss further in chapter nine, a move to a constructivist approach implies that 
everything we talk about, including our identities, are manufactured through 
discourse. However, this carries the danger of falling into an essentialist view that 
leaves very little space for dimensions which are nevertheless crucial to political 
change. For example, how can we talk of change if we seem to afford more agency 
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to discourse than to people? (Burr 1995). It might be, as Frosch (1991) seems to 
suggest, that we are in a phase of transition and that some of the difficulties we 
encounter in conceptualising what we do as social constructivists engaged in 
discourse analysis, are due to remnants of modernist language which clash with a 
post-structuralist approach. Therefore, in psychoanalysis for example, we still use 
notions like progress, or self development which do carry modernist implications of 
unitary subject and history. I am certainly concerned about the possible political 
implications of abandoning aspirations to change, progress and making sense of 
history altogether. I therefore agree with the position that although subjectivity is 
constituted by discourse, the subject is yet capable of critical historical reflection and 
is able to exercise some choice with respect to the discourses and practices that it 
takes up (Sawicki 1990). This position prevents the possibility of reifying discourses 
(Burman and Parker 1993), conceptualising them as if they were 'tectonic plates' 
whose clashes constitute subjectivity in a way that leaves no room for agency (Parker 
et al. 1990); a position which might lead to social practices being constructed as if 
operating in mysterious ways, with the danger of removing them from real life 
(Burman and Parker 1993). 
If we think of our political stance as commitment to 'giving voice' in order to 
provide some legitimacy and validity (Kitzinger 1989) to people's 'real experiences', 
it is necessary to allow space for issues like class, ethnic origins, race, disability and 
sexual orientation. These are fundamental constitutive factors which, however, we are 
in danger of losing sight of when we look at the subject at the level of text with one 
specific focus. 
There was no doubt in my mind that all the elements in the participants' history had 
constructed them as they were, but my focus was gender. I found it very difficult, 
therefore, to allow space for the other dimensions when the participants did not 
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address them directly. My political conviction that these dimensions are of crucial 
importance in people's lives, directed the choice of extracts. Albeit in a tokenistic 
way, I attempted to give voice to these dimensions by selecting names and extracts 
which, when possible, would include dimensions other than gender. For example the 
extract from Ambra (chapter seven) highlights issues of ethnic origins and race, and 
so does her name; in the extract from Dawn (chapter ten) I look at class, with Mae 
(chapter nine) I include details of her relationship with her mother which I felt 
enhanced the understanding of the text. Nevertheless a lot is inevitably lost when 
renouncing a biographical approach to text. 
5.2.3 The Coding of the Interviews 
I listened to the taped interviews before transcribing them, as that helped me to hold 
the interview in my mind as a whole. I then listened to them again after transcription 
to check the accuracy of the written text and many, many times afterwards when 
working on the themes, to double-check the accuracy of the text. In the long, 
painstaking process of transcribing, I noted pauses but I did not measure the time gap 
(for transcription convention see Appendix 8). 
To bridge the theory with the research questions, I broke the literature down into its 
various themes and dimensions from the beginning. I kept index cards with the 
articles' and books' summaries divided into different sections. The resulting number 
of categories were then collapsed under larger headings and used as a general 
guideline for the first set of interviews in the pilot study. The first general outline 
contained eight dimensions: words and feelings associated to shame, experience of 
shame, what shame does, content of shame experience, defences and coping 
strategies, shame anxiety, shaming agents, shame and guilt. 
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As previously described, I reviewed the list of dimensions and related questions after 
each interview until I felt I was getting some consistency and the participants were 
generally addressing the same issues. At that stage, some areas of proposed 
investigation were abandoned and others, suggested by the participants, were added. 
Priority was thus given to the participants' choice of relevant areas, so that subjects 
that did not match the participants' accounts were deleted even if they were 
considered important in the literature. 
Each interview was line-numbered and laboriously examined, linking words, phrases 
and paragraphs to the above main headings (for an example see Appendix 6). At the 
same time I also added comments if something struck me as important or if I had 
noticed it before in another interview. Having done that, I read the coding for all the 
interviews and collated the content for each heading. 
Patterns began to appear, although of two kinds: on one hand there was a relatively 
straightforward pattern which related to the 'shame scenario' (see Introduction and 
Appendix three and four) which could have been developed further into a content 
analysis. But there were also patterns of a much more fragmented and complex nature 
which required a more interpretative examination. 
It has been pointed out how the identification of discourses can in fact be aided by 
content analysis (Mostyn 1985, Parker 1992) and I would certainly agree. However, 
the analysis of data I had in mind was very different from the traditional content 
analysis which aims at allocating instances to a set of predefined, mutually exclusive 
categories (Henwood and Pidgeon 1992). Furthermore in my case, because the 
categories were based on gender-biased literature reflecting the dominant culture, I 
felt there was a danger of reinforcing 'common sense' constructions of shame (Potter 
et al. 1990, Parker 1992). To avoid this and to allow myself to concentrate on 
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patterns of a much more complex and fragmented nature requiring a more 
interpretative examination, I had to face the constant doubts inherent in having 
nothing else to start with but my own intuition (Hollway 1989). 
I thus began the process of thematic deconstruction again, indexing the data partly 
on the basis of the previous coding. This time however, there were two important 
differences: firstly I paid attention to the whole story in terms of how women 
experienced shame (eg. the content of the experience, women's reaction to it, what 
other emotions were mentioned, ways of reacting, coping, talking about it), even 
when they started by mentioning shame and then seemed to move away from it. 
Secondly, I did not look for consistency but for contradictions (Parker 1992, Potter 
and Wetherell 1987) and for the function and the position of the words. This was 
done to conceptualise new ways of understanding women's accounts of shame which 
listens to women's real accounts, rather than the sanitised versions. 
5.2.4 The Themes 
The themes were content-based and inductively selected from the interviews. The 
themes were not equally sized, constant units; some are broader than others and all 
of the themes overlap and are inter-related. I selected extracts which clustered around 
the following five themes: 'Shaine and the Ideal', 'Femininity and Shaine' 
'Withdrawal as Defence against Shame', 'The Shameful Self behind the Facade', 
'Shame of the Victim'. 
The Ideal theme was based mostly on the answers to questions relating to self and 
self-esteem (see Appendix 3,4,5). The Femininity theme was based on the questions 
regarding gender, the actual content of shameful experiences and other fragments 
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which. came up spontaneously in the interview. The Withdrawal theme was based on 
the questions regarding coping strategies and defences. The theme of the Faýade was 
partially based on the questions on coping strategies, but it often transpired from the 
participants taWng about how they felt about themselves. The only theme which was 
not based on any specific set of questions, but was repeatedly referred to, was the 
theme on Shame of the Victim. 
Although these general themes Will be addressed as separate sections, this -is for the 
sake of presentation only, as all of the themes overlap and are interlinked. For 
instance, an account of hiding one's body in shame has significance within the theme 
of failing to have an ideal body, within the theme of construction of femininity and 
also that of hiding and withdrawal as defence. 
5.2.5 The Analysis: A Thematic Decomposition 
My approach to the analysis of text is based on the general principles of Grounded 
Theory as introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It is used in two ways: to invoke 
the general notion of grounding theory in experience and accounts and more 
specifically when referring to a method which involves distinctive analytic strategies 
(Henwood and Pidgeon 1995). In analyzing the data I will be using Grounded Theory 
in both ways. 
The application of Grounded Theory starts with a repeated and in-depth reading of 
the text for the purpose of generating categories to make sense of initially 
unstructured qualitative data. These categories are then defined and the relationship 
between them is explored. This eventually results in the creation of new hypotheses 
and theory. Grounded Theory attempts at 'realism' on the one hand, through 
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inductively reflecting participants' accounts and 'constructivism' on the other, 
through encouraging interpretive processes (Henwood and Pidgeon 1992,1994, 
1995). 
This position, however, has been considered problematic as it ends up not adequately 
addressing the philosophical underpinnings which such an approach carries. For 
example, theory cannot simply emerge from data, as observation is always set in pre- 
existing concepts (Henwood and Pidgeon 1994). As a solution to this problem, 
Charmaz (1990) introduced a constructivist version of Grounded Theory which 
assumes the pre-existence of the researcher's perspective from which they actively 
build their analysis. 
My analysis of the data started with what has been termed a 'thematic 
decomposition', a close reading which attempts to separate a given text into coherent 
themes or stories. " (Stenner 1993: 114). This employs a constructivist approach in 
grounding theory on shame in women's accounts of their experiences using a 'flip- 
flop' technique (Henwood and Pidgeon 1995), between data and conceptualisation 
(Bulmer 1979). 
5.2.6 A Discursive Analysis 
This analysis did not attempt to be representative and in fact by choosing this kind 
of analysis, I implicitly chose not to investigate how often women mentioned certain 
aspects of shame, but 'what' they said and 'how' they talked about it (van Dijk 
1993), i. e. how the themes developed discursively. 
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What follows in chapters six to ten is a discursive analysis of a number of the 
accounts within these themes. In analyzing these accounts, I will look at the process 
through which the women position themselves as shameful. 
The analysis has three aims: First I will explore the multifaceted and variable 
meaning of the 'shameftil subject' and how being shameftil is constructed within the 
themes. This rests on the view that discourses constitute objects and contain subjects 
(Parker 1990,1992; Burman & Parker 1993) 
Second, by looking at the subject positions taken within the accounts, I will explore 
issues of power and resistance i. e. what that particular subject position enables and 
prevents women from doing, on what ideological constructions it rests, what function 
it serves, how the experience of shame can be a site of resistance and/or 
subordination/conformity. This rests on a view of discourses as reproducing power 
relations and achieving ideological effects (Parker 1990a, 1992). 
Thirdly I will explore the similarities and tensions between using a psychoanalytic 
and a discourse analytic approach to the text, in particular vis-a-vis psychic and social 
change. In particular I will investigate how psychoanalysis can function as a 
discourse in itself, thus allowing specific positions to women. This rests on a 
Foucauldian interest in the objectification and subjectification of medical discourses 
(Foucault 1973a). 
In setting myself the above aims I am using discursive analysis as a goal in itself - 
in applying this method to the exploration of women's shame - and as a strategy with 
the goal of exploring ideological and power issues. The reason for this choice of 
method rests on the potential of discourse analysis to act as ideology critique and to 
provide alternative discourses (Burman and Parker 1993, Parker 1992). This project 
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is based on the assumption that different discourses carry with them different 
prescriptions for social relations and that those alternative discourses that both re- 
describe and provide a critical distance from language and power are also the basis 
for alternative social relations, alternative societal forms (Parker 1992: 40). More 
specifically, this analysis aims at contributing to feminist research, by attempting to 
make explicit the ideological implications of the positions taken by the women in the 
text, while at the same time suggesting alternative, more constructive subject 
positions available to women. The first step towards personal change is to recogmise 
the discourses - and the positions provided by them - that are currently shaping our 
subjectivity (Burr 1995). 
5.2.6.1 Which Discourse Analysis? 
It has been repeatedly stressed that doing discourse analysis is not easy; it is a 
painstaking process and can be very frustrating and anxiety-provoking (Burman & 
Parker 1993, Potter & Wetherell 1987, Parker 1992). This is partly due to the 
impossibility of describing it adequately in 'recipe-type' form, which makes discourse 
analysis 'an approach to research', rather than a particular method or technique (Burr 
1995: 163). Some authors have attempted to provide some guidelines for doing 
discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell 1987), but because the nature of discourse 
analysis itself is subjective and interpretative, there is still no definitive version of it. 
To some extent, this lack of clear guidelines has been considered as positive, in 
warding off the dangers of "reducing analytic sensitivity to discourse to just another 
thoughtless empirical technique" (Parker 1992: 122). 
I have already mentioned in chapter four, how the term 'discourse analysis' has 
already splintered into many, sometimes quite different ways of analyzing text. Burr 
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(1995) identifies two main approaches to the study of 'discourse': One draws 
primarily upon the French philosophical traditions of structuralism and post- 
structuralism and focus on issues of identity, personal and social change and power 
relations (Hollway 1989, Parker 1992, Weedon 1987). The other approach focuses 
more on the performative qualities of discourse, i. e. what are people doing with their 
talk, how accounts are constructed and their consequences for the speaker (Potter and 
Wetherll 1987, Edwards and Potter 1992). 
The version of discourse analysis I will be using looks at text from both perspectives 
and is influenced by a mixture of different approaches. I will be focusing on the 
function of language and its relation to ideology (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 
Wetherell and Potter 1992), but with some reservations. I am wary of some semi- 
positivistic, liberal implications in asserting that discourses are 'out there' and that 
people 'freely choose' which to use (Wetherell and Potter 1992, Marks 1993). 
Although I agree that we all use the same existing resources to construct our talk 
(Potter and Wetherell 1987, Marshall and Rabe 1993), 1 think that we are all 
imprisoned by language (Marks 1993) and that we favour some subject positions over 
others because they have positive implication for our sense of self and self-esteem 
(Burman and Parker 1993) - i. e. they contain higher narcissistic supplies (Sandler 
1963). They may provide a sense of being in harmony with the world as it is 
represented by 'common sense' (see Weedon 1994 for an illustration of the 
presentation of ideological situations as 'common sense') and because they supply us 
with more power in relation to others (Hollway 1987). These are obviously always 
relative and contextual which accounts for contradictions in speech (Potter and 
Wetherell 1987). 
I would also stress the importance of distinguishing between discourse analysis which 
is "effectively functioning as ideology-critique and traditional positivist methods 
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masquerading as discourse analysis" (Burman and Parker 1993: 11). 1 would like to 
position myself in the former group as my political motivation in deconstructing 
shame is to identify the process through which oppression becomes internal 
regulation and self-discipline; in other words to explore the self-oppression involved 
in taking the subject position of shameful. The political aim of this thesis is therefore 
to 'remake the link' with the historically gendered and social source of shame. I 
believe that this process, by suspending the common sense status quo, can open the 
way to the conceptualisation of 'new ideals' and feelings of pride in women's 
experience. This is what I see as my contribution to feminist research. 
This kind of reflexive inquiry rests on the disbelief in neutrality and objectivity 
which underpins positivistic research. It can also be helpful in avoiding the illusion 
of a 'blank screen' researcher; an illusion which would render invisible certain 
extremely interesting information which develops out of the interplay between 
interviewer and interviewee. Therefore I distance myself from some discourse 
analysis that clearly leaves out the role of the interviewer, or at least does not explore 
their influence on the dialogue (see Wetherell and Potter 1992). 
5.2.7 A Psychoanalytic Reading of the Text 
In parallel to the discourse analysis, I will also explore the text from a psychoanalytic 
point of view. This requires some brief clarifications, both in terms of similarities and 
differences between psychoanalytic and discourse analytic approach to text, some of 
which I have already discussed in chapter four, and in methodological terms: i. e. in 
what way a psychoanalytic reading of the text enriched and added depth to the 
analysis. 
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Broadly speaking, I intend to use psychoanalytic theory discursively, in that it 
attributes specific meaning to speech. As with any other discourse, this activity has 
consequences. Some of these consequences are reflected in the subject positions it 
makes available. It is these subject positions and the meaning which is attributed to 
phenomena, in this case shame, that I will focus on. 
Generally speaking, both a psychoanalytic and a discourse analytic approach 
encourages us to listen to text, whether written, spoken or acted, on a different level 
(Parker 1992, Burman 1992). Furthermore, both offer the possibility of looking at 
what factors militate against change and at the dynamic interplay between resistance 
to power and resistance to change (Hollway 1984, Eichenbaum & Orbach 1983). 
I propose the psychoanalytic reading exclusively as a hypothetical exercise of 
deconstruction of what the women said as text; as such the suggested psychoanalytic 
reading of what the participant said is not considered to carry any validity or insight 
into the speaker's psychic life. A psychoanalytic interpretation, I believe, belongs to 
the therapeutic relationship in the consulting room; it ought always to be contextual 
and draw its meaning and significance from within the interaction between patient 
and therapist. This meaning cannot be extrapolated from the context as the same 
'material' could mean completely different things according to the different phases 
of the therapeutic relationship, within the same session, within the patient's life span. 
Furthermore (also similar to discourse analysis), I believe that meaning is negotiated 
within the specific patient/therapist relationship and is heavily constructed by the 
analyst's understanding of it. Therefore, to attempt a similar approach under any 
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other circumstances, but using the same tools of analytic interpretation claiming 
access to people's psyche, I strongly believe to be unethical and meaningless. ' 
On the other hand, psychoanalysis is a powerful tool in understanding the 
intrapsychic dynamics through which interpsychic constructions of reality and power 
relations become operative from 'within' and contribute to the formation of the 
'docile subject'. This is a crucial point as psychoanalysis used in this context could 
provide an answer to the question biography vs. text inherent in the discrepancy 
between traditional psychology and a discourse analytic mode of inquiry. Social 
psychology takes into account people's identities and history, by looking at the 
unitary subject with personality traits, affected but separate from society. On the other 
hand discourse analysis, moving away from the interest in individual subjects as 
active agents and focusing on text, leaves little space for the historical personal 
context which also constructs the subject. 
A psychoanalytic approach used alongside a discursive analysis of text might allow 
a way out of this impasse in suggesting that "... meanings are given in discourses, 
[but] they are also imbued with significance by the sedimented history (held on the 
metaphoric axis) of a particular person occupying the position at a given time. " 
(Hollway 1984: 128) 
Similar to discourse analysis, psychoanalytic practice considers speech as having 
functions and performing actions beyond communication. For instance, a patient's 
dream could be a communication of unconscious material, or could be used to 
represent a transference relation or could be used as resistance by avoiding pressing 
6 Some very interesting research has been carried out based 
on discursively analyzing extracts from psychotherapy 
sessions (Madill 1995, Madill and Doherty 1994) 
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conflicts. Hence it is not sufficient to pay attention to the content of the 
communication, but also to the ftinction which often constitutes important 
communication per se. However, while the therapeutic relationship allows space for 
the exploration of such communication through the analysis of transference and 
resistance, the researcher-participant relationship rarely considers such elements as 
important. This brings me to an important area related to qualitative research, which 
has only recently begun to be addressed. 
5.2.7.1 The Researcher/participant ReIationship 
The understanding of the experience of research from the point of view of both the 
participant and the researcher has increasingly been acknowledged to be a 
fundamental facet of the qualitative research process (see King 1995 for a review and 
in-depth discussion). In particular, feminist researchers have argued for the 
importance of paying attention to issues which research reports do not usually 
comment on, like the social/personal characteristics of those doing the interviewing, 
the interviewee's feelings about being interviewed and about the interview, or the 
interviewer's feelings about the interviewees (Oakley 1981a). 
At the same time attention has been drawn to the need to redress the power 
inequalities between researcher and participant (Gergen and Gergen, 199 1). This issue 
has become of particular relevance when as a feminist interviewing women, the 
researcher wants to convey her intention not to exploit either the participants or the 
information they give. An increased closeness and the shifting from pure data- 
gathering to friendship, has sometimes been advocated as a solution in that it would 
allow not only to redress the power imbalance, but also foster a shift from the 
interviewer being a data-collecting instrument for researchers, to being a data- 
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collecting instrument for those whose lives are being researched (Oakley 198 1 a: 49). 
This implies that inter-views might be carried out in such a way that the participants 
as well as the researcher can benefit from it. 
Although the goal of equalizing the power balance and empowering women through 
the research process is positively motivated, the realization of the objective is highly 
problematic (Allen & Baber 1992). In particular, as I will discuss later, I am 
concerned with the possibility of it becoming abusive. 
I definitely recognise elements in my approach to interviewing in common with 
Oakley's stance (as above) and with Harding's argument for the researcher to place 
herself on the same critical plane as the overt subject matter (Harding 1987); this 
would require evidence about the class, race and gender of the researcher to be made 
as visible as that of the participant. This I did mainly through sharing some of my 
personal details. All the participants knew that I was Italian and that I was doing 
post-graduate research in Psychology. The majority of participants knew that I was 
a therapist. The participants to the pilot study certainly knew because they were my 
friends and with them, as I have already described in chapter four, I discussed in 
depth their emotional reaction to my questions. 
The other participants (some of whom were friends of friends), may have known that 
I was a therapist, in which case I assume it had some influence, although I can't say 
of what kind and I did not explore the issue with them. This is because I felt that to 
clearly state my profession would have implied that I was approaching the interview 
primarily as a therapist, which I was not. I did not feel it was appropriate, neither did 
I desire to make any interpretation and I assiduously avoided any comment which 
might be taken to be one. On the other hand, the fact that I am a psychotherapist 
inevitable influenced the research process both in that my profession affects the way 
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I view the world and that I was approaching the research from a psychoanalytic 
theoretical framework. 
Beside being a psychotherapist, however, there were other aspects of my personality 
and history that I felt construed the specific interaction between my subjects and 
myself. The fact that I was a fellow-student, for instance, facilitated the process and 
redressed to a certain extent the power imbalance. To be interviewing other research 
students meant that they knew through experience something of the difficulties of the 
process. 
Another helpful factor with some of the participants, was that I was foreign and that 
English is not my first language. Not only it helped in reducing the their self- 
consciousness of being interviewed in a foreign language, but also, particularly with 
the women coming from latin or catholic backgrounds, it enabled me to capture 
subtle nuances which I was able to bring out in the interview where relevant. 
Furthermore, especially during the pilot interviews, I did share my opinions with the 
interviewees after the interview and discussed with them some of the feelings which 
had been brought up. 
Feminist researchers have highlighted the importance of 'feelings' in contrast to the 
traditional focus on 'facts' when inquiring into women's experience (Hollway 1983, 
1989, Crawford et aL 1992). It is in order to meet the extra demands involved in 
dealing with the feelings elicited by the interview, that some authors have argued for 
the usefulness of counselling skills in interview situations (Coyle et aL 1994, King 
1995). It is in this respect that the need for ongoing supervision and an awareness of 
some of the psychodynamic processes associated with in-depth interviews have been 
recommended (King 1995). 
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In my research I was certainly greatly helped by my skills as a therapist, both in 
containing the emotional tension created in the interview process and by my use of 
basic counselling tools (mirroring, open questions, prompts, encouragement to free 
associate). I also volunteered to discuss the interviews at a later stage if the 
participants needed to. In some cases that did happen and I was gratified that the 
interview had been useful for the participants in that, through our discussion, they 
were able to clarify their own thoughts and emotions. I also offered the participants 
access to the transcripts and so far, two have requested a copy of their interview 
transcription. 
However, it is also crucial to deconstruct the myth of a given unity and alliance 
between researchers and participants, just because (in this case) they are both women 
and to bear in mind the unpleasant reality that women too are capable of domination 
and exploitation (Allen & Baber 1992). 
It is therefore crucial to question whether striving for intimacy is exclusively benign 
and positive for the interviewees. My concern remains that if we display warmth, 
empathy and genuineness, all important factors to create a safe envirom-nent for the 
participant, we can expect to develop closer relationships with our participants, but 
how much can we truly offer that? (King 1995). In other words, the increased 
openness between participant and researcher might increase the possibility of 
unwittingly abusing or damaging the participant. ' 
Furthermore - and this is the focus of my concern - by creating a space 
for the 
participant to open up and by encouraging them to discuss their emotional reactions, 
7 Bahvani (1988,1990) has made some interesting remarks on 
issues of empowerment in qualitative research, 
questioning the assumption that giving a voice, is 
automatically empowering for the participant. 
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aren't we to some degree creating a pseudo-counsel ling situation, without, however, 
the safety of the real counselling situation? King (1995), for example, describes 
instances when both she and her participants found themselves facing issues far 
beyond the scope of the research because the interview process had stirred up 
memories, powerful feelings and sometimes intimate revelations. Often the researcher 
has no skills or resources to deal with such issues and, more to the point, neither does 
the participant who may be left with re-opened wounds. The question is then, what 
are the ethical boundaries of some qualitative research? 
Without aiming to find an answer to this question, my own experience has certainly 
prompted me to reflect on these issues. I feel that there are issues of power which 
cannot be redressed even in the best possible situations. The interview develops 
according to its own pace and although I mentioned above that the participants' 
opening up was facilitated by my counselling skills, the question remains whether it 
necessarily helps the participant to get in touch with their emotions in a interview 
setting? The fact that the participant might learn something about themselves and find 
the interview stimulating does not detract from the fact that those disclosures are 
mainly, if not exclusively for the benefit of the researcher and that once the interview 
starts developing, particularly if the interviewer is skilled, the participants might end 
up in a position of extreme vulnerability and openness which certainly is not matched 
by the researcher's. From this perspective then, counselling skills, although providing 
a more subtle and sensitive approach, might result in a more subtle, but perhaps more 
damaging abuse. 
In conclusion I feel that the conscious and unconscious effects that my personality, 
my position as psychology student, my accent, my physical appearance or my general 
way of interacting had on the process are ultimately unknown to me, as they lie in 
the realm of the fantasies and the transference which are always created when two 
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human beings interact. In this respect again, I see a similarity with the 
patient/therapist relationship in that each one is unique and the story is always a joint 
production (Mishler, 1986). 
5.2.8 Research Questions and Findings 
I will now outline in turn the research questions underpinning each theme and the 
findings proposed by my analysis. These themes will be fully explored in chapters 
six to ten. 
The first theme "Shame and the Ideal" looks at shame as deriving from the failure 
to meet an ideal. This theme posits the question: if we challenge the view that failing 
to meet an ideal is exclusively a personal, intrapsychic issue (as psychoanalysis would 
claim), and also reject the view that ideals are 'out there' as neutral constructs (as 
implied by social psychology), what do we learn from looking instead at ideals as 
embedded in social ideological discourses. Within this framework how can we 
understand the subject position of shameful when falling short of an ideal? 
My argument is that, far from being neutral, ideals are historical constructs heavily 
charged with meaning. Their legitimation rests on ideological practices which mask 
them as natural, neutral and 'common-sense'. The capacity to fit in with society's 
ideals grants people a sense of being 'right' and increases their self-esteem and well- 
being. On the contrary, when the women could not fulfil an ideal they felt ashamed 
and bad about themselves. 
The first finding of this theme is that, for the women interviewed, not meeting ideals 
had serious implications for their self-esteem and was expressed in terms of negative 
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self-evaluation. In this way, by positioning themselves as shameful they imply that 
it is their personal failing or inadequacy rather than the impossibility or intrinsically 
contradictory nature of the ideal, thus further legitimatizing the ideals. 
The second finding is connected to the rhetorical devices and strategies used to 
construct this theme. In particular I highlight how the participants, in constructing 
their accounts, rely on a dualistic discourse which separates individual and society, 
victim and perpetrators. 
The third point is connected to contradictions present in speech. For example, one of 
the participants talked of how being naked on a beach could be constructed as both 
a source of pride - within a feminist-militant discourse - and of shame - within a 
catholic discourse. In other words, each of these discourses makes available different 
positions. I illustrate through the analysis of the text first how the position of 
shameful is a negotiated product and second, that the positions are not equivalent in 
that they carry different implications in terms of self-image and self-worth. 
The question underpinning the second theme "Femininity and Shame" is: Are female 
sexuality and the female body shameful and if so, how is the shameful body 
constructed in speech? 
My aim in this theme was to investigate how the participants' way of accounting for 
positioning themselves as shameful functions as 'practical ideology' and contributes 
to the reproduction of female stereotypes. I found that the participants used the 
construction of their bodies and their sexuality as shameful in order to justify their 
experience of themselves as shameful. Through a discursive analysis of their accounts 
I was able to examine 'femininity' as actual practice rather than in theoretical terms. 
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I found, similar to the previous theme, that the whole construction of femininity is 
full of contradictions and that women employ specific strategies to make sense of 
these contradictions. For example, in one extract I found that the participant was 
using a dichotomy between the presentation of her body as resembling that of a 
teenager (source of pride) while actually being 47 years old (source of shame). The 
participant used a rhetoric of 'choice' and 'care of herself' to justify the two 
constructions of her body. In this way, I argued, the normal body of 47 is presented 
as a defect which has to be corrected to be acceptable, thus reinforcing stereotypes 
of female beauty. On the other hand, the same strategy also shows how individually 
the participant is struggling to maintain a positive self-image in the absence of 
alternative, more realistic discourses of the female body. 
This led me to another finding, particularly evident in the theme of shame and female 
sexuality, but applicable to some extent to all of the themes: women's resistance. 
Women construct their accounts in a way that allows them to find some space for 
resistance to the negative evaluation implied in patriarchal discourses. Unfortunately 
this often highlights the comparative lack of alternative discourses. For example, one 
participant attempted to resist the notion of female sexuality as shameful by making 
use of strategies which at the same time also reproduce traditional ideological 
repertoires on women. I suggest that the lack of alternative representations of 
femininity which do not position women as 'other' to men, and the changing and 
contradictory image of what a woman is, might contribute to women's difficulties in 
developing a positive sense of identity. I also connect this to women's frequent 
complaint of an erosion of their self-esteem, confusion about their worth and a 
pervasive uncertainty about their 'being in the world'. 
In the following theme, "Defences against Shame: Withdrawal and Silence", I ask 
whether women's positioning themselves as shameful also plays an ideological 
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function. If we accept that versions of facts are constructed in speech to accomplish 
certain social action and to exclude competing versions, the question is, what function 
is performed by women's accounts of their avoidance and silence when presented as 
protective measures to prevent exposure of their shameful self? I found that often 
women use these accounts to avoid alternative positions of being angry, competitive 
or powerful. Thus positioning themselves as shameful warrants their withdrawal from 
otherwise having to face a situation of conflict. 
An example of this is provided by one participant, who was ashamed and proud at 
the same time for being very good at school. This situation presented conflicts at two 
levels: the envy and attack from her peer group for being a 'goody-goody', and the 
guilt of being better than her older brother who was in the same class. Positioning 
herself as shameful and deciding from then on not to be too good at school, saved 
her from the conflictual situations. I therefore look at the shameful subject and the 
supposedly defensive strategy of withdrawal and silence, as a device to avoid 
conflicts around wider cultural issues of competition and women's access to power. 
I suggest that although silence and withdrawal might provide the individual women 
with a temporary solution to conflict, these strategies also have serious implications 
in terms of women's complicity with reproducing what has always been an 
'acceptable', but highly limiting and self-destructive view of women. The following 
two themes develop this argument and question that this type of strategy might not 
be very successful at an individual level either. 
The theme "The Shameful Self behind the Facade" looks further into self-protective 
strategies, in particular that of hiding behind a facade. This strategy rests on the 
dualistic split between the external public self, representing women in their competent 
and successful actions (constructed as the 'facade') and the internal experience, 
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representing women as faulty, inferior, shameful, inadequate, which is constructed as 
the 'true self. 
The question underlying this theme is whether it is possible to understand differently 
why the participants attribute the possibility of rejection to their unlovability based 
on positioning themselves as shameful and inadequate. My aim is to remove this 
dilemma from the personal sphere and re-connect it to the broader social issues to 
which it alludes. In particular I link the facade to the social construction of woman 
as 'other' to man, and bow in the absence of a representation of her value 'per se', 
women might conform to roles and expectations which makes them acceptable. 
I also stress in this theme how this continuous refusal to identify with a self that is 
strong and successful might have allowed the women to cope, but has also prevented 
something from developing. In other words, the facade might protect the self from 
negative attribution from the outside, but also prevents the positive, hidden qualities 
on the inside to express themselves; the inadequate position does not allow women 
to make a statement of their value. Furthermore, it encourages women to value 
themselves according to their capacity to please others, rather than looking after 
themselves and their needs. 
In the final theme "Shame of the Victim", I pull all the threads together and ask the 
question whether this type of analysis of women's accounts of shame has any 
practical significance for women. In this final section I argue that the solutions 
identified in the previous themes - ultimately that women construct shame as a 
reflection of personal faults - have a cumulative and damaging effect for women's 
sense of well-being. This is the focus of this last theme where I argue that 
positioning oneself as shameful is highly disempowering and debilitating. This 
argument is based on the claim that subject positions are not just theoretical 
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constructs, but have implications for one's sense of self and self-worth (Burman and 
Parker 1993). 
1 believe that the investigation of these real implications is an important factor if 
discursive analysis aims at political change. The question asked here then, is what 
effect the positioning of themselves as shameful or inadequate has on women. What 
transpired from the accounts was an apparent distrust in their own judgment and self- 
blame. For example, I found that in case of attack women often tended to question 
their perception of reality, their responsibility and complicity in the event, and finally 
turned the rage against themselves rather than on the attacker. I illustrate how the 
self-blame can be constructed as a positive 'taking responsibility for one's actions'. 
My intention is, at this point, to take to its extreme consequences the implications of 
positioning oneself as shameful and create some space for alternative subject- 
positions for women to emerge. 
5.3 Condusions 
In this chapter I have addressed some of the methodological issues raised in chapter 
four. In particular I have given an in depth description of the way I conducted the 
interviews and the qualitative methods used to analyze them. One of the issues raised 
in this chapter concerns similarities and differences between a discursive and a 
psychoanalytic reading of text. The issues related to the research/participant 
relationship and how they were affected by my clinical experience have also been 
discussed. I have also stated my research questions and given a general overview of 
the findings. The following five chapters form the qualitative section of the research, 
and contain an in-depth analysis and discussion of the five themes. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
Shame and the Ideal 
"We live in an atmosphere of shame. We are ashamed of everything that is 
real about us; ashamed of'ourselves, oJ"our relatives, oJ - our incomes, oJ'our 
accents, of our opinions, of our experience, just as we are ashamed of our 
naked skins. " 
(G. B. Shaw in Wumser 1981: 60) 
6.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to look at how shame is constructed within the theme of 
ideals and failing to meet them. I will also look at how a psychoanalytic reading of 
the accounts might contribute to the view that shame associated with failing to meet 
an ideal is a personal, intrapsychic issue. 
In opposition to this, I claim that the ideals and the associated shame are neither 'out 
there' or exclusively intrapsychic. Nor are ideals neutral constructs, but are embedded 
in social ideological discourses. My first step in this investigation will be to provide 
a relevant framework within psychoanalytic literature which I will subsequently 
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ground in the experiences reported in the interviews. This will be followed by a 
discursive analysis and a psychoanalytic reading of the extracts. 
6.1 Shame and the Ideal in Psychoanalysis 
As early as 1914 Freud made a connection between the reinforcement of the ego's 
narcissism, the fulfilling of the ideal and the increase in self-regard, clearly statmig 
that the ideal has a social side'. The fear of loss of parental love which motivates the 
child to comply to the parents' wishes, later in life becomes fear of loss of love from 
society. Freud explained this process by holding that the child introjects societal 
values and norms and is motivated to comply, from within, by the desire to be the 
'ideal child' loved by the parents. 
It is only with Sandler's formulation of ideal-self (Sandler 1986) that some space is 
allowed to the actual negotiation with societal values at present (for a more in-depth 
exploration of the concept see the Introduction). The concept of the ideal-self is based 
on Edith Jacobson's (1954) understanding of self-representation which is described 
as comprising the image and subjective experience of ourselves that we have at any 
given moment. 
In other words the self is constantly in a process of being negotiated and constructed. 
The concept of ideal-self from this point of view is quite rare in psychoanalysis, as 
8 "In addition to its individual side, the Ideal has a 
social side; it is also the common Ideal of a family, a 
class or a nation. [ ... I Originally this sense of guilt was 
a fear of punishment by the parents, or, more correctly, 
the fear of losing their love; later the parents are 
replaced by an indefinite number of fellow-men. " (Freud 
1914) 
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it considers the outside ideals in their present influence, not just as internalizations 
of norms'. 
The concept of the ideal-self is used to represent one of the shapes of the self- 
representation and is the desired shape of the self, i. e. the 'self-l-want-to-be'. This 
is the shape, at a particular moment, which would yield the greatest degree of well- 
being; in this way the attainment of the ideal-self motivates human beings (Sandler 
1986). If the individual cannot change in order to identify with their ideal-self there 
is the affective state of lowered self-esteem and shame (Pines 1995, Sandler 1963, 
Wumser 198 1) 
In line with this view, Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) holds that the pressure of sibling 
and peer group are much more significant in pressurising the individual to meet the 
ideal. Because of this pressure, the need to meet ideals can also become 
incapacitating as she considers the loss of society love to be at the level of a 
narcissistic injury (Chasseguet-Smirgel 1985). This view is consistent with Piers and 
Singer (1953) who stress the necessity of 'checking out' our ideals in the real world. 
It is this necessity of having our sense of value reflected back to us and approved of 
by people around us that makes the fulfilment of an ideal so crucial in terms of self- 
esteem. 
The above references to literature seem to suggest some recognition of the inter- 
subjective nature of the ideal-self. However, because psychoanalytic intervention aims 
at intrapsychic change (Sandler and Sandler 1993), the inter-subjective nature of the 
9 "At any one time we have a whole system of Ideal-Selves 
that are derived from different sources. One may be closely 
related to the aims of an unconscious instinctual wish, 
another may be linked to Super-Ego standards, others with 
the Ideals of the real parents or of the group of which we 
are a part, and so on. " (Sandler 1986: 124) 
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conflict can be neglected. The ideal is recognised as having importance because of 
itsfunction of motivator, but its content is considered irrelevant and is presented as 
neutral. In contrast with this view I want to argue that it is crucial to scrutinize how 
the ideal is constructed and presented. 
Firstly, ideals are heavily charged with meaning. Second being able to fit in with 
society's ideals grants people a sense of being 'right' and acceptable and increases 
their self-esteem and well-being. ideals are historical constructs whose legitimation 
rests on ideological practices which mask them as natural, neutral and 'common- 
sense'. 
6.2 Grounding theory in experience 
This chapter explores the connection between the ideals that the women inter-viewed 
measure themselves against and shame in the participants accounts. Following Brown 
and et al. (1990a, b), the implicit existence of these ideals were identified by 
sentences prefaced with phrases like I wish I were more/less... ", I would like to ...... 
I should... ". whereby the women positioned themselves as being other than or less 
than a desired standard. The majority of comments were very general and varied 
from person to person. For example Mae talked of personal characteristics: [I am not 
clever enough, I am not pretty enough, I am not intelligent enough, I am not 
attractive enough], while Dawn focused on social situations and performance in 
public: [a situation where you don't react in the way you are supposed to (.. ) being 
ashamed of not knowing what kind of things to say]. 
Sandy was very specific about the kind of person she would like to be: [I would like 
to be one of those capable people who seem to effortlessly manage to be pleasant and 
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not too much and not too overconfident and irritating because they are so full of 
themselves () calm, collected and likeable], while Tania was much more general: [I 
was reacting by trying to be ideal for my parents]. 
All the above texts construct a self that is lacking in relation to desired qualities 
around which the 'ideal- selves' are constructed. The women interviewed positioned 
themselves as being 'other than that'; implying that it is possible to be or become 
those ideal Selves, even if it is possible only for other women, as was implied by 
Sandy. 
What is striking about these ideals is that, apart from the account from Tania where 
the ideal is placed in the context of her parents' desire, all the other ideals are 
represented as self-referential. No explanation is offered on why they are desired or 
what being that particular kind of person would accomplish. The ideals are 
represented in isolation, as if standing on their own. The ideal cannot be questioned 
as it is presented as an absolute. For example Mae does not say that she is less pretty 
than x, but that she is not pretty enough. 
What is under scrutiny is the individual failure to meet the ideal; in this instance to 
be 'pretty enough'. It is around this failure that the shameful self is constructed. This 
is seen immediately in the fact that positioning of themselves in comparison to these 
ideals has implications for the women's sense of self. In these extracts the women 
take subject positions built around negative self-evaluation constructed in comparison 
with qualities or ways of being which are represented as existing independently of 
the subject and as distinct possibilities. 
The emotions expressed when talking about their failures are of inadequacy [Dawn: 
Iftlt inadequate in the sense that I had not been able to behave as I was expected] 
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and strong feelings of disliking oneself [Sandy: I think that people will see a very 
immature person, somebody who just gets it wrong, does everything wrong socially]. 
More specifically, I want to focus on the fact that the shameful self is constructed 
around the comparison with the ideal, as is clearly stated by Moira: 
"It is like a struggle between what you would like to be and what you really 
are(. ) shame comes into that when you realize that you are not actually the 
person you would like to be and you have to confront your own weaknesses 
and bad points(. )" 
This account constructs the ideal as the context which makes the self shameful. Moira 
is presenting the dynamic as a fact and the feeling of shame as a result of her insight 
into this fact. The two selves, the self she would like to be and the self she really is, 
are presented as things, separate and, in this case, different. This allows Moira to 
position her shame as a positive, mature acknowledgment of 'reality'. This 
acknowledgment, it is suggested, takes place within Moira and is her own private 
affair. 
Other women offered a different version of their shameful feelings and introduced 
the effect of media and 'society'. For instance Judy, talking about what contributed 
to her feelings of shame concerning her body said: 
"[.. ] I never ftlt that I could actually meet those expectations, I mean they 
are seýf-imposed in a sense but you know coming through things like pictures, 
cause I was not aware of how the media informs thosefeelings at the time but 
I was certainly aware ofpictures on telly and adverts and dolls [.. ]" 
The language she uses in describing expectations as 'coming through things like 
pictures' suggests the idea of herself as passive recipient of messages which manage 
to get inside of her and then become self-imposed. These messages come from 
agencies which, in the account, are presented as being 'out there'. Therefore shame 
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is presented as the result of social conditioning. The supposition "you know" implies 
a shared knowledge between her and I, further warranting our joint position as 
victims of social conditioning. 
On similar lines Sonia, while talking about why sexual freedom in women can be 
seen as shameful, gave this explanation: 
"They (people) would think that I am cheap, there is no doubt about that, it's 
like "Ifshe does that... 'Y all the whole attribution series -aoes into motion, they 
apply as throughout a series of eventsl basically it's sociery that makes usfeel 
shamefull f.. ] We live in a very bigoted society [. J' 
Here the social conditioning is more openly stated, and with it is the passive position 
of being shameful. This is further qualified as being the judgement of a bigoted 
society. The distancing from that society is stated by the opposition to what they, the 
other people, the bigoted society out there would think, with the implication that she 
would think otherwise. Her possible feelings of shame are thus constructed as an 
imposition. 
The two above accounts rest on a dualistic discourse which separates individual and 
society, victims and perpetrators. The power to impose ideals and to shame is located 
C out there' in society and the individual woman is the victim of it. Foucault strongly 
dismissed this dualistic representation of how power is exercised as insufficient 
(Foucault 1980). In particular it is inadequate in untangling the complexities in which 
power finds expression. A Foucaultian approach can be useful to feminism, as it 
enables going beyond the belief in a purely 'innocent' class of the purely 'oppressed' 
(Bailey 1993: 111) and replaces it with a new understanding of one's identity and its 
possibilities (ibid: 117). Furthermore I would argue that locating power in an external 
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force makes invisible the spontaneous and solitary resistances of women in everyday 
life". 
I will try to capture the complexities of oppression, shame and resistance, still in the 
theme of ideals through the following extract from an interview with Moira. I want 
to argue that when looking at the experience of shame she describes, we are looking 
at a struggle for a different 'meaning' to be attributed to her action and for a 
different discourse within which she would not be positioned as shameful. 
I will first give a psychoanalytic reading of the account. In it I will use two concepts: 
one is the understanding of shame as a reaction-formation and the other is the 
concept of the ideal-self, which I have already described in the previous pages (see 
also shapter four for a discussion of the concept). Although both psychoanalytic, 
these two views on shame show how shame acquires quite a different meaning 
according to the view on human nature and motivation underlying the two 
formulations. It could be argued that they function as different discourses on the 
human mind. 
10 Foucault asserts that "there is a plurality of 
resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that 
are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are 
spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or 
violent; still others that are quick to compromise, 
interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only 
exist in the strategic field of power relations. " (Foucault 
1978: 96 as cited in Bailey 1993: 116) 
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6.3 Moira's account 
M: I was on the beach, last summer and we were sunbathing in France, we had 
been to a nudist beach the previous day and although this was not a nudist 
beach people were topless, and I took my top off and someone was 
completely naked and I thought "what the hell" and I got completely naked 
on the beach and I was placidly lying down and there was this guy who was 
selling drinks and my husband stopped to buy a drink and they began to have 
a chat and 1 felt extremely exposed. The conversation went on because my 
husband was very interested in what he had to say and I suddenly became 
totally self-conscious and I had been very brave (. ) obviously you feel that 
you have to go along with it, once you have your aims set you become kind 
of militant about it, but in fact I was feeling quite self-conscious about (it), 
and it is a fear, because in a way to put clothes on was admitting that I was 
feeling shame so (. ) 
B: This is very interesting because it sounds like there are two themes (. ) one 
was the fact that your naked body was exposed, but there was also something 
else and that was (-) you felt you had to be in a certain way and to put your 
clothes on would have showed that you were not in that way 
M: yes, yes [B] is that right? 
M: yes, I suppose I was feeling very bad about it but I had to struggle in my 
mind thinking "so what the hell, what is wrong with it", but I was feeling 
uncomfortable, I was not enjoying being naked, I had enjoyed it before, it 
became a kind of a self punishment, I did not want to show that that was it, 
that I was feeling embarrassed about my own nakedness, so I had to struggle 
between the image I wanted to project and my own self-image, a tricky one, 
but it was funny how this bloke was like a mirror in front of me and while 
before I could not see myself I began to see myself/[ ... 
] yes, it is like a 
struggle between what you would like to be and what you really are; you 
would like to be all free of inhibition and censorship and in fact you are not, 
realizing all that (.. ) 
6.3.1 The Psychoanalytic Reading 
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If we approach the account looking for the causes of shame, two can be identified: 
Moira's exhibitionistic drive and her becoming aware of a discrepancy between her 
'actual self' and her 'ideal-self. The former belongs to the classic psychoanalytic 
frame of reference which regards shame as a reaction formation. There is Moira's 
desire to expose her body and the pleasurable feelings associated with it ["I was 
placidly laying down; V had enjoyed it before (being naked)"]. This is followed 
however by being seen, which provokes feelings of self-consciousness. The feeling 
of exposure becomes negative and painful: she experiences it as uncomfortable, a 
kind of self punishment and finally there is embarrassment. 
The concept of shame as caused by falling short of an ideal can be identified when 
she talks of the struggle between the "image I wanted to project and my own se4f- 
image" and clearly spelt out when she says "it is a struggle between what you would 
like to be and what you really are; you would like to be all ftee of inhibitions and 
censorship and in fact you are not, realizing all that.. " 
The first problem with this type of analysis is that it ends up isolating aspects of the 
experience of shame, somehow separating them from the context which ultimately 
gives them meaning. This type of analysis seems to rest on some underlying 
assumptions which are worth paying attention to: Firstly, that the various elements 
considered are facets of the 'phenomenon of shame' which is 'out there', and can be 
observed and measured. Language is taken to reflect a number of these facets or 
factors at a given time. Secondly, a Newtonian model of cause and effect still 
permeates the analysis of the cause of shame. Thirdly, by using a psychoanalytic 
model, shame automatically becomes an exclusively 'intrapsychic' phenomenon. 
6.3.2 A Discoursive Analysis 
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Moving onto a more discursive level of analysis of the text implies leaving most of 
these assumptions behind. It requires moving away from the assumption that language 
is neutrally describing the phenomenon of shame and looking moreover at how 
language is used and for what purposes. Furthermore, what are the contexts which 
give meaning to shame and what are the implications of using those contexts of 
meaning? 
I he apparent content or this shame experience is reiated to nakedness. At the 
beginning of her account, Moira tells me about having been to a nudist beach the 
previous day. This information has the function of contextualising and perhaps 
justifying her subsequent actions. This attempt at legitimation carries on in the next 
line with the information that ".. although that was not a nudist beach [Jsomeone 
was completely naked'. 
Following on from the above psychoanalytic reading, if language neutrally represents 
Moira's shame, then shame is an intrapsychic conflict and is exclusively her own 
business. But if Moira is drawing on existing socially constructed discourses, her 
shame expresses some of the dilemmas connected to the contradictory demands made 
on women at this point in history. 
The psychoanalytic framework is still useful. It would seem that the two 
psychoanalytic explanations or contexts coexist and run parallel to each other in the 
account. However, what I am interested in is what happens when they clash. Moira 
introduces the contradiction with two opposite representations of the same action. She 
talks of feelings of self-consciousness and shame on the one hand and pride for 
having been brave on the other: "I suddenly became totally seýflconscious and I had 
been very brave" (10,11). 
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Moira here is adopting two subject-positions. I suggest two interpretations of her 
words. From within the context of Moira wanting to be in control of her body, 
having dared to be naked is signifier of courage, emancipation, open-mindedness, 
sexual liberation. At the same time and within the same context, putting her clothes 
back on would mean defeat and shame. However, from within the context of 
acceptable social behaviour the same action of being naked is a signifier of shame. 
1 would argue that it depends on which 'self Moira identifies with that determines 
her action as shameful or as a source of pride. It would appear, however, that there 
is some uncertainty about which of these is the shameful self and that neither can be 
sustained for long. 
Moira appears to take up both subject positions at the same time. She offers the story 
as a dilemma between the two contexts but also as a double bind between, a) two 
ideals which are mutually exclusive and b) the contradiction between what Moira 
ideally wants to do and the way this makes her feel uncomfortable and becomes a 
self-punishment. The dilemma and the feelings of shame are not 'caused' by Moira, 
but by the nature of her self as a contradictory, fragmented and constructed thing. 
It is constructed in at least two senses: firstly, through contexts which reflect 
contradictory demands made on women on a large scale i. e. the apparently 
'acceptable' uses of female nudity in fashion, advertising and the media in general" 
and the coexistence of both 'traditional' and 'modern' stereotypes for women. 
11 "The paradox that women's breasts glare out from almost 
every tabloid newspaper and are used to sell all manner of 
consumer durables, yet a woman who bares her own breasts in 
public could be arrested for indecent exposure, points to 
the anomaly that men have more access to and control over 
women's bodies than women themselves" (Ussher 1989: 22). 
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Secondly, the self is always negotiated and constructed primarily in the interaction 
with the 'other'. There are at least three possible 'others' in this extract, each having 
a different 'effect' on the process of attribution of meaning. There is the 'other' of 
the nudist beach visited the previous day, the 'other' in the shape of the man selling 
drinks, and there is me, with my multiple self of woman, researcher, feminist, 
psychologist. 
I .,. I. in other words, the seit is fragmenied and contradictory because it is being 
constructed in the here and now of the interaction. This is why it is crucial to look 
at my role and that of the 'others' and the negotiation of the two above positions 
within the interview setting. 
The justification of why Moira was sunbathing naked could be seen as an attempt to 
make me judge her positively. This strategy highlights the power imbalance between 
her and I in the interview setting. Moira begins by saying that she did not feel shame 
on the nudist beach the previous day. The nudist beach had provided her with a 
context within which her nakedness was not a signifier of shame. We could postulate 
that this was because everyone else was naked and she was not different; i. e. the 
ýsocial norm' was different, or perhaps because nakedness did not carry any sexual 
connotation. What matters is that by referring to the nudist beach, Moira introduces 
the possibility of a context within which it is possible to attribute a different meaning 
to her action. 
This is what I think she is attempting to do again with me. It is in this context that 
I read the sudden shift to the use of 'you' as an impersonal pronoun ["Obviously you 
feel that you have to go along with it and once you have set your aims you become 
.. 
" (11,12)] as a way of drawing me into the assumed shared position as 'liberated' 
women. The fact that the sentence is ended with a statement of the dilemma and 
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somehow left suspended can be seen either as an invitation to me to express my 
opinion or perhaps a way of eliciting direction. 
My response is apparently non-committal and seems to paraphrase what Moira had 
said. On the other hand what I say confirms the existence of her conflict. Perhaps the 
use of paraphrasing, a well-known counselling skill, is what prompted her to talk 
more in depth about her feelings. If this is the case, she was responding to my 
psychoanalytic self. 
The third 'other' mentioned in the extract is the man selling drinks. His function as 
a mirror is particularly interesting. In the extract he is used as the other who, in the 
experience of shame, breaks the silent, unconscious continuity of existence and makes 
the self painfully visible and aware of itself. However, in order for this process to 
produce shame, the image of the self as shameful has to be accepted as a true 
representation and be identified with. 
The role of the man, then, could be taken to represent a patriarchal common-sense 
discourse on the female body. The examination of this is far beyond the scope of this 
chapter, however, the way in which this man is positioned by Moira is as a reminder 
of the way she will be seen by 'society'. The way in which this symbolic mirror 
positions Moira becomes, at least partially, the way she sees herself. Therefore her 
female, naked body becomes a signifier of shame. Moira concludes the extract by 
saying: "ahm, I suppose I could say I felt shame, I felt ashamed of my naked body 
and therefore of myself. " 
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6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the construction of shame through falling short of an 
ideal, using both a psychoanalytic and discourse analytic approach. The next chapter 
takes up this last statement of Moira's as the starting point for an investigation of the 
theme of shame and femininity, in particular the complex transaction through which 
a shameful body becomes a shameful self. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
Femininity and Shame 
"According to Goffinan f.. ] the 'beauty system' is naturalised by the ideology 
of sexual differences and is made to feel essential to femininity. f.. ] But what 
this ideology implies is that, like a stigma, the unadorned and unimproved 
female body is a source of shame and negative feelings. " (Tseelon 1995: 90) 
7.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore some constructions of femininity used by the 
participants to explain and justify their representations of themselves and other 
women as shameful. I will argue that this way of accounting functions as a practical 
ideology (Gill 1993) and contributes to the reproduction of female stereotypes. The 
underlying intention in this chapter is to move beyond 'femininity' as simply an 
effect of patriarchal oppression and to look at how women are active in the process 
of reproducing stereotypes (Smith 1990). To approach the issues through women's 
accounts has the benefit of examining 'femininity' as actual practices, actual 
activities, taking place in real time and real places (Smith 1990: 38). 
The general theme of 'femininity' will be examined by looking at shame in relation 
to the two themes of the feminine body and female sexuality. This is because the 
majority of women talked extensively or made some reference to one or both of these 
themes. I will start by looking at each first from a psychoanalytic frame of reference, 
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then link it to broader sociological issues and their feminist critiques. Finally I will 
discursively analyse some extracts from the interviews and propose a post-structuralist 
critique of some of the issues raised by the analysis of the extracts. 
One important clarification to be made here, is that all the women interviewed spoke 
of their sexuality and their bodies within the context of heterosexuality. The 
discussion of the implications of heterosexuality as the implicit norm is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, it is cruclai to bear in mind that in this chapter the 
female body and sexuality are looked at exclusively within that context. 
7.1 BODY AND BEAUTY 
7.1.1 Back to Freud 
For Freud, women's shame is firmly rooted in the female body's inherent deficiency 
(1897,1933). Chapter three summarised Freud's phallocentric representation of 
femininity and some of its feminist critiques; in that chapter Freud's representation 
of women has been taken to represent the construction of femininity in a patriarchal 
society. Freud defined shame as the female feeling par excellence, and attributed it 
to the lack of a penis. This lack, according to Freud, makes women more narcissistic 
and vain in an attempt to compensate for their deficiency. Thus, the centrality of the 
body in women's shame is granted not only by its deficient state, but also by the 
extra attention women lavish it with in order to compensate for its lack of a penis. 
It is from this centrality of the body that this chapter begins, attempting an 
investigation which wants to go ftirther than a portrayal of women as passive victims 
of patriarchy. It has been argued that the internalisation of a patriarchally constructed 
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image of the female body might affect women's sense of value and identity (Ussher 
1989, Wolf 1990, Faludi 1991). In an attempt to utilize Freudian theory, feminist 
writers have suggested a symbolic reading of the phallus as representing women as 
second class and inferior (see chapter three for a review of the literature) 
Luce Irigaray (1974,1985) is particularly enlightening in understanding the impact 
of patriarchal discourses whose phallocentric biases are taken for universal truth 
(Whitford, 1992), despite the criticisms of her having used another torm ot 
essentialism in the shape of an alternative feminine discourse modeled the on female 
genitals, in order to rescue women from the repressive effects of phallocentrism (see 
Berg 1991)12 
Irigaray argues, for instance, that the women constructed within a psychoanalytic 
discourse are positioned as 'lacking', deprived of a value per se. Woman is defined 
as the other sex in terms of its relation to men: as mother, virgin or whore, for 
example, but not in relation to themselves (Whitford 1992). 
In the interviews, when talking about their relationship with their bodies, the women 
communicated a powerful awareness of their physicality. This was often 
communicated with a desire 'to be beautiU' (eg Sandy: I would like them to think 
that I am attractive) and in most cases paralleled a dissatisfaction with their actual 
appearance. For example: 
Tania: I had a big split between my expectations for myself and what I was in terms 
of emotionally and intelligently, suddenly I had this body and I would throw 
it away/ 
There is a vast body of literature which has 
expressed doubts and often severe criticisms of 
various parts of Irigaray's theory (see for instance 
Plaza 1982, Silverman 1988) 
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Judy: My sense of feeling ashamed of my body and not feeling comfortable 
with it, which is not as acute as it was, but still not being able to be 
the way that I am (. ) maybe it has got to do with expectation, maybe 
with cardboard cut-out/ 
The women expressed very strong negative feelings coupled with a sense of being 
uncomfortable and feeling painfully visible. These feelings were particularly acute 
concerning body size and shape. 
7.1.2 Feminism and the Female Body. 
Feminist writers have always paid a great deal of attention to the representations, 
fantasies and exploitations of the female body (De Beauvoir 1949, Millett 1972). A 
lot has been written recently on the objectification of women's physical appearance 
as a challenge to capitalistic/patriarchal oppression (Williamson 1978, Coward 1984, 
Wolf 1990, Faludi 1992, Stanley and Wise 1993). In particular some feminist writers 
have highlighted some fundamental contradictions which confront modern women. 
For instance, it has been noted that while the extensive use of female bodies in 
advertising might seem to suggest an intrinsic link between the female body and 
beauty, the derogatory light under which the female body is constructed carries the 
potential for women's debilitation and negative self-image (Ussher 1989). 
Particular attention has also been paid to the 'ideal of beauty' and the investment in 
it. For instance, it has been recognized that while commonly accepted practices of 
heterosexual femininity take for granted that there is status and power in being 
attractive to men (Hollway 1984), adhering to current ideals of attractiveness might 
turn out to be an impossible task. Wetherell and White (1992) for example, have 
pointed out how often the 'Ideal woman' is portrayed as being a size eight, which for 
most healthy, adult women would be unrealistic to attain. (This is apart from the 
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continually reinforced ideal of being white, heterosexual and able-bodied, which for 
large sections of the population are either impossible or irrelevant) 
However even in these most striking cases, women often do not regard the ideal as 
impossible, or even unreasonable, but rather experience themselves as failing and are 
ashamed of their bodies (Wetherell and White 1992). In this way, an unnatural, 
constructed value is presented as natural and normal and gains legitimacy. 
S. Orbach (1986) takes this situation to its extreme consequences and suggests a link 
between these contradictory demands and anorexia. She argues that : 
"Anorexia nervosa - self-starvation - is [ ... ]a metaphor of our age [ ... ]a 
dramatic expression of the internal compromise wrought by Western women 
in the 1980s in their attempt to negotiate their passions and desires in a time 
of extraordinary confusion. [ ... ] what occurs 
in anorexia nervosa is the 
excruciating spectacle of women actually transforming their bodies in their 
attempts to deal with the contradictory requirements of their role in late 
twentieth-century America and England. " (Orbach 1993: 4) 
This is, I think, exemplified in the following extract from the interview with Sonia, 
which I Will now analyse, suggesting a reading of it related to Irigaray's concept of 
the body as 'wrapping'. Irigaray (1974,1985) argued that women's power under 
patriarchy is dependent upon their function as a means of exchange, whereby their 
worth resides in the conformity of their bodies to patriarchal standards of beauty. If 
in a male-dominated 'market', the phallus is the only 'currency', femininity is caught 
in the vicious circle of having to learn to act 'as if she had it'. " 
" The implications of this phenomenon in terms of sense of 
identity will be further explored in the chapter on the 
'faqadel. 
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The body, argues Ingaray, becomes women's fagade of value; the phys1cal vanIty of 
women and the 'fetishization' of her body mandatory if she is to be a desirable 
4 object'. She will seek to secure an increase in her price by using disguises and 
masks in the form of cosmetics, through which women intend to deceive; to promise 
more value than can be delivered (Irigaray 1974). 
However, the resulting sense of value is short-lived and always at the mercy of a 
deprecating look. Shame will be the remainder of the compromise and the disavowal 
at work in the fetish. 14 It is in this light that I wish to look at the following extract. 
7.1.3 Sonia'a Account. 
S: I don't think I have got any problems with my self image physically, I am 
quite happy with that: I am not a beast or skinny so I think that is OKJ 
I would like to turn the clock back and turn younger/ 
B: I have just realized I did not ask you how old you are/ 
S: Is that really necessary? 
B: Well, if you don't want to/ 
S: 47 (laughs) and this is a source of amusement because no one knows my age 
and I never tell anybody, not that I am ashamed of it, I am quite proud of it 
in a way because I have done a lot of things, I have achieved a lot very early 
because I also studied abroad and I studied arts and I think one's vitality and 
contentment shows on one's face and that's why I say I am quite happy with 
myself physically because I still think I have a physique of almost like a 
teenager, so I if I took my clothes off and look at this body it does not look 
like a 47 years old body simply because I am not a great drinker, I don't 
14 "Therefore woman weaves in order to veil herself, masks 
the faults of Nature, and restore her in her wholeness. By 
wrapping her up. In a wrapping that Marx has told us 
preserves the "value" from a just evaluation. And allow the 
"exchange" of goods "without knowledge" of their effective 
value. " (Irigaray 1974: 115) 
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15 smoke, I swim and I am aware of my body, things that are going on, I go to 
16 the osteopath every week/ 
7.1.4 A Discursive Analysis. 
The extract opens with a positive remark and the participant positions herself as 
happy and not having a problem with self-image. However, what immediately 
transpires from this extract is that in spite of this, the positive attribution to her 
physical appearance is made in negative terms: I am not a beast or skinny so I think 
that is OK. " This is presented as not having problems with self-image, implying that 
those are the limits of positive experience of one's body. 
Soon after that, Sonia tells me that age is an issue, and stresses that further by an 
outburst of laughter, which I would interpret as containing a mixture of 
embarrassment and pride. She is very keen to specify that her age is a source of 
amusement, then she reassures me that it is certainly not source of shame, 
underscoring this by adding that it is in fact source of pride. 
My first reaction would be to take the statement "not that I am ashamed of it" as a 
'disclaimer' (see Wetherell and Potter 1992). This however, would have some 
important consequences: firstly, it would mean forcing a choice on Sonia as to 
whether she feels proud or ashamed of her body. Secondly, it would grant me the 
privileged position of somehow knowing what she really feels. Thirdly, I would be 
looking at Sonia's body as a thing, rather than as a multifaceted construction. I would 
then lose sight of the coexistence of two representations of body: one, the 'teenage 
body' is represented as a source of pride, while the forty-seven years old body is 
presented shamefully, hidden and denied. What is crucial in the understanding of 
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Sonia's choice of identifying with the 'teenage body' is that only that position spares 
her from shame. She colludes with the arbitrary value given to looking young and 
slim, thereby evading the devaluation implicit in her actual age. 
Sonia constructs a further split, already identified in other accounts, between mind 
and body. In this extract her intellectual achievements, which, she tells us, show as 
vitality and contentment on her face, are somehow quite separate from her carefully 
looked-after physique. 
The implications of the use of an unrealistic ideal for women has been discussed in 
the previous chapter. What I am interested in here is the mystification of the rhetoric 
of 'choice' and 'self-determination' and their key role in commercial representations 
of diet and exercise. There are two points here that need to be clearly spelled out as 
they are relevant to the extract above. 
The first is the rhetoric of care which makes it difficult to distinguish between 
genuine self-care, from a practice of self-riormalisation to current standards of 
femininity (visits to the osteopath, exercise, not smoking). The second, connected to 
this, and carrying serious consequences for women's relationship to their bodies, is 
that the original body (i. e. the mean before the normalisation), becomes a "defect 
which has been corrected" (Bordo 1993: 179) and this is because it is compared to the 
normal ised\unreal body. 
The extract from Sonia therefore offers a graphic representation of how individually 
she struggles to survive the shame of a 'real body' in the absence of more realistic 
ideals and alternative discourses of the female body. However, I have also pointed 
out my difficulty in completely identifying her strategy as straightforward resistance. 
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Bordo (1993) has warned against the pseudo-feminist messages of the mass-media 
which present women's 'normalisation' (the re-shaping of one's body to fulfil current 
ideals of beauty), under the light of self-empowerment and 'taking one's life into 
one's hands' (Bordo 1993: 196). She gives the poignant example of the singer Cher, 
who by successive operations of cosmetic surgery, re-shaped her body into a more 
conventional, ever-youthful version of female beauty. However, this unrealistic and 
unreal body, argues Bordo, tragically becomes a standard against which other women 
will measure, judge, discipline and 'correct' themselves (Bordo 1993: 197). 
Similar issues are negotiated in the next extract, which highlights the fragmented, 
multifaceted construction of the female body, shame and the self. 
7.1.5 Judy's Account. 
[ ... ]I think I was always very self-conscious because I thought I was fat, and 
clothes never felt right to me and I always felt that people were sort of 
looking at me and think that I was fat and I was never particularly fat, I was 
sort of (. ) I had puppy fat (. ) I was never noticeably fat but I used to think 
that people were pointing at me saying "Gosh, she is fat, look at her, she is 
podgy, ugly/ 
Judy's account moves between many different levels, demonstrating how the 
construction of the shameful female body, far from being a one-directional, 
straightforward process, involves constant negotiations and contradictions. 
The first line already contains two levels of polarities: past-present and subject-object. 
The past-present opposition is there from the onset [I think (present) I was (past) 
always very self-conscious because I thought (past) I was fat" (past)]. By starting her 
speech by reference to a present reflection immediately Judy sheds a light of 
uncertainty about what happened: it is not clear whether, a) in the past she was fat 
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or not; b) whether something else happened in the past but on reflection, this is what 
she has now decided happened; or c) whether or not it was her body size that made 
her self-conscious or something else altogether. 
One of the effects of this initial line is to set the scene: we might expect, as we are 
talking about bodies, reference to concrete facts. Instead the speech conveys 
confusion, uncertainty, vagueness. The body constructed is not a solid, easily 
definabie entity, but obviously constantly negotiated. The other effect of this opening 
is to ground the following statement in the present context of the interview. 
The important polarity between thinking and being, mind and body, is also stated in 
the first line. This strategy requires the listener to suspend the belief in one's body 
by pointing at the possible difference between a body as it is 'thought about' and as 
it is 'lived'. 
Up to now there is no conflict between subject and object: we are invited to assume 
that the Judy who was self-conscious, the Judy who thought she was fat and the Judy 
who was fat were the same agent. This is totally contradicted, however, in the next 
few lines where we are told she felt that other people thought that she was fat, 
whereas actually she was not. This contradiction and the increased uncertainty is 
made more evident by the presence of 'never particularly' and 'never noticeably'. 
The use of words like 'never', 'always', 'everybody' are often employed to make the 
statement more persuasive functioning as 'extreme case formulations' (Pomerantz 
1986). So we are further invited to believe that it was other people who thought she 
was fat, although in fact she never was. And yet in both cases 'never' is immediately 
followed by a word which mitigates or even nullifies the impact of the statement. At 
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first she says that she was "never particularly fat" thus juxtaposing a very powerful 
word which cannot be disputed with a relative, imprecise term. 
To come out of this impasse Judy resorts to another split of child/adult and states that 
she had 'puppy fat'. In this way she introduces a further differentiation which allows 
her to be fat and not fat at the same time, i. e. she evokes a context in which her 
fatness would be acceptable. This is furthered by saying that she was never 
"noticeably fat", i. e. that she was fat but it wasn't noticeable. This in turn introduces 
the final polarity between subject and object to explain how, despite the fact that she 
did not think she was fat and that she indeed was not particularly fat, people still 
noticed it and pointed at her. The quote ends with the poignant equation of being fat 
with being ugly. 
I read this dense and tortuous statement in many ways. Firstly I think it illustrates the 
complexity of the negotiations surrounding the female body and some of the 
polarities between which that negotiation takes place. Secondly, it shows Judy's 
struggle to resist negative definitions of her body. Thirdly, it shows how the self is 
constantly negotiated in a to and fro movement between subject, audience and 
internalisation of the judgement. This also demonstrates the intersubjective nature of 
language. Finally if we take the first and last lines of this extract, the pain is firmly 
placed with Judy: she is shameful and ugly. 
I want to pursue this further in the continuation of the interview which contains some 
explanation of how she arrived at this position in regard to her body. 
Judy: 
One of the things I remember is being very ashamed of my body and not 
going swimming for long long time, then I bought this bikini, I was 12,13, 
1 had breasts and this bikini really showed them off/ and I remember that I 
felt that all the men were staring at me, maybe they weren't, but I was 
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mortified, I wanted to chop my head off my body and be sort of disassociated 
with this/ and I was aware of men and boys looking at me but I was not sure 
whether they were looking at me in adoration or critically, or laughing at me/ 
I just had this terrible feeling of being on show and being on exhibit/ I was 
not just a girl going for a swim, I was a girl in a bikini with big breasts/ [ ... ] On exhibit, like an object, a sexual sort of object, kind of a (. ) someone who 
represents something, [ ... ] it felt a bit wrong because I was being looked at like an adult but I still felt like a child and therefore I felt like I was being 
looked at in that sense, like I was on show, parading in front of people/ 
In the previous extract Judy's body was constructed as uncertain, contradictory and 
changeable in terms of what it was, although definitely shameful. The construction 
of shameful body is due to Judy feeling shame as self-consciousness because she 
thought she was fat and because she felt that other people thought she was fat. We 
are left not knowing what her body was in reality. In the second extract, however, 
the body eventually becomes physical, even though split between head and breasts. 
This account constructs the female body as object: a sexual object and the object of 
the male gaze, built on the reflected image received from other people. 
This representation is in the experience of being on exhibit and of being disassociated 
from one's body. This disassociation is considered as the effect of the gaze which 
positions the woman not as a person but as an agglomerate of sexual part-objects ("I 
was not just a girl going for a swim I was a girl in a bikini with big breasts"). 
This act of power and control is graphically expressed by Foucault: 
"There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a 
gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will 
end by interiorising to the point the he is his own overseer, each individual 
thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself' (Foucault 
1977: 155, my italics). 
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The disassociation is also defined as a defensive measure, by turning the rage against 
oneself ("I was mortified, I wanted to chop my head off my body and be sort of 
disassociated with this"). It has been noted by feminist researchers (Swann 1995, 
Malson 1995), that a dualistic mind-body discourse is often employed to make sense 
of women's relationship to anorexia and PMT. This extract implies that a 
disassociation of the mind from the body is considered a necessary measure to retain 
a minimal sense of self Disassociation is therefore presented as a way of preserving 
some sense of ownership of one's self, by allowing the spht-off, shameful body to 
be owned by the gaze, while the 'woman' hides. 
This disassociation perhaps explains some of the confusion between what Judy 
thought and what she was, expressed in the previous extract as if she had 
metaphorically separated her mind from her body. 
There is also a continuation of the split between adult and child. A resolution to this 
split is offered by the representation of herself as a girl (child) with big breasts 
(adult). And yet this extract still contains resistance to this image which Judy insists 
is forced on her from outside. The resistance to being 'an object, a sexual sort of 
object' can be found in her feelings that there was something wrong, again a split, 
between her feelings of being a child while being looked at as an adult. 
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7.2 SEXUALITY 
"It is during adolescence that the young woman first experiences a split 
between her body and her self: between her own experience and the archetype 
she is expected to emulate. " (Ussher, 1989: 14) 
One of the functions of the child\adult split as communicated in the interviews, is that 
positioning oneself as a child might offer some safety from being a sexual object. 
This is supported by the way women talked about puberty which irrevocably marks 
the change into womanhood. Often the participants identified puberty as the moment 
in which, as women, they became shameful. For instance: 
Jessica: 
I think for women the body is also about shame, shame of looking like a 
woman. [ ... 
]I think the body becomes some sort of vehicle for dealing with 
sexuality, dealing with shame [ ... II have talked with many women about what it is about going into puberty, and the feelings about the changes between 
themselves and brothers and the father/ 
Here the body, sexuality and shame are all placed under the same umbrella, almost 
to the point of implying that shame and sexuality are the same. This is explained later 
where, when commenting on a shameful incident she has just told me about, she 
remembers: 
Jessica: 
um (. ) like I had been slapped in the face/ interesting that slapping the face 
makes me think of my mother telling me of when she started her periods and 
she hid it and then she told her mother and her mother slapped her/ that's 
what they do, they slap the girls around their faces when they start their 
periods, because that was the end of innocence as it were, and she 
remembered feeling that she was bad and I think that these things are carried 
from mother to daughter/ 
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Several times women expressed the shame and negative connotations attached to 
women who are represented as actively sexual: Doreen: "a shameful woman would 
be a 'femme fatale"'; Paula: "sex before marriage [ ... ] was a man's gain and woman's 
shame"; Sonia (referring to a woman going to a bar by herself): "What this woman 
comes here by herself for (giggles) is she looking around for something? "; Jessica: 
I think I felt very ashamed because I wanted to be very sexy" and later she adds, 
"How can we be as women? There is a line between what is seen as being a tart and 
being ... so if you are in your body and you move and you like eye contact with 
people you are also seen as a tart, so how do women become unashamed and feel 
that it is alright to be the way they are? " 
The above quote summarises the main conflict in women's heterosexuality; the 
difficulty in finding a satisfactory position between the need to be in control of one's 
sexuality and at the same time the fear of being judged a 'tart'. It has been pointed 
out how women are torn in the 'madonna/whore' dichotomy as a result of which 
women cannot find a positive model for identification. 
"Individual women are inevitably positioned at either end of the dichotomy: 
good/bad, madonna/whore, feminine/career-oriented [ ... ] This welter of 
images 
forms a large part of the contradictory discourses which both define and 
prescribe behaviour. [ ... 
] This inevitably leads to consternation and splitting 
in the individual woman... " (Ussher 1989: 15). 
It could be argued that in fact women take on all of these positions and that shame 
is one of the ways of negotiating the contradictions. This has been suggested by 
Wumser (198 1), for example, who claims that shame can be caused by a 'split' used 
as a way of dealing with contradictions; the interweaving inner and outer reality. 
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I have selected the next extract because it touches on many such 'splits' and 
contradictions around female sexuality as the site of negotiation for women's value 
and shame. The account graphically illustrates the many contradictory constructions 
of 'being a woman' and how these contradictions are negotiated through actions of 
projection and the use of disclaimers. Particular attention is paid to the 
'madonna/whore' dichotomy, which many feminist writers have looked at as central 
in the dilemma of female sexuality as discussed above. " 
Contrary to Judy who immediately took the position of women being shameful, 
Ambra resists this definition. And yet, in the very accounts she uses to prove that 
women are not shameful, it is possible to see the re/production of ideological 
repertoires which construct women as shameful. Ambra makes use of opposition as 
a rhetorical device to explain how it might be that sometimes women are represented 
as shameful: 
7.2.1 Ambra's Account. 
B: What do you think makes shame so powerful? 
A: Because in the past women did not have anything else except 
their virtue, so they had to protect it, while virtue is not an issue for men, 
men are supposed to sow their wild oats and rubbish like that while f ... ] 
morality may even have told them [women] that if they lost their virtue there 
was nothing left, especially in Indian cultures, the woman was nothing 
without a man, so that's why they burnt the widows with their husbands in 
the fires, we still get it, it's illegal now/ but now that women have careers of 
their own, virtue does not matter that much/ 
15 11 The other sex is def ined in terms of its relation to 
men: as mother, virgin or whore, for example; but not in 
relation to itself. " (Irigaray in Whitford 1992) 
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The extract begins with Ambra firmly setting the interview in a framework of cause 
and effect. The first polarity is based on gender differentiation: Ambra positions 
women as having their virtue and nothing else, while men "are supposed to sow their 
wild oats". In other words, a woman's value and pride resides in her capacity to 
maintain herself as a virgin or by guaranteeing the access to her sexuality exclusively 
to one man. By contrast, the fact the men are 'expected' to be promiscuous and this 
becomes a source of pride. 
Hollway offers an extremely in-depth and stimulating analysis of gender construction 
in terms of discourses of promiscuity (see Hollway 1983,1984,1989) therefore I will 
not expand on the subject here. However these issues of virtue, women's worth and 
shame are important to bear in mind as they are central to Ambra's argument 
throughout the interview. To exemplify the centrality of virtue to women's value, she 
gives the tragic example of Indian women who were expected to throw themselves 
on their husbands' funeral pyre. This implies that their value was only temporarily 
borrowed from their husbands and when they died, the women lost their function and 
value in life. Ambra uses this extreme example to support the claim that heterosexual 
women were nothing without virtue. 
However, perhaps aware of the seriousness of her claim, she counteracts it with 
another dualism: past and present. Everything she has told me about shame, women, 
virtue and the practise of sati belong to the past. This account strikingly ignores the 
continuing likelihood that a widow in India, unless she belonged to the comparitively 
small middle class, would face a life of considerable hardship. Perhaps that admission 
would force Ambra to bring her account to a more realistic level, which seems 
exactly what she is trying to avoid. This is why, I think, she resorts to abstract notion 
of propaganda, which does not require her to face the more obvious link to existing 
economic conditions: 
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A: Propaganda, especially in India, you are supposed to show how much 
dependent on your man [you are] and throw yourself on the [fire](. ) It's just 
propaganda, it's the way women are brought upý 
There is a striking contrast between the description of women committing sati out of 
shame and the attribution of it to 'just propaganda', which sounds like an invitation 
not to take it too seriously. This implication is present later on as well, particularly 
when talking about rape, almost as if too much was being made of the problem. 
I read these as devices which Ambra uses to distance herself from a horrific situation 
that otherwise, inevitably, she would be part of, both as a woman and being of Indian 
origins. Perhaps it is also a way of re-addressing the power imbalance not only as a 
woman in the context of a patriarchal society, but also as an Indian woman in the 
context of being interviewed by a white woman. The implication of her momentary 
resolution is that things are alright now - "now that women have careers of their 
own", which positions both of us back in Europe, as 'career women' capable of 
ridiculing the power of 'propaganda'. 
This takes us to the third dualism, between the virtuous woman and the career 
woman for whom virtue does not matter that much. Nothing is said however, about 
whether the 'career woman' is constructed as asexual or as promiscuous and, as it 
will become clear from the continuation of the extract, the two contradictory 
constructions cannot be successftilly held together for long. 
B: And you think it has got to do with Shame? 
A: That is imposed on to them because today's woman has no shame like that 
(. ) I don't know because when you have cases of rape that I think even today 
that destroys women so much, so the shame must still be there even if today 
a woman can go and live with any man they like, so why would they feel so 
bad about it? 
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The attempt at distancing continues with a further temporal split at the beginning of 
this extract ("that is imposed on to them because today's woman has not shame like 
that"), where she positions the two of us as 'today's women', implying that those in 
the past were the shameful women, but not us. Ambra also attempts to excuse them 
by positioning them as passive recipients of propaganda which is "imposed on them". 
The temporal dualism cannot be held however, for although today's women do not 
have shame like that (i. e. that promiscuity is no longer a cause of shame for women), 
they still are shamed when raped. 
The shameful woman, originally constructed around the virginity/promiscuity 
discourse, is now constructed out of being a rape victim. This sets Ambra in a 
dilemma, as she obviously feels obliged to clarify what causes shame, but wants to 
avoiding falling into the previous construction of women being shameful when 
sexually promiscuous: "shame must still be there even today if a woman can go and 
live with any man they like, so why would they feel so bad about it? " 
If a woman can live with (i. e. have sex with) any/as many men she likes, why would 
she feel bad about being raped unless she still values her virtue? For previous 
generations, shame was constructed around the value of virtue. To lose her virtue 
made the woman shameful. Now that that value is no longer so crucial, Ambra asks, 
why do women still feel shame? Ambra resorts to notions of the body to resolve this 
dilemma: 
A: I think it's about the notion of their body that this man has not respected 
them and has just imposed themselves and treated her just like a bag and I 
suppose because she has to face the world having been violated and having 
been shown up to be a weak human being, I think this is why they feel 
shame/ 
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Here Ambra constructs shame as being the signifier of weakness and of humiliation, 
of having to face the world and of being 'shown up'. She is using a construct of 
shame which implies being seen by the outside world as an inferior or damaged 
being. What is unclear, however, is what makes the victim of rape a 'weak human 
being'. Is she referring to physical strength in not having been able to fend off the 
assault? This is contradicted in the following lines: 
A: r... ] I think they respond to the conditioning they had [ ... ] they know how they are supposed to respond/ I think if you were brought up as a woman in 
a empty island, let's say, and she was raped I think she would feel confused 
and perplexed, but she would not feel ashamed, if she had had no contact 
with human beings/ maybe she would just feel the same as if an animal had 
bitten her leg off or something, so maybe it is all the associations with 
morality that you have been brought up with when you were a very small 
child/ 
[ ... ] if you have brought up this woman as a totally independent human being, 
then I suppose sex [would be] nothing, just an experience and she would not 
understand it/ [it] would be the same as any other trauma like having been 
attacked by an animal or something/ so the fact that women feel violated, it 
is different from what a woman feels when she has been run over by a bus, 
so that shows that there is moral shame rather than physical hurt/ the physical 
hurt is just part of it, but the shame is imposed on her by society/ 
This extracts clarifies that what she is referring to is 'moral shame'. Ambra resorts 
in this instance to the notion of upbringing and, as mentioned earlier, morality 
, imposed' on women. The strategy employed suggests that the cause of the problem 
is the special importance attributed to rape, which otherwise, if one were brought up 
free of sexual propaganda, might be experienced as similar to any other attack on the 
body. However, in wanting to reduce the importance of rape, Ambra is forced also 
to reduce the importance of sex which becomes "nothing, just an experience". In this 
way she falls back into the moral connotations of sexuality. 
In order to avoid these moral implications Ambra, like the other women, resorts to 
a more inventive version of the same mind/body dualism. Wanting to attribute shame 
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to propaganda, she is left with having to look at rape as just a physical thing 
(comparable to having one's leg bitten off, being attacked by a wild animal or run 
over by a bus). In this way the body can be hurt, but there is no shame. Again the 
shameful self is constructed as women being positioned as passive under the influence 
of society. But in this way Ambra also hints at the impossibility of understanding 
morality and sexuality outside of a social context. Her example illustrates very 
powerfully how even a very concrete event like a rape has no meaning in abstract; 
in fact, she says, on a deserted island, outside of a social context which attributes 
meaning to the event, the woman would not be able to understand it. Ambra suggests 
she would feel confused and perplexed, but not humiliated, implying that shame is 
completely socially constructed. In spite of this admission, her rhetorical device of 
distancing herself from the whole issue in fact helps her to evade the crucial step of 
examining exactly how and why female sexuality should be constructed as shameful. 
In respect of sexuality, women in this extract were initially positioned as virtuous if 
they preserved their virginity and shameful if they did not. In her hypothetical 
socially neutral environment, they are positioned as either indifferent to sex or, if 
raped, confused and perplexed but not ashamed. What is avoided is the link between 
shame and female sexuality. Women feel shame because they respond to 
conditioning, but what is the logic behind this conditioning? She continues: 
B: So you say that when one is run over by a bus it is a bodily thing, while the 
other one [rape] has to do with 
A: The emotions and morality/ 
B: Also with the way one feels about oneself.? 
A: Yes, must do, or what you have been trained to feel about yourself/ 
B: So it has to do with expectations/ 
A: Oh yes, but then maybe that is the reason why judges don't have such severe 
penalties for men who rape a prostitute, because their expectation of a 
prostitute [is] 'so what, what a difference does it make to herT while if, let's 
say if it was a young child they would be given huge penalties because the 
child was unmolested so it is a far greater thing to molest a child like that/ 
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[ ... ] although maybe that 
is an unfair comparison, because prostitutes are 
considered so low in society/ let's say a woman who has had lots of lovers 
say (. ) I think if she was raped compared to any woman who never had any 
lovers then the judge would give less of a penalty to the rapist of the first 
then to the second, but in that case two women are valued in the same way 
as being human beings, because a prostitute has got a different status, but the 
judge would think that the trauma would be less for the one who has lots of 
lovers than the one who hasn't/ 
[ 
... ] 
if my friend who had lots of boyfriends, I don't feel they are less worthy 
than those who never had a boyfriend, so I think in today's society that 
stigma has changed, thank goodness/ 
B: But you think/ 
A: Yes, but judges tend to be old men and they are from a different era/ I think 
women in the forties might have thought 'Oh I had a lot of lovers and I have 
been naughty so I am less worthy than a woman who has kept her virtue', but 
I don't think that women from today would feel this way, because morality 
has changed/ but judges who belong to yesterday keep the old morality and 
that is why you got such a hoo-haa in the press with judges saying 'she was 
asking for it for having a short skirt' because they have not kept up with the 
modern morality/ 
The final part of this interview takes us back full circle to the beginning in many 
ways. First Ambra goes back to the past-present split and thus justifies the inequality 
of the legal system's judgement of rape as a remnant of the values of a past 
generation. She cannot however use that strategy as successfully as before. While 
previously today's 'career women' were portrayed as being spared from the painful 
consequences of a shaming moral attribution to their sexuality, now no attention is 
paid to the fact that when these same women are raped, they are still judged 
unsympathetically by men ("she was asking for it"). 
What she manages to do is to maintain a distance from the problem due to the split 
'I and Them'. This split, which she used before to distance herself from the suicidal 
Indian women, is now used to distance herself from both the victims of rape and 
from the old fashioned Judges. This is underscored by her insistence: "I don't feel 
they [promiscuous women] are less worthy than those who had never had a 
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boyfriend". This allows Ambra not to have to deal with the consequences of what 
she is saying: the raped women are 'out there' with the shame and the propaganda, 
distinctly apart from her. They are the ones who, when raped, have to account for 
their sexual life in order to be taken seriously. Neither does she have to deal with the 
recurrence of the parallel between virtue and women's worth, because it does not 
concern her. The shameful women are 'out there' either in the past, or in other 
countries, or being brainwashed by propaganda, or dealing with old judges. We, from 
the safety of academic research, united by our 'otherness' ýLe. 'not shameful ), can 
look at the phenomenon and talk about it. 
Ambra takes a very different position from the other interviewees in that she refuses 
to position herself as shameful and therefore free from the pain of it. But, does her 
position really allow her to do that? What would happen to Ambra if she were raped, 
or if she were back in India, or if she was not a 'career woman'? What transpires 
from this account is that positive representations of active female sexuality are totally 
absent. Women are represented either as virtuous virgins, as promiscuous-but- 
shameful, as rape victims or as prostitutes. The question left open is what positions 
would be available to her (or to many other women), if she could not position herself 
as 'other'. 
For example, it could be argued that in the face of certain representations of women 
in this account, the difference between rape and intercourse fades away. This justifies 
the assumption that rape is less traumatic for the woman who has had many lovers 
and that the punishment of her rapist should be less harsh. This judgement reflects 
the assumption that the rapist has damaged something whose value was already 
lessened. This, however suggests that female sexuality is a public affair, that 
women's active sexual behaviour has serious implications for women's perceived 
worth. 
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7.3 Conclusion 
I want to suggest that a lack of alternative representations of femininity which do not 
position women as 'other' to men, and the changing and contradictory image of what 
a woman is, might contribute to women's difficulties in developing a positive sense 
of identity. Erosion of self-esteem, confusion about their worth, a sense of wrongness 
and of a fundamental, pervasive uncertainty about their 'being in the world' being 
only some of the emotional effects. 
At another level, but equally damaging, these positions have highly disempowering 
implications for women. This will be further explored in chapter ten. Contrary to 
Ambra, I do not think that shame is 'out there' or that the intersection of female 
sexuality with shame takes place in a vacuum, but in the everyday lives of women. 
As such we are all implicated and involved. 
186 
Withdrawal and Silence 
CHAPTER EIGHT: 
Defences Against Shame: Withdrawal and Silence 
"Shame, Remorse and Misery are three Furies in whose hands women 
inevitably have to fall as soon as they cross the boundaries. 
(Balzac, 'Gobsek' in Wumser 1981: 60) 
"I will not serve that in which I no longer believe, whether it call itse4f my 
house, my fatherland or my church: and I will try to express myseýf in some 
mode of life or art as fteely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my 
defence the only arms I allow myseýf to use - silence, exile and cunning. 
(Joyce 1916, in Gilligan 1992: 157) 
8.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I will explore the subject position of shameful when functioning as 
practical ideology (Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Gill, 1993); i. e. how versions of facts 
are constructed in speech, to accomplish social actions (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and 
to exclude possible competing versions (Madill 1995). In specific I will be looking 
at the function of women's accounts of avoidance when presented as protective 
activities to prevent exposure of their shameful self. Hence this chapter will look at 
accounts of silence, withdrawal and the shameful self. 
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I will start by providing a psychoanalytic framework to the chapter, then ground 
some of the theoretical concepts in women's experiences. This will be followed by 
a possible reading of the accounts from the viewpoint of some feminist literature and 
finally I will discursively analyse some extracts to investigate how by positioning 
themselves as shameful, women can both conform to and resist oppression at the 
same time. 
8.1 Psychoanalytic Framework 
These are the aspects of the shame phenomenology I consider relevant to this chapter: 
shame anxiety, shame defences and, more specifically, the intrinsic link between 
shame, hiding and the faýade. The concept of fagade and its connection with the self 
and shame will be explored at a later stage. 
The specific form of anxiety called shame anxiety (Wurnser 198 1, Lewis 197 1), is 
believed to be evoked by the imminent danger of unexpected exposure, humiliation 
and rejection. Shame anxiety can be seen as a response to the overwhelming trauma 
of helplessness previously experienced. Alternatively, it may function as a signal, 
triggered by a milder type of rejection and warning that a more intense one could 
reach traumatic proportions (Wurnser 1981). 
Shame is an acutely painful experience about the self, in which the subject feels they 
'could die' or 'crawl through a hole' (Lewis 1979). As implied in the root of the 
word (see Introduction), shame experiences embody a sense of deep exposure (Lynd 
1958), of bodily or psychological nakedness (Yorke 1988). Therefore the 'purpose' 
of shame has been repeatedly connected to hiding and disappearing in order to isolate 
the person from the danger of exposure (Wumser 1981, M. Lewis 1992). Biblically, 
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this is graphically expressed by Adam's fall and the attempt to hide, which 
represented the exposure before God (M-Lewis 1992) and, as discussed in the 
Introduction, observations of the phenomenological expression of shame (head 
bowed, avoidance of gaze, shrinking of the body), support the idea that shame 
engenders a wish for concealment and avoidance. 
People use various strategies to shelter themselves from the occurrence of shame, i. e. 
in psychoanalytic terms, they employ defences. However, reiation of defences to 
shame is of a complex nature as shame can have the function of defence at the same 
time that other defences are called upon to protect the self from shame (Nathanson 
1992). Rage, contempt, envy and depression (among others) can all have the function 
of defending against shame. 
Intrapsychic defences, although sometimes discussed as being employed in aid of 
resistance (Sandler et al. 1992), are considered protective measures. For instance 
traditionally, psychoanalytic theory has viewed defences as directed against drive- 
derived manifestations of intrapsychic conflict (Morrison, 1989). Defence strategies 
aim at maintaining an intrapsychic homeostatic balance. They are adaptive and 
psychologically valuable (Kohut, 1984). 
8.2 Withdrawal 
A number of defensive measures have been attributed specifically to coping with 
shame, such as turning passive into active; grandiosity and idealization; lying; 
masochistic flaunting of degradation and externalization by the humiliation of others 
(Wumser 1981). 
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However, as I intend to illustrate through the analysis of the interviews, despite the 
seemingly wide choice of options, it was the silence, the withdrawal, that was 
repeatedly referred to as the way of dealing with shame. This was described by 
different women in different ways: 
Vanessa: 
So I just felt really small and I got really embarrassed, you know when you 
feel yourself going red and that's it, from that moment I withdrew from the 
conversation, [ ... ] trying to 
be invisible(. ) 
B: People have different ways of reacting to shame situations (. ) how do you feel 
you react? 
Molly: Running away, in all sorts of ways, either physically or as a 
youngster trying to make myself as small as possible, trying to disappear/ 
Sophie: 
[ 
... ] the only option seems not to go anywhere and talk to anybody 
Rita: 
[] when I realized I just got off and walked off/ 
All the women mentioned above were describing situations in which they had been 
either humiliated, or shown as ina dequate or helpless. Often the situations involved 
issues of power. For instance, Vanessa is referring to a board meeting at work in 
which somebody in a superior position had denigrated a comment of hers. Following 
this she positioned herself as "having said something really stupid" and withdraws 
from the conversation. This could be read as 'ranking behaviour' (Gilbert 1994), 
whereby Vanessa is avoiding confrontation in a situation in which she knows she 
would lose. " 
16 Gilbert (1994) has linked the physical reaction 
associated with shame to ranking behaviour in animals, 
whereby animals who assess a confrontation with another 
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Sophie expresses the extreme form of withdrawal in actually choosing not go 
anywhere or talk to anyone rather than be shown to be the inadequate and socially 
deskilled person she thinks she is. Molly also, in her childhood school memories, 
refers to her inadequacy and her smallness, and finally Rita describes her response 
to a situation where a man had exposed himself, making her feel humiliated but also 
feeling that her reaction to the situation was inadequate (this will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter ten). 
In summary, all these accounts seem to confirm, as suggested above, that withdrawal 
is used as a defence to hide from shame, which implicitly proposes the existence of 
a shameful self as a given fact. This is a strategy identified by discourse analysts as 
'everyday empiricist accounting' (Edward and Potter 1992: 162), where the facts force 
themselves on the human actors who have an entirely secondary role (see also Gilbert 
and Mulkay 1984, McKinley and Potter 1987, Mulkay 1985). 
This reading is further corroborated by some feminist literature. For instance, it has 
been suggested by researchers investigating gender differences in behaviour that 
women seem to find it more difficult to be assertive about their capacities in a social 
situation (Walkerdine 1992, Bartky 1990). Walkerdine has observed that, in 
education, although women tended on average to be better students than men, they 
displayed far less confidence in their ability to master the material (Walkerdine 
1992). 
This is consistent with Bartky's (1990) observation that women use what linguists 
call 'women's language', i. e. their speech is marked by hesitations and false starts. 
animal as likely to lead to their defeat, show a similar 
bodily posture to shame behaviour: avoidance of the gaze, 
attempt to reduce body size, reduction of muscle tension 
etc. 
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They tend to introduce their comments with self-denigrating expressions like, 'You 
may think this is a stupid question, but... '. They often use a questioning intonation 
which in effect turns a simple declarative sentence into a request for help or 
affirmation. Also, there is often the excessive use of qualifiers, eg. 'Isn't it true that 
[x] might be... '. 
In the two studies mentioned above, the behaviour of the female students was 
interpreted by the researchers to be indicative of a desire to take up as little space as 
possible, to be inconspicuous or even invisible. This phenomenon has also been 
identified as an important factor in the case of women suffering from eating 
disorders, where it has been suggested that anorexics seem concerned with not taking 
up too much space, a concern expressed physically in a desire to be slim and almost 
invisible. In Orbach's words: 
"She has changed her body dramatically. She has become slimmer and smaller 
[] She has agreed to take up only a little space in the world. " (Orbach, 
1993: 10) 
This in turn seems to find confirmation in the following account from Jessica about 
shame and dieting. However in the same account, the possibility of an alternative 
reading appears, where avoidance is not covering inadequacy but a much more 
complex situation: 
Jessica: 
I developed a eating disorder in my adolescence, I went onto a diet when I 
was 12 or 13 and didn't need to go on a diet at all, [ ... ] you see when you are 
thin you are not dangerous, there is nothing to be ashamed of, about the 
feelings that you provoked, so you try to change your body/ 
In this extract 'disappearing' in the form of thinning out, of making oneself smaller, 
is construed as an attempt to counteract both shame and danger. The danger is 
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implicitly connected to sexual feelings, which also warrant the shame. What I want 
to focus on at this point is the word 'danger', which does not suggest inadequacy but 
power - even if negative power. It is also suggested, however, that this attribution Of 
negative power comes from other people and the feelings provoked in them, which 
Jessica construes as her responsibility. It could be argued that her account strongly 
suggests a power she felt she had, but which became problematic in social situations. 
The issue of the split between the private 'I' and public self, already mentioned in 
the previous chapter, will be looked at in depth later in this chapter. -What 1 want to 
pursue here is the possibility of suspending the reading of avoidance as connected to 
a inadequate, shameftil self. 
Paula for example, described a constant pattern of avoidance and silence in her life 
when confronted with shameful situations: I wouldn't talk about it [ ... ]I would lie 
or pretend I didn't know what they where talking about". Referring to another 
situation, she said "when I remembered I had the same reaction, I just could not 
speak, I had nothing to say and I just wanted to forget, not to think about it a 
refusal to face up to it". 
She had been talking about feelings of inferiority and being different from others, 
thus implying that she hid in shame. And yet, in one of the shameful situations she 
reported, she had 'accidentally' head-butted a man she was angry with leaving him 
with a permanent scar on his forehead and in another she told me of having vomited 
on a man who had turned down her loving attentions. 
These two scenarios strongly suggest that the construction of the self as shameful is 
preventing any alternative reading of the situation from emerging. Paula manages in 
this account to position herself as unthreatening and free of blame due to her taking 
the position of being inadequate and shameful. 
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The existence of alternative and contradictory subject positions which would not base 
withdrawal on the inadequacy of the self is clearly expressed in the following extract, 
where Sarah is talking of what had caused her to feel shame in her childhood. 
8.2.1 Sarah's Account 
B: Was it r, shame, l about not being good enough? 
S: Or too good/ so being the last one to be chosen, but also if I was chosen, or 
being special in some ways, I mean, I must have been quite bright and I 
started school early and I have a brother two years older than myself and I 
went through the infant classes quicker than he did, so I was actually in the 
same classes with him at about seven and I would feel quite embarrassed 
when the teacher would ask me to do things/ obviously I also felt proud of 
the capacity side (. ) if I was chosen to do things, I remember being chosen 
to present the headmaster a bunch of flowers on [inaudible] day, so being the 
one, the goody who was chosen to (. ) 
This account constructs the shameful self in two opposite ways: there is shame for 
being the last to be chosen (shame for failing), but also shameful for being chosen 
(for being special). This is accompanied by another contradiction her expression of 
the embarrassment of being singled out as special and, in the following line, the pride 
of her capacity. This is in total contrast with the polarised outlook offered by the 
literature on shame which states that shame is the opposite of pride and that, while 
shame is the accompaniment to failure and lowered self-esteem, pride comes with 
success and increased self-esteem. Yet here there is attribution of shame to success. 
Furthermore, because shame and pride are determined by social norms, certain actions 
will provoke shame and others pride. What, on the contrary, transpires from this 
account is that the same position of being successful is constructed both as shameful 
and proud at the same time. This, I would suggest, has some dependence on the 
actors involved in negotiating the attribution of meaning. There is no indication that 
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the shame is constructed between Sarah and her teacher, who it seems was the one 
most likely to recognize the capacity she felt proud of In fact, Sarah clearly locates 
the belief in her capacities not in herself, but implies that someone else must have 
thought that she was capable. This she accomplishes by phrasing it in terms of 
disbelief [I must have been quite bright] and positioning herself not as the agent of 
the judgement but as a passive object of someone else's judgement. 
Later Sarah explains that her peer group had greatly influenced her feelings, as 11. was 
against her peer-group culture to show interest in school matters. This is hinted at in 
the last line when being the one chosen is described as the 'goody', implying that 
being studious or the 'teacher's pet' constituted a betrayal of adolescent, anti- 
conformist rebellion against the adult world. 
Alongside these already contrasting and coexisting scenarios, a third can be identified 
at the beginning of the extract, which Sarah focuses on immediately. This involves 
the introduction of Sarah's brother, two years older than her. The account implies 
that her brother is less bright and less academically successful than Sarah, to the point 
that she not only caught up with him, but despite the age gap was still the one chosen 
as special in the class. I want to argue that this situation presents a moral dilemma: 
if Sarah positions herself as proud and successful, that automatically positions her 
brother as inadequate and shameful. This is why I think Sarah takes both subject 
positions at the same time, of being proud and ashamed of her success. This allows 
her to do well at school and, at the same time, to get on with her peers and not 
shame her brother. It also allows her to avoid challenging the obvious expectation 
that her brother should do better than her, I assume, because he is older and male. 
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An explanation of this type of dynamic in terms of gender has been offered by 
Gilligan. " 
The problematic implications of this strategy will be discussed later in this chapter 
as a general theme; however, in relation to Sarah, by way of re-connecting this to the 
subject of withdrawal, I want to point out that later in her interview she stated that 
only in childhood did she do well at school and that since then she has avoided 
showing any special interest in something. 
8.2.2 A Feminist Reading 
It has been pointed out how competition and achievement are rarely straightforward 
for women and how even if women manage to achieve their objectives, they 
sometimes subvert themselves, denigrating any praise and attention they may receive. 
There seems to be an awareness or fear that their ambitious urges are 'improper', or 
even destructive (Coward 1992). These observations, along with others on the same 
lines (Walkerdine 1990, Bartky 1990) raise the question of why being weak, ignorant 
or invisible seem to he 'easier options' for some women. 
17 11 [ ... I men and women may perceive 
danger in different 
social situations and construe danger in different ways - 
men seeing danger more often in close personal affiliation 
than in achievement and construing danger to arise from 
intimacy, women perceiving danger in impersonal achievement 
situations and construing danger to result from competitive 
success. [ ... 
I the danger women portray in their tales of 
achievement is a danger of isolation, a fear that in 
standing out or being sent apart by success, they will be 
left alone. " (Gilligan, 1982: 42) 
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Some of the answers to this question offered by feminist and psychoanalytic writers 
have been reviewed in chapter three. Anthony (1981) for instance, talked of the 
shame syndromes in women as "constitutional, physical and psychocultural", due to 
the vulnerability of women's still emergent identity. He describes how women, in 
order to negotiate the historical submerging of their identity in the service of the male 
ego, have taken on a 'pseudo-identity' characterised by negative attributions of self- 
denial, general inferiority and shame. This is very consistent with the general identity 
transpiring through the interviews and would also explain how powertulness and 
success would be experienced as unfamiliar and dissonant to a sense of identity built 
around inferiority. 
In this context, Weldon (1988) talks in terms of 'success anxiety' in women which, 
she argues, could become the equivalent of castration anxiety ascribed by certain 
earlier writers. Gilligan (1982) too has examined this issue in terms of representations 
of women vested with positive and negative connotations: well-being and self-esteem, 
but also denial of responsibility and evasion. " In addressing the meaning of 
morality for women, Gilligan looks at the attributions that success and ambition have 
for many women. She claims that being ambitious carries connotations of being 
'hungry and selfish' and, using one of her interviewee's words, implies that "a person 
on the way up stomps on people, whether it is family or other colleagues or clientele" 
18 11 The 'good woman' masks assertion in evasion, denying 
responsibility by claiming only to meet the needs of 
others, while the 'bad woman, forgoes or renounces the 
commitments that bind her in self-deception and betrayal. 
It is precisely this dilemma - the conflict between 
compassion and autonomy, between virtue and power - which 
the feminine voice struggles to resolve in its effort to 
reclaim the self and to solve the moral problem in such a 
way that no one is hurt. " (Gilligan, 1982: 71) 
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(Gilligan 1982). Coward (1992) has also written about women's attitudes to self- 
advancement and their difficulties with the apparent connotations of competitiveness. 
It has been noticed and criticised (Stanley and Wise, 1993; Segal, 1991; Coward 
1992), that the attribution of women's distaste for power to women's 'intrinsically 
better nature' is now part of the prevalent cultural fantasies about women. '9 This is 
certainly one of the implications of Gilligan's claim, for which she has been criticised 
(Segal 199 1; Faludi, 199 1). Gilligan believes that women are often caught in the 
opposition between selfishness and responsibility. And because women's lives are 
lived in response, guided by the perception of others' needs, they can see no way of 
exercising control without risking an assertion that seems selfish and hence morally 
dangerous. 
Despite the fact that Gilligan does acknowledge that, while seeming to offer safety 
from the onus of responsibility, avoidance, withdrawal and drifting carry the danger 
of landing in a more painful confrontation with choice, there are some problematic 
implications with her position. The main objection I would offer, is that by looking 
at the situation as the effect of socialisation she firstly positions women as passive 
victims of a society 'out there'. Secondly, the negotiation with moral choice which 
women solve by rejecting power is presented as an intrinsic quality possessed by 
women, which makes them better human beings, thus risking falling into essentialism: 
19 11 Given a prevalent cultural fantasy of women as 'nicer' 
people, more caring, more nurturing - something bolstered 
first by feminist's ideas of uncompetitive sisterhood and 
solidarity and then by the New Age celebration of the 
nurturing feminine - there is a readiness to explain 
women's distaste for competitive situations as arising from 
their greater natural decency and kindness. " (Coward 
1992: 42) 
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"The popularity of Gilligan's thesis, is due to the fact that it provides apparent 
confirmation of the wistful belief that women are less individualistic and 
selfish than men, that they are better attuned than men and more empathic 
than them to emotional and relational issues. " (Sayers 1986: 19) 
It is understandable, considering that one of tasks Gilligan had set herself was to 
argue against a male-centred view of morality which penallsed women, that Gilligan 
attempted to counteract the situation by shedding a positive light on women's 
choices. However she fails to see that this 'positive' outlook might legitimize 
women's inertia and glorify their passivity. Besides, by looking at avoidance and 
withdrawal as a personal, moral choice rather than as an ideologically meaningful 
subject position, we cannot investigate the complexities of the negotiation involved, 
the implications and the possibility for resistance which the position allows. These 
will be the focus of the discourse analysis to follow. 
Before I move on to that, I want to briefly mention the relevance of envy to 
withdrawing from success. This is important because it points at the immediate 
advantage of positioning oneself as a 'nicer', non-competitive person, as it deflects 
envy. This is discussed by Jessica: 
J: [ ... ] the other thing I associate it [shame] with is envy, 
fear of envy and 
achieving, because I used to envy so much () maybe shame is a bit like, it 
translates other very powerful feelings like greed, envy, all those things and 
being ashamed becomes a way of reacting or playing out the experience that 
those feelings might provoke. 
It is in this sense that Wumser talks of shame as a protection against envy through 
a technique called 'masochistic flaunting of degradation' which he describes in the 
following: "If I am suffering and low it proves that I can't be a threat to anybody and 
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I can't take the power away from anybody. " (Wumser 1981: 41) He commented 
further that masochistic submission is often better than the guilt of envy and rivalry. 
This kind of strategy is exemplified as an attack on the 'horrid self' that wants to 
take away from others what they own. 
However, Jessica attributes shame also to an internal conflict about her own greed, 
envy and neediness, i. e. the resolution to the conflict is attempted individually and 
the problem is biame(I on negative personal qualities. The link made by Wumser 
between envy, deprivation and unlovability is relevant to this dilemma and often (as 
it will be soon discussed), offered as the resolution of it. The exploration of issues 
of withdrawal, power and resistance, silence, shame and unlovability is the objective 
of the discourse analysis in the next section. 
What I want to do now is to try to pull together some of the issues discussed so far 
by looking at an actual conversation and show how the solution provided in the 
extract is precisely the shameful unlovable subject position. I will look at two 
extracts, both from a interview with Molly. Here Molly reports two experiences of 
shame which I will look at separately. 
8.3 The Silence 
8.3.1 Molly's Account: Extract One 
M: When I was a child, I was seven and the teacher asked another child how 
much it is four times eight/ I knew it, but she had asked the other child who 
didn't know, and as probably she knew that I knew the answer she asked me 
and I said thirty-two, but I felt very embarrassed because the other girl didn't 
know the answer and the teacher asked me to stand up and to go to the 
blackboard and she gave me a stick and she asked me to beat the other child/ 
I didn't want to/ so she held my hand and forced me to beat her/ this gives 
me a sense of shame, very strong and I remember this as a very bad thing/ 
B: Why do you think you felt ashamed? 
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M: Because I had no authority to beat the girl and the teacher I felt she was 
forcing me to do the thing that I didn't want to do, and she put me in front 
of the whole class to do a bad thing and because I knew the answer I had to 
beat another child, and it is a very strong confrontation because you have to 
beat the other one and I felt all these things even if I was only seven and it 
was very strong/ [ ... ] B: [And] after that you didn't want to say? 
M: No, never/ I didn't want to because I didn't enjoy that the other ones knew 
that I knew something, I wanted to keep quiet, perhaps it had some effect 
until now because it was very strong/ [ ... ] n: But you 15-It ashannedl .7 
X%ILL %, %. U 
M: Yes because I felt that I didn't want to do this, and I was forced to do it 
because she held my hand against my will and she forced me to, I couldn't 
escape from the situation/ 
B: And also do you think the fact that it was in front of the other children made 
it (. ) it was important? 
M: No, what made me feel strongly was what I did [it] against my will, because 
I remember that I wasn't looking at the class but I was looking at the girl, but 
I don't remember the girl I remember the stick and my hand doing a thing 
that I wouldn't like to do, this is what I remember, and the teacher behind 
me/ [ ... ]I 
don't want to have the power to beat another one and the fact that 
I knew the answer gave me the power to beat another one who didn't know, 
it would have been easier to be on the other side, to be in the weak position/ 
8.3.2 A Psychoanalytic Reading 
If we look at this extract from the point of view of psychodynamic defences, both 
formulations (shame functioning as defence and the employment of defences against 
shame), can be identified. Shame can be read as a defense against an unacceptable 
drive, whereby Molly's shame is a defensive reaction to her sadistic pleasure in 
hitting the other girl. Her sadistic impulses have been repressed through the 
'damming' action of shame which has transformed pleasure into its opposite: a 
painful feeling. The splitting-off of the conflict is also highlighted by her dissociation 
from her own hand: it was the hand that did the bad thing, outside of her control. 
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At the same time this extract could be read from another point of view, which is 
what Molly herself suggests. Shame and the memory of it, which has persisted for 
many years, becomes the focus of the story. Molly is not in control; she is forced to 
do something unacceptable and experiences intense shame and embarrassment. This 
experience, a trauma, is at the basis of the shame anxiety. She then associates 
traumatic shame to situations of 'knowing something' and of 'speaking up'. 
Therefore in order to avoid shame, she avoids situations which, through this 
association, would cause shame. 
This reading of shame lies in between two of Freud's models: in the affect-trauma 
model, shame results from a real trauma coming from the outside world, in the 
topographical model, however, shame is the trauma or the threat of trauma; at the 
same time it protects the psyche from the trauma of internal conflict. 
In a psychodynamic reading of the text, Molly is isolated from the context. The 
events and the other actors in the external world are only functional, if not totally 
irrelevant, to the conflict which is viewed intrapsychically. 
8.3.3 A Discursive Analysis 
In the discursive analysis, I will move away from the analysis of intentions and 
hypotheses about the internal world and will look instead at the 'social' interaction. 
In the above extract, this involves three actors. As a result of their interaction there 
is the creation of a 'shameful self. I will take these three actors as the three positions 
provided by the account and look at them in relation to the power they carry. 
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One of the actors is the female teacher. She is in a powerful position due to her being 
adult in relation to children and being a teacher in relation to the pupils. She also 
holds power within a power/knowledge discourse. However this power is not 
represented as positive or desirable, but as cruel and sadistic. In complete contrast to 
the teacher's position, there is the girl who does not know the answer: she is a child, 
a pupil and she does not know. 
Molly's position however, is at the centre of the action and is what 1 wiii focus on. 
She is in the middle: she is a child and a pupil, but she has knowledge. It is the 
knowledge that gives her the power, identified in the extract as a negative power: 
"the fact that I knew the answer gave me the power to beat another one who did not 
know". 
From the account, one would assume that the shame was connected to having beaten 
the other child. To avoid this, one might expect that the lesson learned would be to 
refrain from physically beating others. But when Maria talks about how this affected 
her life, what she withdrew from was having knowledge, i. e. power: I didn't want 
to [speak] because I didn't enjoy that the other ones knew that I knew something, I 
wanted to keep quiet". This suggests that the position of shameful is here constructed 
as being the one who knows. Hence, 'strong and knowledgeable' is shameful and has 
to be avoided, 'weak, ignorant, victim' is preferable: "it would have been easier to 
be on the other side, to be in the weak position". 
However, there is a further subtlety in the text. The issue is not simply around who 
knows and who does not, but moreover by someone knowing that somebody else 
knows. This is first stated in lines 3-5 and reiterated in lines 21-22. In line 3 ("1 
knew it") there is no indication that the knowing is problematic. The situation 
becomes conflictual when the teacher knew that she knew (lines 4,5), i. e. when the 
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private T that knows becomes public and is engaged in a social interaction. it is at 
this point that Molly becomes silent. I will come back to this very soon. 
I now want to go back to how the silent subject is constructed as shameful. There are 
various avenues open to us in attempting to make sense of this representation; I will 
first consider the issue of conformity. 
I have discussed at length the existence of cultural expectations vis-a-vis women3s 
relationship to success and power in a patriarchal society. Molly's shame can be thus 
read as conformity to these implicit cultural norms, that by positioning herself as 
shameful Molly does not disrupt the cultural expectations of her. In fact she does 
more than that, because the shameful position in this case (particularly in the light 
of Gilligan's work), is construed as morally superior. This position could be taken 
to represent an application of what Wetherell et al (1987) have called 'practical 
ideologies', which allow the speaker to justify under a positive light her submission 
in a power confrontation. 
Therefore her withdrawal from conflict and lack of rebelliousness is presented under 
the positive light of 'non violence' and refusal to be implicated in the abuse. This 
presentation of oppression as 'free choice' can be seen in terms of the Foucauldian 
idea of the 'docile subject', where physical or overt coercion becomes unnecessary 
as the subject 'chooses' to comply (Foucault 1977,1977a). Ideology, it must be 
remembered, has as one of its devices to disguise real relations of power as 
something more acceptable, more benign, thus assuring the preservation of the power 
relation (Althusser 1971, Thompson 1975). In this instance, the shift from openly 
physical and psychological coercion to self-oppression is graphically represented. 
However, what is also stated very clearly in the text is that Molly does not really 
have a choice whether to be implicated or not. 
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Crucial to the analysis of this extract from a feminist standpoint, is the assumption 
that the account is located within a patriarchal society and that the interactions have 
significance (i. e. describe/constr-uct) within it. The patriarchal ideology is hidden by 
the fact that the dynamic is totally negotiated between women. In this way the 
question becomes one of choosing what kind of woman Molly wanted to be, rather 
than what are the options open to women vis-a-vis access to power. I find it very 
significant that what is represented here is the absence of a positive representation of 
empowerment for women. This crucial factor is overshadowed by the presentation of 
the dilemma as a moral choice. 
I have already discussed how Gilligan and Coward both pointed out how one of the 
discourses often employed by women to justify their absence or 'free refusal' to have 
access to positions of power, is the morally based discourse that doing so would be 
at the expense of others. This refusal is further fuelled by the construction of women 
as 'better human beings' who take other people into account when making decisions. 
I have also expressed my reservations with this claim. One of the most serious is that 
power is taken out of its historical context and becomes a thing per se, rather than 
something that women could use to better their lives. In this instance, for example, 
Molly could have taken on the teacher's power and become a different kind of 
teacher or found some way to 'speak up' for the other girl. But by positioning herself 
as shameful, Molly construes herself as totally powerless, but as a moral being. This 
positions her as a 'nice' girl, who would rather sacrifice herself than hurt other 
people. This obviously does not exclude the shame for not having resisted. 
Molly's reaction can also be read as a resistance to power which is oppressive; she 
can see what comes with having power and wants no part of it. In order to explore 
this reading I want to go back to the conflict between the private, knowing T and 
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the silent, public 'I'. This can offer a different reading from the above. If we take the 
silencing as the action of power, it is still in the silence that we can find the 
resistance to the same power. This I identify in the discrepancy described above. The 
silencing is restricted to the public 'F, because Molly remembers that she knew; she 
says that she has stopped saying, not stopped knowing. The shame belongs to the 
public self In this way I am reading Molly's silence as a way of distancing herself 
from an oppressive regulatory action she disapproves of (Bahvnani, 1990; Marks, 
1993), as a strategy of opposition. 
This is a very seductive reading of the text as it allows some space for defiance, but 
it also has serious repercussions for organized resistance. Firstly, I think that it is very 
problematic to analyze silence as a language, whether as communication or as 
strategy. Secondly, silence as a strategy has very isolating and limiting consequences; 
in terms of organized struggle it isolates women from each other, prevents the sharing 
of experience and contributes to the view that women's struggles are personal, 
individual. 
And yet, from a merely rhetorical point of view, positioning herself as shameful 
allows Molly to hold both contradictory positions, at least for the time being. In the 
second extract however, that the two readings I have suggested so far are represented 
again and the position of silence is taken to its consequences. 
8.3.4 Molly's Account: Extract Two 
M: [ ... ] put 
down, yes, put down and humiliation and that you are not so strong 
2 and you don't know anything about something, you are not important, you are 
3 something, someone (.. ) 
41 am thinking of another example, I must have been 6 and I was in the 
5 classroom and everything felt very strange, I had just began school and in the 
206 
Withdrawal and Silence 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
break we went to the playground/ the teacher said something very strange but 
I believed her. She said to put a sheet of paper on your desk and think of 
something to be drawn on it and you ask Jesus to come and draw it for you 
(laughs) and I put my best pencil and I went to play and when I came back 
there was nothing, I felt so.. oh God... how could have I believed her? it was 
a mixture of feelings ... 
humiliated because I trusted her and nothing happened, 
without power to go there and ask her "where is my drawing, you are a liar, 
you are not correct" and because I didn't talk I felt ashamed because probably 
to talk is important, to free the feeling, but I didn't/ 
B: And what did you do? 
M: Nothing, I looked for the Paper and I felt that Jesus didn't love me, I am not 
so good to be loved, because the teacher had said if your behaviour is good 
in the playground ... so I thought I had behaved very bad and it was my fault (laughs) 
8.3.5 A Psychoanalytic Reading 
In this extract the focus of the investigation is not the action anymore, but the self. 
This is crucial in that, as I have pointed out in the Introduction, it can make shame 
into an experience of traumatic proportions. 
Shame is related to the self in three ways: Firstly, there is the shame of the powerless 
(line 13), who has been tricked and humiliated (lines 12,13). Secondly, there is the 
shame of having fallen short of an ideal, since she had not spoken up (lines 15,16). 
In both these cases there is a sense of narcissistic mortification. Thirdly, shame is 
also attributed to being unlovable (lines 18,19): 1 am ashamed because I am 
unworthy. This could also be read as compensation for the grandiosity. 
At first glance, this extract seems to describe a very similar situation to the first 
account as it takes place in the classroom, I assume with the same teacher and at 
around the same time. There is, however, a crucial difference: this time there are only 
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two people involved: Molly and her teacher and Molly is at the receiving end of the 
abuse. This takes away Molly's choice whether to be implicated or not. 
Looking at the words chosen here, it seems that humiliation is what bridges the two 
accounts. In the first three lines, Molly gives a list of the components of her 
experience of shame: humiliation, being put down (twice), weakness, being 
unimportant (inadequacy, smallness perhaps) and ignorance. Here is the first 
contradiction: in the first account Molly did know and, as she reiterated many times, 
it was precisely the fact that she knew that gave her the power to beat the other child. 
And yet here she is describing as shameftil the position where "you don't know 
anything about something". Who is this 'you'? I think it can be read in many ways. 
As I pointed out in chapter six the use of 'you' as impersonal pronoun can be seen 
as a device to involve the other (in this case, myself as interviewer), into an assumed 
shared experience. It implies either that I know what she is talking about through my 
own experience, or that everybody feels humiliated and unimportant when discovered 
in ignorance. This could then be taken as a device to distance herself from the 
experience and its implications by locating it in an impersonal field, or as a device 
to connect herself to the girl who was beaten, i. e. at that point Molly is talking from 
that position. 
This takes us to the next line (line 3) where she makes a very ambiguous statement. 
She says that being in that position makes you feel "you are something, someone". 
Here she seems to be saying two contradictory things. On one hand she is referring 
to depersonalisation: that position makes a person into an object, a thing, one looses 
identity and humanity. On the other hand however, she is saying that that position 
makes you into someone, it gives you identity, i. e. it gives some space for action and 
identity per se, however painful and problematic. This could be connected to the 
conflict, highlighted earlier, that takes place when moving from the private '1' that 
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knows or doesn't know (as is the case here), and the public T and how it is seen in 
the interaction. 
This discrepancy can be also identified in the description of her being in the 
classroom where everything felt very strange. The site of power feels unfamiliar and 
with unknown rules. Molly attempts to portray this situation again in terms of moral 
choices. In line 7 she hints at this, implying that she starts from a position of trust 
and that despite her knowledge that the teacher was saying something rather odd, she 
chooses to trust her, to believe that she was not lying. In this way Molly establishes 
her fairness, her naývety and her goodwill in the situation. The fact that she uses the 
same word (strange) to describe both the classroom atmosphere and her teacher's 
suggestion, allows her to suspend her judgement further by implying that perhaps the 
teacher's suggestion was strange because everything else was strange. This allows 
Molly to avoid having to consider the teacher as a liar or herself as gullible. Her 
goodwill, fairplay and capacity to assess situations is further established by her 
gesture of choosing her best pencil, the only one appropriate for Jesus. 
It is what happens between lines II and 19 that interests me most, as Molly is forced 
by the events to offer a reading of the situation with the implied positioning for 
herself She offers two alternative and opposite subject positions: the angry or the 
shameful position. In lines 14-17 there is the position of anger: Molly hangs on to 
the knowledge and rebels to the teacher. This position is construed around finding 
power in one's knowledge. By positioning herself as the knowledgeable, she positions 
the teacher as the liar. In this context speaking up is clearly presented as empowering 
and liberating. 
The other position follows this in lines 16-19. This is the silent, shameful Molly who 
turns the anger against herself, denies her knowledge and power and submits to the 
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teacher's representation of events. This is warranted by her positioning herself as 
unlovable, which reinstates the teacher's authority. It could be argued that this was 
never fully accomplished, as the position of shame allows Molly to remember the 
abuse and that she knew she had been wronged. 
One could question what benefit challenging the teacher could have brought her, in 
a situation where there was no real alternative to the establishment. But I am also 
aware of the fact that subject positions -have implications tor one's sense of self and 
self-esteem. Molly's example illustrates how the absence of alternative positions may 
favour the employment of individual measures with high costs for one's sense of 
reality. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how speech can perform social action by presenting 
historically and ideologically constructed versions of reality as facts. These versions 
of reality function as 'practical ideology' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). 1 have 
suggested in this chapter that women positioning themselves as shameful has that 
function. I have claimed that by positioning themselves as shameful, the women 
interviewed are not just describing reality, but constructing a version of reality that 
allows them to avoid wider cultural issues and conflict about their access to power. 
I have also argued, in this and in previous chapters, the impossibility of avoiding 
these issues which in fact are negotiated in speech. I have deconstructed the 
participants' presentation of withdrawal and silence as defences against their 
unavoidable shameful exposure warranted by the positioning of themselves as 
shameful. Through a discursive analysis of extracts from the interviews I have 
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illustrated how this action is accomplished in practice. I will now briefly discuss 
some implications of the conclusions reached in this chapter. 
If we reconnect the participants' construction of themselves to wider political issues, 
their silence and withdrawal has serious implications in terms of women's complicity 
with reproducing what has always been an 'acceptable', but highly limiting and self- 
destructive view of women. Women's positions in these extracts seem to be in line 
with women wanting to see themselves as altruistic and selfless, not as competitive 
and needy. This, it has been argued, is due to the fact that 'traditional womanly 
values' still grant women some power (Coward, 1993). Women might try to access 
at an individual level some of the power they are excluded from at social level in a 
patriarchal society; but in this way leaving social power structures unchallenged. 
What I have argued in this chapter and will be argued further in the next two, is that 
this type of strategy is not very successful at an individual level either. On that scale, 
I am concerned with the effects of a continuous undermining of one's sense of 
reality, knowledge and identity. In the next two chapters I will attempt to explore 
some of the implications for women's sense of self in the section on the Fagade and 
in the following chapter on women's capacity to resist attack. 
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CHAPTER NINE: 
The Shameful Self behind the Faýade 
9.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter questioned whether or not withdrawal functioned exclusively 
to protect women from shame and argued that this version of events performed other 
ideological functions. I first looked at how their withdrawal was justified by the 
participants by positioning themselves as inadequate and shameful. Withdrawal was 
therefore presented as a necessary strategy to safeguard themselves against further 
exposure of such inadequacy. In contrast with this view, I argued that these 
strategies (designed to 'protect' women) can also be deconstructed as individual 
solutions to wider social issues with a deeply disempowering and confusing effect on 
women's sense of identity and capacity. 
The theme to be analysed in this chapter starts from these conclusions one and further 
develops some of the implications. Continuing the examination of strategies employed 
by the participants to protect themselves from shame, I will now focus on the strategy 
of hiding behind a 'faqade'. I will be looking at the split between what women 
describe as their internal experience of themselves - presented as the 'true self' - and 
what is presented to the world on the outside: the 'faqade'. 
In this dualistic split, the external public self represents women in their competent 
and successful actions. Therefore, while the faýade is cathected with positive feelings, 
the true self is experienced as faulty, inferior and shameful. However, as the external 
212 
F 
self is constructed as a mere fagade (i. e. false or inauthentic), even the positive 
feelings associated with it are devalued and disbelieved. This section explores the 
disempowering implications of this phenomenon. 
The 'fagade self (similar to the defences of withdrawal and silence), rests on the 
construction of women as inadequate and shameful. My claim is that the splitting of 
the self requires considerable mental gymnastics and ultimately a denial of one's 
sense of reality. 1 want to explore whether the extracts offer the possibility of 
alternative subject positions which women could take. Hence, the theme will be 
explored in a way that takes in some of the broader social issues to which it alludes 
(Burman and Parker 1993), as well as what function the accounts serve; in particular 
what version of events that account is designed to counteract (Coyle et al. 
forthcoming, Potter and Wetherell 1987, Marks 1993). 
For example, it has been previously suggested that a position which represents 
women as powerful and successful carries the threat of rejection. This threat however, 
is not linked by any of the women interviewed to ideological pressure or social 
coercion; instead they attribute it to their own unlovability. 
9.1 Psychoanalytic Framework 
The relation of shame to the self has been widely studied (see Introduction for a 
review). One of the functions of shame is to act as a boundary between the private 
and public aspects of oneself (Pines, 1987). Shame, as the guardian of boundaries, 
protects the separate, private self and prevents inftusion. Shame guarantees the self s 
integrity. Therefore shame anxiety is experienced when one's dominion over their 
'innermost self is threatened or temporarily shattered (Wumser, 1981). More 
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specifically, shame is the experience of being exposed in a situation where the self 
is seen as a lesser, inadequate self. 
Shame can be used to bridge contradictions, interweaving inner and outer reality. The 
specific content of the two split realities can vary, but In all experiences shame 
indicates some profound personal flaw (Wumser, 1981). 
Scheff (1990) also links the intense pain of shame to the exposure of personal 
inadequacies and he describes how: "each person has spent what feels like an eternity 
of time and effort in constructing a competent, valuable self. The threat of losing that 
self may be more painful than the threat of losing one's life. " (Scheff 1990) He 
seems to imply that it is the construction of a valuable public self, the loss of which 
would lead to such despair. 
The construction and the loss of the public self, or 'loss of face', has been linked to 
the root of the word shame. As seen in the Introduction, the word comes from the 
Old High German root, scama, "to cover oneself'. Sceme is "cover, mask". In shame 
one wants to change oneself into another being or to hide - not to be seen any more. 
The mask (or facade), changes the shameful one who fears to be seen, into one who 
is seen and is strong. Shame is the wrath over one's imperfection and limitation 
(Hegel in Wumser 1981: 306). 
The above suggests that shame experiences which affect the self are likely to involve 
feelings of inadequacy, which has been widely discussed in the literature reviews 
(Introduction and chapters one, two and three). In the context of this chapter I will 
assume that when the participants refer to fear of being exposed in their inadequacy 
they are talking of shame. 
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9.2 Grounding in experience 
The above descriptions of shame are consistent with experiences reported by women 
of a constant, underlying anxiety of being exposed, of people seeing 'who they really 
are', which is presented as shameful and hidden. 
The following extracts were selected from sections in the interviews when women 
elaborated on their emotional experiences of shame. At this point shame was often 
referred to, probably to explain in greater detail the various emotional responses they 
had had in that situation to one or more feelings belonging to the shame family, e. g. 
small, stupid, inadequate (see Introduction for a discussion on the shame family of 
feelings). 
Sandy: 
Tania: 
Sonia: 
Mae: 
(. ) I suppose it goes back to this idea of what I think I must be in public, this 
faýade will be broken and although this is a fagade I am not very fond of, the 
thought that somebody might see through it, is appalling/ 
[ ... ] when I was adolescent there was a 
disparity between the way I acted and 
the way I felt inside, otherwise I couldn't have coped, and it was always very 
difficult, so really something didn't develop/ 
It somehow feels much more calamitous in a situation not with friends, you 
feel almost unmasked (. ) [ ... ] That 
is quite specific [ ... ] that 
is just another 
facet of the fact that I would not like to get caught out looking stupid, 
sounding stupid/ 
[ ... ] people 
from the outside are always telling me 'you must me joking, you 
can't possibly feel inadequate', but that is literally the way I survive, I am not 
going to allow myself to show that inadequacy and I hide it constantly, 
constantly/ in any situation, 
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Vanessa: 
[ ... jI 
felt as though I had said something really ignorant () and I could feel 
myself withdrawing from what they were saying, putting on a faýade maybe 
and taking on board what they were saying and acting as if I was admitting 
that I was wrong, I felt I was wrong/ 
Sandy defines her public persona as a fagade, reconfirming the split between an 
implied private self and the public/performance fagade-self. The fact that she is 'not 
very fond of this fagade could be taken to mean either that she does not like it very 
much or that there is no emotional attachment to it, implying a further detachment. 
The split between performance and action is also present in Tania's account, 
suggesting that her feelings were kept private and unaccessible. She presents this split 
as a defensive strategy which enabled her 'to cope'; however she also adds that it was 
very difficult to keep the split and that it had some negative effects which she 
describes as 'something did not develop'. What did not develop is left unsaid; it 
could be a sense of self which is experienced as solid and not split off, or some other 
nameless potentialities. What matters is that there is an acknowledgment that this 
supposedly defensive split has had repercussions on her development. 
Sonia, on the contrary, highlights the useftilness of the mask which prevents others 
from "catching her out" "looking or sounding stupid'. The looking and sounding 
suggest that again we are dealing with social performance. On similar lines, Mae 
stresses the usefulness of hiding behind the mask which covers an inadequate self. 
Similarly, for Tania this split is presented as necessary for survival. Finally there is 
Vanessa who also talks of a fagade behind which she protected herself, but her 
account provides a very good illustration of the complexities and drawbacks of this 
defensive strategy. 
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Vanessa first constructs the fagade as a diplomatic exercise whereby, following the 
embarrassment and humiliation (see chapter eight for the full quote) she disengages 
herself, which supposedly allows her to continue functioning in the situation. She 
pretends to take on board what they are saying and acts 'as if she were admitting 
that she was wrong. This implies that Vanessa clearly thought she was not wrong, but 
strategically pretended so, while managing to retain the belief in what she knew. But 
her final statement 'I felt I was wrong' suggests that this belief could not be held in 
the face of external attack and that it did affect the way she felt about herself. 
What I find striking in these accounts is the implication that the fagade not only fails 
to protect the self from negative attribution from the outside, but neither does it allow 
the positive, hidden qualities on the inside to express themselves. 
In other words, the use of a fagade does not seem to be very functional at all; unless 
what is hidden is really shameful it seems to have hardly any usefulness at all. I think 
that this is the reason why the shameful self is constructed as a given, an obvious fact 
used to warrant the employment of a faýade. Hence not much is said about the 
fagade/mask, except that its validity is warranted by the anxiety expressed at the 
thought of losing it (calamitous, appalling thought). This attributes the fagade with 
positive, strong, protective connotations. 
Much more is said, on the other hand, about the hidden self, which by definition is 
presented as the true self This second representation of the self is stupid, appalling, 
silly, totally inadequate. These constructions prevent the emergence of alternative 
readings. What these alternative readings might be and what implications they might 
have for women is what I will explore in the second part of this chapter. I first want 
to investigate further the implications of presenting one's self as a faýade and how 
it has been linked to women's position in society and to shame. 
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It is very difficult from the above extracts to draw conclusions carrying relevance to 
broader social issues, because the experience of having a fagade is, in every case, 
described as a very personal or isolated event. I suspend the belief that these 
experiences are due to the individual women's incompetence and shift the focus to 
an extract where there is more information on the split between the public fagade and 
the 'true' self. I have selected as a starting point part of the interview with Sonia (see 
chapter seven for the full extract where it was discussed in relation to the feminine 
body). 
Sonia: 
[ ... ] that's why I say I am quite happy with myself physically because I still 
think I have a physique of almost like a teenager, so I if I took my clothes off 
and look at this body it does not look like a 47 years old body/ 
In this extract the body is presented as the fagade. I want to refer again to Irigaray 
(1974) as I find her ideas useful for the exploration of women's multiple use of 
fagade and in particular of the body as fagade. I have already looked at the 
implications of Irigaray's theory of women's body as commodity (see chapter seven); 
I am interested here in the implication of women's 'acting' their social self, as 
discussed above. Irigaray argues that, deprived of the 'phallus' currency (the only 
currency available in a male-dominated market), women's only choice is to act 'as 
if she had it'. In other words, women are not attributed any value per se, nor is there 
any possibility of a representation of her value 'for her and by her', which could 
bring her into the system of exchange as something other than 'object'. 
I argued in chapter seven that in Sonia's account, the teenage body was constructed 
as positive and desirable, while to her the forty-seven year old body was shameful 
and had to be hidden. I want to argue further that the teenage body is constructed as 
a faýade charged with value; a value, however, based on a lie because Sonia is 47 
years old. In this case the faýade shows the lived experience of the absence of 
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alternative positive representations of ageing women. In the extract there were 
alternative sources of pride: the studies abroad, the exciting past - but the function 
of those events was presented as useful as long as it added value to the faýade and 
credibility to the teenager appearance ("one's vitality and contentment shows on one's 
face and that's why I say I am quite happy with myself physically because I still 
think I have a physique of almost a teenager"), instead of being used to strengthen 
the 'true' self and make the facade less necessary. 
It is in this context that Irigaray argues for a different meaning of shame for women 
than the one attributed by Freud. In 'The Shame that Demands Vicious Conformity' 
Irigaray (1974) offers an acute symbolic representation of the price involved in 
relying on a fagade of value. In contrast with Freud's statement that 'shame' will 
remain a testimony of the deficiency of her genitals (Freud 1933) she argues: 
"Shame will be the remainder, in reverse, of the compromise and the 
disavowal at work in the fetish. [ ... ] How can one trade on something so 
empty? To sell herself, woman has to veil as best as she can how price-less 
she is in the sexual economy. " (Irigaray, 1974: 115) 
Irigaray warns further about the double-edge function of the fagade: 
"[... ] Almost imperceptibly, the wrapping will have brought Nature and her 
work into a fetishistic economy by hiding all she is capable of producing and 
preventing us from appreciating it. [ ... ] But the contradiction 
is already 
implicit in the veil ("glossing over") Freud talks about, in the duplicity of that 
veil's function. Used to cover a "lesser" value and to evaluate the fetish, it 
will equally serve to conceal the interest afforded by what it claims to protect 
from devaluation... " (Irigaray 1974: 116) 
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Irigaray seems to suggest here that, constructed to hide a lesser value (in the extracts 
the shameful and inadequate self), the wrapping in fact prevents the real value from 
being known. Before I move on to exploring this duplicity and what else the faýade 
could be hiding, I want to look at what constitutes women's 'faýade% public self 
according to some other feminist writers. 
Two avenues of explanations are suggested: one which follows the relation between 
shame and conformity as a way ot avoiding rejection; the other which relates to 'tear 
of success'. The two are connected by the fear of being rejected because unlovable. 
Many of the feminist explanations seem to describe the phenomenon only in terms 
of women's being in the position of oppressed. Susie Orbach (1987), for instance, 
suggests that in a patriarchal society, women enter the world beyond the home as 
guests and not principals. Therefore women are required to accommodate themselves 
to the public sphere and to others in private. If not as midwives to the activity of 
others, their presence still has to be unobtrusive. They must conform to prevailing 
masculinist values and accept entry on that basis (Orbach 1987). 
Scheff (1990) offers an alternative way of looking at this dynamic which captures 
some of the complexities of the process of negotiation involved in the imposition of 
power. Scheff s interest is in how shame leads to collusion by way of a 'deference- 
emotion' system. A deference-emotion system is described as one which compels 
conformity to norms exterior to the Self by informal but pervasive rewards and 
punishments. Anticipation of rejection following embarrassment, often in a subtle 
form, Scheff claims, is among the most powerful control mechanisms. He argues that 
people who conform are unable to face a conflict which might expose a perceived 
deficiency in themselves. This view is consistent with the experiences in the above 
extract and in the previous chapter. Scheff also stresses how independence requires 
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the capacity to face opposition without a lowered sense of personal worth. This view 
is supported by the extracts (see for instance Molly or Vanessa in chapter eight) 
which suggest women's incapacity to rely on their self-esteem to resist collusion 
Several feminist writers have looked for explanations of women's pervasive low self- 
esteem. Bartky (1992) for instance, attributes the lack of belief in oneself to the 
corrosive nature of shame which prevents feelings of success and power to attain the 
level of belief. A vicious circle thus seems to exist between shame and 
embarrassment which lower self-esteem, which in turn leads to the deference-emotion 
system. This prevents the identification with more positive self-images which could 
increase self-esteem. 
When looking for the roots of women's uncertain sense of self-worth, feminist 
writers tend to attribute it to processes of socialisation. This is extremely useful in 
acknowledging the implications of patriarchal societies for women, but unfortunately 
they rely on individual/society, oppressor/oppressed dichotomies which hinder the 
recognition of women's implication in the process of oppression. 
According to Valerie Walkerdine for example (Femininity as Performance' 1990), 
women are used to performing, adapting to a series of roles. The following account 
is a good illustration of a lived experience of a woman playing different roles. 
12.3 Mae's Account: Extract One 
M: Sometimes if I am into a party mood, I can be shocking, I can drink too 
much, you can drink with the boys, it depends, you kind of clue into what 
people want, do they want you to take them out of themselves, are they trying 
to have a party through you, are they depending on you to liven things up, 
you can actually clue into those things or do they want to sit down and have 
a very intimate chat with you in a comer, you clue into that and play the role 
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of what they want you to be and in that way you gain acceptance/ [ ... II can do it in all sorts of ways, can dance on the table or let's be intellectual/ [ ... ] 
According to Walkerdine, however, underneath these roles there is a repressed core, 
a true self, which has been inhibited, clouded by the layers of social conditioning. 
These, she argues, are part of a process of gender socialization which condition 
women into passivity. She thus implies that due to socialisation, women's 
potentialities have been thwarted and their capacity for self-reliance reduced. On 
similar lines Gilligan (1982' ) InighifighLS Lhe impossibility of self-development in a 
society which, although affirming publicly a woman's right to choose for herself, the 
exercise of such choice brings her privately into conflict with the conventions of 
femininity, particularly the moral equation of goodness with self-sacrifice. Therefore, 
although independent assertion in judgement and action is considered to be the 
hallmark of adulthood, it is rather in their care and concern for others that women 
have both judged themselves and been judged (Gilligan 1982). Therefore, Gilligan 
suggests, women still gain acceptance in the form of self-denial and passivity. 
As early as 1934 the psychoanalist Karen Horney (1967) considered shame and self- 
esteem crucial factors in the oppression of women. She held that it was essential for 
the understanding of some symptoms of her female patients which she attributed to 
women's struggle to to move beyond their traditional roles. 
"[... ] with her lowered self-esteem of centuries' duration, [ ... ] women who 
nowadays obey the impulse of the independent development of their abilities, 
are able to do so only at the cost of a struggle against both external 
opposition and such resistances within themselves as are created by an 
intensification of the traditional ideal of the exclusively sexual function of 
woman. " (Horney, 1967: 183) 
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Homey observed that certain patients, although presenting no prominent 
psychopathology, seemed to have difficulties in their relations to men and to work, 
which they blamed on their personalities. These difficulties often caused considerable 
impairment in the development of their potential. Homey describes the phenomenon 
as a "general feeling of being different and inferior, which they attributed to an 
inherent and hence unalterable predisposition. " (Homey 1967: 186) These feelings of 
deep insecurity and inadequacy referred to some real or imaginary defect, becoming 
self-tormenting complaints invariably associated with a deep feeling of shame. 
All the above suggests that through a combination of pressures coming from inside 
and out, shame confirms women's belief in themselves as inadequate and intrinsically 
inferior. Furthermore this belief is attributed to a supposedly inherent and inalterable 
disposition. However, what I am also arguing is that this is employed by women for 
specific reasons and purposes; one of which being the attempt to deal with conflictual 
demands and experiences. I claim that this confuses women further about their value 
and power. 
9.3.1 The Other Story 
Although I have reached similar conclusions to Walkerdine's I find myself 
dissatisfied with a lot of the previous explanations as they do not allow space for the 
possibility of a different story. For instance, rejection is not only feared because of 
inadequacy but also because of being powerftil and successful. As discussed in the 
previous chapter success might provoke rejection, on the one hand because it would 
mean transgression of what is the expected passive position for women and on the 
other, because would invite envious attack. However, the employment of a faqade 
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disguises this dynamic and attributes the rejection to what is experienced by women 
as their intrinsic unlovability. 
Walkerdine (1990) also stresses that it is possible to tell a different story: one of 
success. The example she gives mirrors situations reported in the interviews in this 
study: 
"[... ] received more or less straight 'A's for all her work, but still cannot 
believe that the distinction belongs to her; it is as though the person with her 
name exists somewhere else, outside her body: this powerftil person whom 
she cannot recognize as herself Instead, she feels that she is hopeless, 
consistently panics about her performance and appears to have little 
confidence in herself [ ... ]I am sure this story has resonance for many 
women. " (Walkerdine 1990) 
I want to parallel Walkerdine's comments with Mae's story. 
9.4 Mae's Account: Extract Two 
I M: At the end of my degree, honours degree, I was incredibly ill because of 
2 feelings of inadequacy, hospitalized and managed to get all the work done, to 
3 sit the exams and at graduation which happened four months later, 1 
4 discovered that I had been awarded the government award as outstanding 
5 student, and I was shocked because again academic success is irrelevant 
6 because I am not a perfect human being you see (laughs) and now five years 
7 later I still don't believe it, don't really believe that they gave me the award 
8 because I was a good student, but because I survived a bad illness/ maybe 
91 don't trust them telling me the truth/ 
Mae could very well be the student described in Walkerdine's quote. What I think 
discourse analysis can add to her rendering of the situation is an approach which 
looks at the 'choices' as subject positions. The first advantage of this approach is that 
224 
F 
it immediately validates the possibility of a different reading of the story. The first 
subject position in the account is that of the inadequate student. The feelings of 
inadequacy were such as to 'cause' her to be hospitalized. The self here is 
constructed as inadequate, fragile, ill. The comment at the end about the award being 
given to the survivor of the illness is the self she implies is the one worth 
recognition; the only one she obviously feels is 'her'. The other self, the outstanding 
student, she constructs as a lie and as such, she disowns. This is, more or less, as far 
as Walkerdine takes the situation. 
I think it is much more complex than this. Firstly, if we consider Mae as a 
fragmented self, this account contains more than two fragments. The inadequate 
student is other than the survivor (although I think she attempts to polarize the 
situation between the two; I will soon get to why I think she does this). It is 
important to recognize the existence of this self which fights and wins because, 
although Mae disowns the outstanding student as a lie, a fagade and not her true self, 
she does identify the survivor as her true self. In fact, the account implies that this 
is the self which got and deserved the award. 
In this light then, we can make sense of the contradiction immediately introduced 
where, although distancing herself from the outstanding student, she says: "at the end 
of My degree, honours degree", where she takes the degree as her own and implies 
pride in the fact that it was an honours degree. This is further substantiated in the 
next line where she says that despite [my reading: Mae says 'and'] the illness she 
managed to get all the work done and sit the exams. I say 'despite' because it is 
obvious that the I who sat the exam was in conflict with something else. Mae 
constructs this as the inadequate self, but in lines 6-7 something else surfaces: 
"academic success is irrelevant because I am not a perfect human being". 
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A psychodynamic reading of the text could be helpful at this point as it encompasses 
the idea of conflict between different agencies in the psychic structure. So, for 
example, the dismissal of the success could be read as a harsh super-ego judgement 
motivated by guilt feelings due to conflicts around success. Or as the voice of a 
persecutory object or introject. I find these readings useful, not because they tell me 
what is 'really' behind Mae's feelings which she is unaware of, but because they 
allow for an understanding of 'meaning' as something fluid and constantly in the 
process of negotiation. This view is informed by some post-modernist critiques of the 
Freudian structural model, which looks at the relation between ego, super-ego and id 
as a conversation among three partners, all with interesting stories to tell, but not 
attributing a privileged voice to any of them (Rorty, 1986). 
What matters here, going back to the subject positions, is to take this 'dismissive 
voice' to represent the active refusal of identification with the success. This is 
achieved by emptying it of value. 
What is repeatedly stressed in this extract is that, despite the existence of alternative, 
more positive and successful representations of herself, there is almost a 
determination not to take that position. This is warranted by construing what is seen 
on the outside, the successful, positive representation, as a fagade and a lie. This 
could also be read as a manoeuvre to avoid conflict and gain acceptance, but brings 
it back to a space where different actions within the text are possible, rather than 
resorting to external influences and women's passivity. 
9.5 The True Self. Post-structuralist and Psychoanalytic View 
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The crucial issue underlying this chapter is the idea of self. To answer the question 
'what is the selff and even more so, 'what is the 'true' self'? ' would be a mammoth 
- perhaps impossible - task, far beyond the scope of this thesis. And yet, it is also 
central to this discussion, as to construe the self as a fagade immediately implies the 
existence or the possibility of a self which is somehow more authentic than that. 
This 'true' self can obviously be defined in many ways according to the frame of 
reference (see Neisser, 1988 for a inter-disciplinary review). Hence we can have a 
true self in moral terms, in psychodynamic terms (further splintered according to the 
school of thought), in philosophical and even in spiritual terms. For the present 
purposes, psychodynamically speaking, I am referring to the term 'self as employed 
by Sandler (see Introduction and chapter two for a discussion) and in post- 
structuralist terms as a multifaceted, constantly negotiated self (see chapter four). 
These terms are far from being adequate; in fact they can be highly unsatisfactory. 
Part of my dissatisfaction is due to my reluctance to relinquish my interest in the 
central importance of the complexities of an 'inner world' with its own system of 
internal relations and how this relates to intimate relations with oneself and other 
persons. These dimensions, I find, are rarely captured by the post-structuralist 
analysis of the self. Besides, my reservations participate in the wider current debate 
around modernity and post-modemity (Habermas, 1987; Hebdige, 1988; Dews, 1989). 
I will first summarise some of the main positions in the current theoretical debate 
which may help to throw some light on the subject. I have not reached a firm 
conclusion as yet, however, as a second step I will explore the issues in question 
through a discursive analysis of some extracts. 
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I will start from Foucault and his attempted deconstruction on the theory of the 
subject. Firstly, Foucault rejects any essentialist claims of human nature, arguing for 
the totally historical nature of such a notion. This implies the abandonment of a self 
that is 'deep inside us' (Flax, 1990). Habermas (1987a) argues against the total 
abandonment of the ideal of self and subject and attributes Foucault's concerns - 
many of which he shares - to the conftision between transcendental and empirical 
modes of dealing with the issue. Habermas argues for an "incomprehensible element 
that cannot be reflectively retrieved a primordial element prior to all production. " 
(Habermas, 1987a: 296). 
Very similar to post-structuralist approaches to text, Habermas believes that the 
speaker and the hearer together construct a common 'lifework' made of a mutual 
understanding negotiated between the two, but which also uses a store of things taken 
for granted in the given culture. However, he claims that beyond all this, there 
remains an "unanalyzable, holistic background" (Habermas, 1987a: 298) 
It is in this multifaceted construction of self that Habermas finds the space for 
resistance. Ideas of reason, truth and justice, although never divorced from social 
practices, can never be reduced to any given set of such practices and are 
fundamental in serving as ideal referent to criticise the tradition we inherit 
(McCarthy, 1987). This is where we can perhaps find the needed bridge which would 
allow us to benefit from post-structuralism and psychoanalysis at the same time when 
conceptualizing the self 
To return to Foucault, he locates the constitution of the contemporary Western subject 
and our experience of subjectivity within disciplinary and confessional practices, with 
psychoanalysis falling within the latter group (Foucault, 1967,1973). According to 
Foucault, psychoanalysis creates the subject and prompts the individual to exercise 
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surveillance upon herself which is, however conceptualised as 'self-knowledge'. This 
implies the existence of an individual self about which knowledge is possible (Flax, 
1990: 208). Foucault is not at all interested in the therapeutic contribution of 
psychoanalysis which he considers exclusively a normative device. 
It is evident from what I have said above, that a Foucaldian formulation of self is 
inadequate and unsatisfactory from a philosophical and political perspective 
(Bernstein, 1985), a psychoanalytic (Frosh, 1991) or feminist perspective (Weedon 
1994, Ramazanoglu, 1993). Some of these concerns are sensitively expressed by 
Frosh (199 1), who obviously resists abandoning some of the positive connotations of 
a modern self. He therefore argues that a modernist self does not necessarily have to 
be pre-given and fixed, as essentialist and biological theories might have it, but is 
constructed and dialectical, with needs and desires which intertwine with the external 
world (Frosh 1991: 19). 
This individuals share in the social experience, but they can also resist it; in 
psychoanalytic terms this would retain the possibility of an ego capable of forming 
constructive and reparative object relationships even in the most dismal of 
circumstances. Therefore, Frosh argues, it is possible to find sources of resistance in 
the modernist self and, which I consider crucial, this would imply not having to 
abandon the belief in the possible existence of a central self and its potential for 
development (Frosh 1991: 21). 
Feminists have also criticised Foucault's disdain for a modem ideal of self. Flax 
(1990) for example, argues that one of the implications of Foucault's position is the 
reinstatement of another form of the polarity between a 'true' and a 'false' self. The 
'false' self is unitary but essentialist, while the 'true' self is non-differentiated but 
totally historically or textually constituted. This dichotomy is partially determined by 
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the absence of any systematic consideration of gender and gender relations (Flax, 
1990: 210). Besides a 'unitary' self is not necessarily synonymous with a 'core' and 
although we can do without the first, Flax argues, we need to preserve the latter as 
precious, as anybody with clinical experience would know from working with people 
who lack a core self 
I want to explore very briefly these issues in the text, not with the aim of reaching 
any firm conclusion but more In the hope to illustrate some of the complexities of 
abandoning or embracing completely a modernist view of the self. The search for a 
central self is obviously what was behind my following question to Mae, which I 
think is worth looking into: 
9.6 Mae's Account: Extract Three 
I B: And if you were just yourself without tuning into what people wanted from 
2 you? 
3 M: I don't know what that is, that is the crux of the matter, is that I find myself 
4 at 36 not knowing who that is, [ ... J 5 there is a lot of panic in thinking 'Oh God, I am going to walk into this room 
6 and I have got to be something, somebody' and panic undermines that 
7 because if I then have to walk into a crowded room where I don't know 
8 anybody I would panic and I would have to work incredibly hard to be 
9 centred in that situation/ I think what I am developing is quite an astute sense 
10 of what people expect, one picks up all sorts of information on what people 
II expect from you/ 
My question shows immediately that I am using a modernist frame of reference as 
I am assuming that it is possible to refer to an entity [yourselfl which exists 
independently of interaction with others. However, Mae obviously can relate to that 
and her answer validates the importance in her life of looking for a sense of self that 
might have those qualities. In fact she states that this search has been at the centre 
of her life. 
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There are other elements in Mae's account which are worth looking into. In line 6 
she repeats almost exactly what Molly had said (see chapter eight), describing the 
process of self-identification when moving from the private I to the social self. "I 
have got to be something, somebody" where there is a dual reference to being a 
person (somebody), and an object (something). 
Mae also refers to the additional difficulty in entering a room where she does not 
know anybody implying (and supported later), that she needs a reference point to 
'construct' herself around. This is consistent with Lewis's findings about women's 
higher field-dependency and proneness to shame (see chapter two for discussion). 
Finally, the last few lines of the account encapsulate what has been described in the 
feminist literature above about women playing a series of roles and adapting 
themselves to others' needs. This is introduced by the word 'astute' which implies 
a recognition of the usefulness of the skill. However when describing that skill, Mae 
states that, 'one picks up all sorts of information'. Is this usage of the impersonal 
pronoun hinting at the consequent loss of identity in being what other people want? 
For the purpose of this thesis I have restricted myself to the construction of 'true self' 
and 'fagade' as it is presented in each account. I now want to explore further other 
possible readings of the function of the fagade. It has been pointed out that the 
abandonment of a modernist understanding of the self would also imply that all 
attempts at understanding history are fraudulent - both the collective history of a 
people and its culture and the private history of each individual self (Frosh 1991: 29) 
In the discursive analysis of the next extract, also from the interview with Mae, 
want to attempt to use a post-structuralist view of the self, without abandoning 
completely a psychoanalytic framework. I want to argue that history is essential to 
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understanding the self, not in a deterministic way, but precisely because we do not 
live in a vacuum. History can be taken to be the context within which the subject is 
constructed and conversely, where the subject constructs a historical version of 
events. Without a historical framework, for example, we could not make sense of 
what Mae suggests is behind her fear of exposure and sense of inadequacy. The 
analysis of the next extract also ties in the subject of the previous section. 
9.7 Mae's Account: Extract Four 
M: [ ... ]I have been told that I have a good singing voice and I have been told 
that I am a very good pianist, by adolescence or earlier than that, feelings of 
inadequacy actually led me to stop all that, actually stop playing the piano 
completely, which appalled people who knew what I was like before I 
stopped, it is only recently that I have actually found the courage to do chorus 
singing and even in that situation when I go to rehearsals and I am in the 
midst of whole people singing I feel inadequate and yet everybody on the 
outside says 'no, you are OK, you have a very good voice, what is the 
matterT 
(. ) the thing is that as a young child I was singled out by my mother is 
a frustrated concert pianist, that encapsulates the story and she had four 
children, I am the eldest and she allocated an instrument to each child, I came 
first so I got the piano and I showed a talent, my mother's extraordinary 
persistency and support, but I also showed talent in other activities at school, 
the nature of the school is such that if someone shows a talent it makes other 
people feel inadequate, if you are showing (. ) shining there is an attempt to 
block the light, not to encourage to shine and yes, from a very young age I 
felt singled out and it got more and more complex as I grew older and now 
I don't want to - that's rubbish (with anger) - of course I would like to be 
singled out, of course I would like to achieve, of course I would like to be 
wonderful, but I don't allow it/ 
B: Why? 
M: Because it puts me on the outside, it makes me different from the rest, and 
yet there is conflict between wanting to be different and yet it is scary out 
there, it's too scary being different, it is easier to be just one of the crowd, 
boring as hell, but easier/ 
B: Because its scary? 
232 
Facade 
28 M: Yea, it is scary being on the outside saying I am talented, I can do this, I am 
29 good at this" it is scary because you have your own expectations to fulfil, you 
30 have other people's expectations to fulfil and it puts you outside, you are not 
31 run of the mill/ 
Mae begins by positioning herself as inadequate and claims that it is this feeling of 
being inadequate that stops her from performing. Recently she has found the courage 
to perform again, but only when she can hide or disappear in the chorus. What 
emerges after this representation and in contradiction with it, is that she is a gifted 
pianist. This is compared with her mother being a 'frustrated' pianist. In her account, 
she first praises her mother for her support, but then adds that the result of this, her 
'shining' made other people feel inadequate, therefore the light was blocked. 
A possible interpretation of this extract is that it contains an oblique reference to the 
ambivalent feelings of Mae's mother to her daughter's success. It could be argued 
that by 'shining', Mae was making her own mother feel inadequate, perhaps with the 
accompanying fears of provoking an envious attack from her mother, or internally 
from her maternal introject. This is only considered, in respect of this thesis, as a 
representation of the possible conflicts which might be evoked by success for women 
and how from this point of view, the rejection would definitively come from 
'shining' too much; from being too good. 
At that point, in total opposition to the initial representation, the possibility of 
achievement is presented as desirable and that it is Mae herself who does not allow 
it. The position of being singled out for her success is presented as highly desirable 
and wonderful, but at the same time as 'too scary', because it would make her 
different. What is scaring her then, as is stated clearly at the end, is the possibility 
of owning the successful performance; the 'fagade' as the true self, talented and 
capable. 
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9.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored various readings of the employment of a 'faýade' to 
protect the 'true' self constructed as inadequate and shameful. 
I have looked at this first in the way it was constructed by the participants as a 
defence against the exposure of an inadequate self. I have then suggested a different 
reading of the fagade which looks at it as a rhetorical device aimed at preventing 
alternative readings of the events. These alternative readings were reconnected to 
broader cultural issues. Finally I have looked at the 'fagade' in terms of the current 
debate around modernist, post-modernist and psychoanalytic views of the 'true' and 
'false' self. I would like to make few final comments about the issues discussed in 
this chapter. 
The employment of a fagade and the positioning of themselves as inadequate, I have 
argued, allows the participants to do various things: to function in public (Sonia) and 
to cope better with psychic pain (Tania) and to handle diplomatically otherwise very 
difficult situations by removing themselves and acting differently from the way one 
feels. 
However, what the inadequate position does not allow women to do is to make a 
statement of their value. If we take Chasseguet-Smirgel's (1985) view, that we need 
other people's (society's) recognition of our value as a mirror to our sense of self, 
then 'hiding' must affect women's sense of self-worth. This is in line with recent 
feminist discourse analysts who claim that subject positions have implications for 
people's sense of self-esteem and sense of self (Burman and Parker, 1993) and with 
the wider debate on strategies adopted by people in conditions of oppression (Scheff 
1990, Bartky 1990). 
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In the next chapter I will look at the disempowering implications of undermining 
oneself (low self-esteem), particularly in case of attack. 
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CHAPTER TEN: 
Shame of the Victim 
"He who despises himself still nonetheless respects himseýf as one who 
despises. " (Nietzsche 1973: 92) 
10.0 Introduction 
The previous chapters have explored how shame is constructed in the context of 
notions of an ideal, femininity and female sexuality. I have explored the ideological 
function of taking the position of 'shameful' and the consequences of resorting to the 
device of the self as fagade. In all the chapters of this section, the focus was on 
shame as a negotiated construct and on the function in speech of taking the position 
of the shameful subject. Their other feature in common was the investigation of 
individual solutions to conflicts related to wider cultural issues. 
I have looked at the implications of the individual solutions in relation to each theme, 
but I have also implied that these solutions (ultimately the fact that women 
constructed shame as reflection of personal faults), have a cumulative and damaging 
effect for women's sense of well-being. This cumulative effect is the focus of this 
chapter. In particular I will explore the effect it had on the women interviewed when 
under attack. I want to argue that positioning oneself as shameful is highly 
disempowering and debilitating. This is based on the claim that subject positions are 
not just theoretical constructs, but have implications for one's sense of self and self- 
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worth (Burman and Parker 1993); the investigation of these implications in real life 
is an important factor if discursive analysis aims at political changes. 
Following on from the theme of the 'true self' as unlovable and unworthy, issues of 
low self-esteem and shame are developed further in the present chapter. I have 
repeatedly stressed how the discomfort of shame seems to stay with the women; here 
want to suggest a link between that discomfort and the dislike of themselves which 
was repeatedly expressed and 'now the rage is turned against themselves in case of 
attack. 
10.1 PSYCHOANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
The notion of self-esteem implies a large measure of reference to internal criteria: we 
judge ourselves in relation to an internalized sense of 'who we are', as well as in 
relation to our conununity. We are aware of our self-judgements, however dependent 
these judgements may be upon the approval and opinion of others (Ablon, 1985). 
It has been widely discussed in the literature how low self-esteem is related to 
conflicts in the self-representation (Sandler, Pines, Lewis, Wumser, Silberstein et al 
1987) and more specifically, how loss of self-esteem derives from a discord between 
wishful self images and a self that appears to be failing, defective, inferior, weak and 
contemptible by comparison (Lewis, 1971). These conflicts are apt to evoke feelings 
of inferiority and shame (Sandler 1963, Wumser 1981). 1 have selected the following 
extracts to illustrate how the participants talked about themselves. 
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10.2 Grounding in Experience 
Tania: 
I also went through a long phase between five and twenty [when] I didn't 
particularly like myself, so this idea of this child malfunctioning was so 
hateful to me 
Sandy:. 
I can't imagine being a particularly pleasant friend, I don't see myself as 
particularly likeable, no 1 don't think 1 like myself ( ... ] very self-centred and 
selfish, very self-conscious to the point of being almost narcissistic/ 
Dawn: 
I must be a very boring person/ 
Sonia: 
I think I am a bitch, I think I am intolerant and I don't hide my feelings very 
well/ 
Mae: 
It ranges from really hating myself, walking around thinking 'you are just 
unbelievably useless' (. ) 
The Self represented in the above extracts is: boring, malfunctioning, 'a bitch', 
incapable of friendship, self-centred, selfish, hated and useless. The striking quality 
of these extracts is the vehemence used by these women to describe themselves. Also 
noticeable is the total lack of compassion or redeeming features which could 
counteract such harsh judgements. 
Tania talks of fifteen years of self-hatred and describes herself as a 'malfunctioning 
child'. Tania was quoted in the previous chapter when she talked of the split between 
the way she felt inside and the way she acted as necessary for her to cope. The 
extreme quality of the feelings continues in the other extracts. 
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In the previous chapter I suggested a reading of the text which would involve the 
construction of a judgmental Self. This construct, influenced by a psychodynamic 
model of intrapsychic conflict, has the purpose of contextualising one of the possible 
relationships between different selves. This construct is helpful with Mae's extract, 
for example, where there is one self which is positioned as the agent and one as the 
object. The latter is constructed as 'unbelieveabl Y useless' with the former as the 
hateful self Here the psych dynamic -1-1 can be andoned, ass T arn not int-sted be ab 
in using these two constructs as reflection of an unconscious, internalised intrapsychic 
conflict (which of course could be a very useful way of looking at it within a 
therapeutic psychodynamic analysis). 
What I am interested in here is that there is the construction of a hateful/hated self 
with all the other attendant negative connotations. I have used Dawn's and Sandy's 
extracts in chapter six where they described their 'ideal self. At that point, Dawn 
talked of her shame in not knowing what to do in social situations. Here she 
describes herself again within a social context, as a very boring person. Sandy's ideal 
self was also focused on social performance and here she describes herself as not 
likeable, unpleasant, very self-centred etc. These links suggest, firstly, that these 
representations of oneself carry a very strong emotional component and secondly, that 
the shameful self is constructed not only as inadequate and failing, but is also 
positioned as hated and under attack. 
Scheff s (1990) idea of a chain reaction of shame and anger in the 'Shame-Rage 
Spiral' (Lewis 197 1) can be useful here. According to Scheff, a chain reaction, which 
takes place between and within interactants, occurs when there is a real or imagined 
criticism, insult, defeat on one or both sides without the resulting emotions being 
acknowledged (Lewis 1971,1987; Scheff, 1990). This idea was based on the 
extensive studies of serious pathological consequences of 'by-passed, unacknowledged 
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shame'. The term 'Shame-Ra e Spiral', introduced by Lewis in 1971 and further IgI 
developed in 1978, describes the sequence of emotions triggered off when shame is 
evoked and not dispelled. The most common sequence appears to be unacknowledged 
shame, followed by anger directed either at the outside, at the self or both (Lewis, 
1978). Shame-rage is apparently experienced as being angry that one is ashamed; 
being ashamed that one is angry; or ashamed of being ashamed. 
These 'spirals' of emotions may accumulate with such intensity and duration as to 
be experienced as overwhelming and unending (Scheff, 1987). At the core of this 
issue is the phenomenon of having emotional reactions to one's emotional reactions, 
which easily becomes a closed loop. These inner storms of shame and rage are very 
disruptive and can interfere with the person's capacity to deal with the world (Lewis, 
1978, Scheff, 1987). 
The above are extremely useful constructs, but as I have argued previously, they are 
also problematic. Firstly I have argued (chapter two) that Lewis was investigating the 
phenomenon within a clinical context with the pathologizing implications of the 
findings. Secondly, the nature of shame is never really questioned as a construct, but 
observed as a thing 'out there', as an agent which affects women. Hence the effects 
of shame are studied within a scientific model and the subjects are observed in the 
way they react to shame as if it were a disease. 
On the other hand, if we abandon the inside/outside, individual/society splits, it is 
possible to see that the shameful self is constructed as inadequate and hateful which 
implies an expectation of hatred, contempt and attack, whether it comes from 
'outside' or 'inside'. In other words, what I am arguing is that taking the position of 
shameful implies taking the position of inept and 'deserving of attack'. Furthermore 
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I want to argue that starting from such a subject position makes it very difficult to 
find any other explanation to events. The following extracts illustrate this difficulty: 
Sonia: 
I don't want people to think that I am obsessional about it because I am not/ 
I don't want people to think that I am neurotic, but I think they could 
sometimes/ [ ... J that is the other thing 'does she over-react'? 
This account shows the negotiation around whether to judge the self as obsessional 
and neurotic, which Sonia suggests takes place between her as the object and abstract, 
de-contextualised 'people'. She firmly states that she is not obsessional nor neurotic, 
but then instead of saying 'I think they might' which would place the responsibility 
on the other, she says 'I think they could' implying that sometimes they could be 
justified in doing so. The implication of the last sentence is that she is not sure if she 
over-reacts or not, implying that if she did, she would be obsessional/neurotic. It is 
also interesting to notice the use of scientific terms which would automatically 
position Sonia's behaviour as pathological. 
Sandy: 
I think it is that I probably worry unnecessarily about things other people 
simply would not have noticed, [ ... ] it just wouldn't 
happen when I am 
rational about [it] I know I blow it all out of proportion and I do it every 
time, 
On similar lines to Sonia, Sandy positions herself as a worrier, irrational and 
someone who blows things out of proportion. This has similar implications of mildly 
pathological, hysterical behaviour. Contrary to Sonia, however, Sandy positions 
herself firmly as both the subject who knows that herself, as the object of this 
judgement, 'does it every time'. 
Shere Hite (1987) describes this as the language of power used to undermine 
women's perception of reality and entitlement. She makes reference to a "big, foggy 
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area" of emotional inequality which manifests in private between a woman and a 
man. This psychological discrimination blankets everything and is built into language. 
So often women are labelled as 'neurotic' and 'insecure', especially when wanting 
to address an issue emotionally: 
"These arguments usually happen in the middle of the night, there is nobody 
there but the man and the woman. The whole power of this society is behind 
the man usin2 that kind of laneuage and the worst forms of it are something Cý 
like, 'You know, you are being irrational, when you get hold of yourself I'll 
talk to you'. " (Hite in Brunt 1989) 
Eventually the woman will feel as if she has a voice in her head repeating that she 
is a nag. 
I find these explanations useful and problematic at the same time: useful because they 
do look at language and power of language to re/produce oppression and because 
they look at the multiple manifestations of inequality. In line with Hollway (1983, 
1984,1989), however, I find problematic how these positions are deterministically 
attributed to gender, rather than being looked at as 'gendered positions' which can 
be taken by both men and women. The latter standpoint would avoid positioning 
women as victims; it would make them agents in their oppression but also in the 
possibility of liberation. Therefore I would say that the fact that women repeat the 
self-derogatory remarks in their heads is not, as Hite claims, a mechanistic passive 
act, but shows how it is not only men who take the position of oppressors towards 
women (although they certainly do), but also women to other women and indeed to 
themselves. 
What matters here is to see how incapacitating the process of self-doubt and self- 
denigration is for the women interviewed, as in the following case: 
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Judy: 
That was the kind of thing I tuned into, and also I felt myself being the centre 
of this sort of focus and I could not deal with it because I thought I knew 
what they were doing and saying, whereas in fact it might have been my 
paranoia... 
Judy states very clearly that the reason why she could not deal with the situation was 
that she could not trust her judgement. The contrast is between, 'I thought I knew 
what they were doing', a statement which is already wrapped in doubt and, 'in fact 
it might have been my paranoia'. She thus contrasts an assessment which she locates 
in the realm of thought and imagination, with the possible fact that she was paranoid, 
implying that what she thought was true might just have been the product of her 
imagination. 
The above extract is the continuation of that in chapter seven where I looked at 
similar kind of uncertainty as to whether or not she was fat and who was thinking it; 
also, in the same chapter, where she describes not knowing if she is looked in 
admiration or derision. The following two extracts look at the effect of self-doubt 
when two of the women interviewed were confronted with wider issues of inequality: 
Mae: 
Sometimes it smacks me in the eye that I am not getting ahead as fast as I 
think I should just because I am female, but those are political issues and I 
am not a particularly political creature 
Dawn: 
I feel ashamed in certain situations of my background, like being in Oxford 
and being surrounded by people who are middle class, and being in a social 
situation and being asked what your father does and not accountant, not 
doctor, but painter and decorator and your mother is a cleaner and that annoys 
me because I shouldn't feel ashamed of my background/ 
In the first extract, Mae makes a strong statement of being discriminated against, 
which she then immediately undermines by distancing herself from a 'political self 
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to whom she attributes the statement. I assume then that, either she considers it 
acceptable to take the position of 'female of unequal status', or that she believes in 
a private, rather than public/political solution to the issue. 
Dawn also refuses to engage at a public level. In her extract, the subject, according 
to specific social norms, is positioned as comparatively inferior, inadequate, or at 
least different. The subject is exposed and made visible in her inferiority, Yet she 
feels annoyed with herself for feeling ashamed. In such a situation, the shame which 
is grounded in a social construct, is considered in personal terms and disallowed. 
What is even more problematic with this solution is that, as it has been suggested in 
previous cases (for example Molly in chapter eight), shame functions as a reminder 
of a real unjust event. But Dawn constructs her shame as her personal failure. This 
is understandable if Dawn takes her shame to signify a betrayal of loyalty to her 
background; however within the context of Oxford University it is a fact that having 
a builder as father and cleaner for a mother does position her in the minority. In this 
context her expectation to get rid of the shame is not only unrealistic, but makes the 
social structure into her individual problem. It is the location of shame in this context 
which justifies her turning her anger towards herself, instead directed it against the 
inequality of the education system and privilege which comes from belonging to a 
certain social class. 
I find Silberstein et al. (1987) on shame and gender very interesting in this context. 
They suggest that society fosters women's self-denigration and that the shame is even 
greater when blame is imputed as well, for the self is derogated not only for its initial 
inadequacy, but also for its inability to overcome it. The punishment also reinforces 
a view of the self as bad and is an attempt to rectify the problem rather than to 
reassert it. 
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This outlook on shame seems very appropriate to Dawn's account, as it is Scheff s 
(1990) suggestion that the "feeling traps", in which emotions of shame and anger 
intensify internally without finding full external expression, are characteristic of most 
systems of social deference or unequal status. 
As pointed out in the analysis of the extracts, a similar dynamic can be identified in 
the way women describe their shame experiences. Often they accompany the memory 
with self-derogatory comments not exclusively directed to the content of the 
experience, but to the fact that they had the experience and the painful feelings in the 
first place. The pain caused by the perceived exposure of their inadequacy is coupled 
with their additional shame for having felt shame. As a result shame is feared, not 
only for the exposure involved but also for the self-attack it causes. This might in 
some ways justify the defence of withdrawal - to hide and avoid humiliation and 
shame which otherwise threatens to continue in never-ending circles. 
I want to argue that the dynamic is more complex than this chain of causes and 
effects. I will explore this issue in the next extract, from the interview with Moira, 
where through various rhetorical devices self-attack is constructed as self- 
empowerment. 
10.3 Moira's Account 
M: I suppose I can be very self-punitive in that situation, my first reaction would 
2 be to blame or devalue the other person, like put the person down, in a kind 
3 of attack of rage but I suppose the second stage would be to take the blame 
4 on myself, in the sense of kind of realize that it had something to do with me 
5 therefore I would be responsible for it, it is kind of taking responsibility for 
6 what you are feeling/ 
7 B: You also said self-punitive/ 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
M: I think that would be the second stage/ 
B: To punish yourself (. ) 
M: Yes, punish myself or perhaps take the blame for it/ not necessarily punish 
myself I suppose, perhaps that what I think it is not necessarily the truth, 
realizing things that I haven't realized while in the process of being angry (. ) 
in general I am quite self-punitive, I don't know if it make me feel better or 
worse actually/ (laughs) [ ... ] it is more kind of mental or emotional, it begins 
with devaluing somebody and ends with devaluating yourself, like making 
you feel small, envious and bad, it is sounding quite awful but I don't 
necessarily see it as b-c-i-n-g qn-lite. h-a-di/ 
B: Why do you think you punish yourself or what do you punish yourself for? 
M: um (. ) because I feel responsible for what happens to me and the way I am, 
so I suppose in a way it is a good thing because if you blame yourself you 
take responsibility for it therefore it is in your hands to change it (. ) if you 
blame other people for doing bad there is nothing you can do about, while 
taking the blame for it is taking responsibility for it and change can come 
from that/ 
Moira starts her account with a choice: she could turn her anger against someone 
outside or against herself, through these two actions it is decided who is in the 
position of being blamed. However, from the beginning the two actions, although 
basically the same, are constructed as carrying completely opposite connotations. So 
that "to blame or devalue the other person" is described within the context of "a kind 
of attack of rage". Alternatively, "if you blame yourself you take responsibility for 
it". This could be interpreted as a very clear illustration of the 'shame-rage spiral' 
described by Scheff, because she is taking the blame for having her feelings. 
I am interested here with the warranting strategy adopted by Moira, who has to 
justify doing something to herself which sounds quite awful (line 16), makes her feel 
small, envious and bad (line 16) and that she is not sure makes her feel better or 
worse (lines 13-14). The first option (turning her anger outwards), is rejected by 
representing it derogatively as an 'attack of rage', while the alternative is legitimised 
as positive action of taking responsibility for her feelings. Therefore, the desirable 
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course of action is that of self-blame, following the acceptance that the situation "had 
something to do with me" (line 4). 
This, I think is the crucial point and on this statement hinges the whole strategy of 
warranting. Moira has to position herself as the one who in some way provoked or 
caused what happened to her. In lines 19 and 20 she specifies this by saying that she 
feels responsible for wh-at happens to her and the way she ii--, 
We don't 
-know what 
Moira is referring to, because she was talking in general terms, but I think the 
following quote, taken from a section of the interview just prior to the above extract, 
is relevant: 
I think when you manage to put a name to something maybe because it 
makes it more manageable, that is my main defence now, to be able to 
analyse the situation and understand what I feel and then why I feel that way 
and I suppose once you get there I suppose it becomes less relevant then, it 
does not stop the pain necessarily but becomes more manageable. " 
This helps to understand the process she is describing as Moira implies that any 
explanation is better than no explanation. But what she is offering in the extract is 
an illustration of the process of constructing an explanation and how any one reading 
is not 'intrinsically true' but becomes true through rhetorical devices and the way it 
is constructed in speech. 
Hence, attacking the other person has implications of irrationality and would position 
Moira as out of control, incapable of thinking while dominated by anger, as is 
confirmed in line 12. This position warrants the second action of turning the anger 
against herself as being reasonable and mature. 
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The need for doing this is in the discomfort provoked by the event and the 
helplessness, which is implied in the lines quoted preceding the extract and in the 
extract (lines 15-24). The strategy is not totally successful as it does not really deal 
with the discomfort. This is acknowledged in line 15 where she does qualify it as 
self-punishment. The last few lines eventually construct the position of the 
'responsible subject' which gives self-blarne positive connotations; this is construed 
as self-empowering in that it. allows her to be in a position off being able to changc 
things. 
This account contains two important elements. First (which takes us back to issues 
explored in previous chapters), Moira looks in herself for a solution to a problem 
which is inter-subjectively constructed. This solution involves positioning herself as 
the one who should be blamed, either for her action or for her intrinsic personal 
qualities (lines 4,5). Secondly, Moira presents this strategy as a defence against 
situations where she would feel helpless, implying that there are no alternative ways 
of understanding what is happening. (I will come back to this point with some 
relevant sociological analysis). However, this is contradicted in the text which does 
provide with an alternative position: legitimizing her anger and attacking the source 
of the discomfort. This alternative position of power is undermined and discredited 
as an 'attack of rage'. 
Scheff's link of the 'shame-rage spiral' to Marx's concept of false consciousness is 
very useful in this context. As outlined in chapter two, Marx used the concept of 
false consciousness in an attempt to understand the acquiescence of subordinate social 
classes to systems of stratification which are patently unjust. On similar lines, Scheff 
looks at the role played by the subordinated classes' internalisation of the opinions 
and values of their oppressors in the perpetuation of their own oppression. If the 
members of the dominated class are ashamed of their own putative characteristics, 
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and this shame is not acknowledged and dispelled, it might result in a permanent 
undervaluation of self and overvaluation of the ruling class. In Italy for example, in 
the 1960s, when labour organizers sought to alert workers to the effects of 
educational 'streaming' on their children, the workers often rejected the organizer's 
analysis, saying, in effect, that the reason a child was being streamed into a career 
of manual labour was not discrimination, but that 'my boy is stupid, just like me. ' 
This leaves the oppressed particularly susceptible to the shame-rage spiral. 
This dynamic is highly present in Moira's extract, particularly because, as I have 
pointed out, for the warranting to be effective she has to position herself as 'small, 
envious and bad' and that she is to be blamed for what happened to her. Further, I 
want to argue that taking this position implies being in a disempowering and 
vulnerable position. This is illustrated by the following extracts where some of the 
women interviewed talked about their experiences of being attacked or being 
victimized: 
Paula: 
Jessica: 
Judy: 
[ ... ] 
if you are the victim you wonder whether you encouraged it in any way 
or whether you had any part in it/ 
[ 
... ] when I was nineteen 
I was raped by two men and I don't know whether 
I felt shame, just trying to think, because it was all part of what in a sense I 
expected that should happen to me and try to work out whether it was my 
fault or not and (. ) I felt I was bad and that I had actually provoked 
something to happen, it was my fault (. ) I am thinking whether it can be 
called shame, they were very very angry, so they were attacking me, I just 
wonder whether when you feel ashamed you feel that you are bad, it is 
difficult to work out/ 
I can remember another instance actually. There was myself and other few 
friends were out walking in the woods and we were () younger and this man 
came up to us and said he wanted to go for a pee and could we showed him 
where to go and being young, 9 or 10 there was a sort of warning light in my 
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mind, but there was also curiosity because I did not know what was going on, 
and we knew the woods very well and he said 'after I have gone for a pee 
you can go for a pee and I check that nobody is looking' and I can remember 
this incredible sense of curiosity and this incredible sense of danger and threat 
and we just run off because we just knew that something was wrong but we 
did not know why and afterwards I felt quite ashamed about that because I 
hadn't understood quite what was going on, and it was a sort of 'why did we 
not know, why did not understand what was happening in that situation and 
why were we being so curious? why did we want to stay anyway? 
What is conveyed by the previous extracts is how when being attacked or abused, the 
women searched for their responsibility for what had happened to them. Jessica says 
explicitly that the attack is what she expected to happen to her and she attributed it 
to her being bad; exactly as Moira had. Judy's account perhaps shows an early form 
of that process; she is too young to fully take on the responsibility for what 
happened, but nonetheless questions herself critically for her curiosity. 
I want to conclude this chapter with a discursive analysis of an extract from the 
interview with Rita. I have selected this account because of its richness and because 
it contains many elements from the themes analysed so far. It is a story about a 
heterosexual woman being flashed at by a man while travelling on the tube at nine 
o'clock at night. 
10.4 Rita's Account 
R: One day I felt so ashamed, I was in the tube, about 2 years ago. I am 
2 shortsighted and I wasn't wearing my contact lenses. In that compartment 
3 there were only 2 women, no men, when we got to [the station] a man came 
4 into the compartment and he came to where I was sitting, opposite to the 
5 other lady and I had the strong feeling that he wasn't wearing any trousers 
6 and he flashed, now because I wasn't wearing glasses or contact lenses I 
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B: 
R: 
B: 
R: 
B: 
R: 
B: 
R: 
B: 
R: 
B: 
wasn't sure that that was real, but the girl, I could tell, I was just thinking, 
you know, it looks like this man is flashing, he was actually flashing, now 
because I didn't realise immediately I didn't take my gaze away from him as 
quickly as I should have done, but when I realized, oh my God!, and he must 
have realized that I was looking at him, but I just couldn't tell (. ) when I 
realized I just got off and walked off, very very embarrassing, I couldn't tell 
anybody, I was petrified even to go to the police 
Why do you think you were embarrassed? 
I think because it took so long to realize that he was actually flashing, I 
should have just ignore the whole thin, -, but I wasn't aware (. ) the 
embarrassment, I was so ashamed I didn't even report it, because where do 
you start, you have to describe the person (. ) I definitely felt ashamed 
what do you think would have happened? 
well I would have had to describe the person which means that you spent so 
long looking at them and the implication of describing a person who was 
flashing is that you had a confrontation, although it was just eyes, it meant 
that I stared at the person 
are you saying that you felt ashamed because you were actually looking at 
him 
yes, (laugh), if I had spoken to the other girl, but we both got off and just 
carried away not knowing what to do 
[ ... ] when I got 
home I coped by talking to my flatmate, I rang my boyfriend 
to get it off my system, I don't know whether to call it shame or anger, for 
me it happened at the same time, somebody imposing something on you, 
physically nothing happened, but it something that somebody does to you, 
you are ashamed, you are angry, you have all these feelings (. ) and if I had 
been wearing my glasses it would have been worse, because all the time I was 
wondering "is this real? " 
do you know why it would have felt worse wearing glasses? 
you know when someone does something to me I try to assess if they are mad 
or not (. ) at that time of night, being a woman and travelling at that time of 
night (9 pm) you worry that you'll get attacked (. ) you have so many thing 
going on in your mind, gosh I have escaped it could have been worse, and 
then the anger, and then you start worrying maybe I'm travelling late and I 
shouldn't, so many things going on in your mind (. ) 
so did you feel you had done something you shouldn't have done 
my boyfriend said: "you shouldn't travel late, because you put yourself in this 
position", so he made me feel guilty that I was travelling late, contributing to 
things like that 
as if it was your fault 
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47 R: yea and then you think, God why can't I travel when I want! [ ... I they 48 happened together, one after the other, I felt ashamed because I didn't even 
49 report it and then I felt guilty because I was travelling late and everything 
50 happens at once after that and you start wondering "is it me? 
51 B: so you didn't report it because you felt ashamed 
52 R: yes if they had interrogated me and I hadn't felt sure about the colour of the 
53 shoes... 
As I have previously pointed out, this extract touches on many issues raised in 
previous chapters, both in the literature reviews and in the thematic decomposition. 
If we look at the 'shame scenario' suggested at the end of the Introduction, this 
extract contains many elements of it: 
1) Shame is constructed as a complex, painful, emotional phenomenon, not only in 
terms of the various emotional responses associated to it [Rita mentions ashamed 
(lines 1,17,18,32,48), humiliation (line 30-32), embarrassment (lines 12,17), guilt 
(49)], but also to other emotions which she experienced concurrently [fear, i. e. 
petrified (line 13), anger (29,32,40), worry (line 40), confusion, i. e. not knowing 
what to do (line 29)]. 
2) Shame can be remembered for a long time after the event, in this case two years 
(line 1). 
3) Two sets of coping strategies are employed to deal with the experience: the first 
attempts to deal with the immediate situation involved withdrawing in the form of 
walking off (line 12) and silence (line 12,13). Denial was suggested as a potentially 
more successful strategy although she did not manage to use it (line 16). The second 
set of strategies is resorted to later and involves confession (lines 28,29) which 
further suggests that shame and guilt often are mixed. 
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4) There are also attempts at reparation, i. e. she would like to have been told that 
what happened had nothing to do with her, which would have repaired her sense of 
self. Unfortunately that did not happen and in fact her fears were confirmed (line 43- 
45). 
5) It was also suggested in the shame scenario that shame has a reason and a cause, 
i. e. something han ens that triggers the feeling (the reason), but then, in a lp -C: 'C: ' --- \- -- - 
psychodynamic framework, that event is made traumatic because it sets off 
unconscious, intrapsychic reactions (the cause) 
In the context of this extract, the inter-psychic reason is the exhibitionistic act. To 
explain the cause for the intra-psychic emotional state it produced, two 
psychodynamic readings are possible: one is a classical Freudian reading whereby 
shame is the reaction-formation to Rita's voyeuristic impulses. In other words, Rita's 
voyeuristic impulses pressed for satisfaction (and partly succeeded), but this was 
followed by shame functioning as a repressing force, transforming the forbidden 
pleasure into its opposite: an unpleasant feeling of shame. This reading is supported 
by the concurrent experience of guilt for the fleeting satisfaction of her impulses. 
Confirming this, Rita does says that going to the police would have involved 
confessing that she had looked at the man's genitals (lines 21-23). The structural 
model adds the element of internalisation of social values through the vigilant action 
of the superego, but nevertheless as it has been discussed elsewhere (chapters one and 
six) both these readings rest on a view of the human psyche as a closed system. 
Another available reading connects shame to the ideal-self formulation. There are 
many aspects of the ideal self that Rita failed to meet. In moral terms she failed to 
immediately turn away. In terms of personality she also failed, by being deeply 
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affected and confused instead of being sufficiently in control to ignore the man. 
Finally, she also felt she failed in not having gone to the police. 
I want to argue that, far from being just a personal intrapsychic conflict (as the two 
psychoanalytic readings would construct), shame is being negotiated at many different 
levels and in an extremely complex way. I will now discursively analyse the extract. 
The scene is set by Rita positioning herself as shameful. She says she felt ashamed 
rather than that she was ashamed. This could indicate that although at the level of 
feelings there was some shame, perhaps she did not entirely identify with it. 
Nevertheless this also implies that she experienced the shame and that the discomfort 
stayed with her. 
The next sentence introduces us to what area the shame will relate to. We do discover 
later that it is about sexual exhibitionism, but Rita first focuses on herself, making 
a point of positioning herself as incapacitated. This does many things: firstly it tells 
us to expect the shame to have something to do with inadequacy and helplessness. 
Secondly, it positions Rita as disabled and relatively helpless. Thirdly, this statement 
could be functioning as a disclaimer (Wetherell and Potter 1992), counteracting 
something that will come later. The fact that this involves Rita (the victim), tells us 
that her position of victim has to be strengthened and warranted from the beginning. 
Rita says that when the man flashed, she had the strong feeling he was flashing thus 
reducing the importance of her statement, which would have been stronger if she had 
said she knew it with certainty. The invitation to trust her innocence in clearly made 
in the following line where she says that she wasn't sure if it was real. Her being 
shortsighted is obviously her strong point. This, however, is contradicted by the claim 
that, although she could not properly see the man sitting next to her, she could see 
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the woman sitting opposite. This could be taken to suggest that Rita was lying and 
use the blurred vision as an excuse. 
On the contrary, I attribute this discrepancy to Rita not trusting her judgement, 
therefore the other woman's expression validates her impression much more than 
what she saw. This is supported in lines 32-34 because if she had been wearing 
cylasses she would have had to trust her judgement, which obviously she could not do, 
as she goes on to explain. When it comes to reading the other woman's expression, 
however, Rita has no hesitation I could tell". 
This is a very important point because it suggests that she was capable of supporting 
and validating the other woman's reading of the situation, i. e. that the two women 
were positioned as potential allies. The potential of this alliance is stated further later 
(line 26,27) where Rita implies that if they had managed to talk, something else 
could have happened, perhaps they could have joined forces and found the strength 
to go to the police or at least to comfort and support each other. But this opportunity 
was lost and Rita is left with her own perception of what had happened which, from 
the beginning, is constructed as uncertain and open to attribution of blame. 
In the following few lines there is a shift of attention from the man to Rita and her 
initial disclaimer ends up working against her. Rita says that because she couldn't see 
properly, she looked for longer than she should have done. Around this she constructs 
one of the shameful/embarrassed positions (the other being that of humiliation), 
around having looked at the flasher's genitals for too long (line 9,15,20,21). This 
is where the opening of the story makes sense, because it implies that Rita only 
looked at his genitals because she could not see properly and she could not tell what 
she was looking at. 
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It seems that the purpose of most of the account is to prevent the reading that she had 
done anything to encourage or bring the event on herself. Consistent with this, she 
is the one who leaves the train, resorting to withdrawal and silence as defence. She 
explains the silence as a way of protecting herself from having to admit that she had 
looked at the man, further positioning herself as the shameful one and the guilty one, 
as she explains in more detail later. By taking this position, Rita makes the situation 
into a personal problem, hiding the reality that she would have found herself being 0--- --- .1 ZD 
interrogated and perhaps humiliated by the police. Her constant doubt about what was 
happening further weakens her position. However, her refusal to go to the police 
could also be read as a realistic reading of the situation and resistance to being 
further humiliated by a system which wouldn't give her a genuine chance to have a 
voice (Marks, 1993). Thus she chooses silence. 
This extract is unusual because it does offer at least two alternative positions to being 
shameful and a victim. There is the position of anger, a) for having being assaulted 
and b) for not having the freedom of travelling when she wants to because she is a 
woman. The other is the possibility of joint resistance. However, the latter is aborted 
and the former is gravely undermined by the self-blame. 
10.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have further explored some of the issues addressed in the previous 
chapters. In particular I have focused on some consequences of low self-esteem and 
feelings of unlovability and attempted a reading of these issues which goes beyond 
the individual experience, but reconnects them to women's position in a patriarchal 
society. Following on from that, I have looked at how the anger at being unfairly 
treated can be turned against women themselves and constructed as a positive step 
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of taking responsibility. Finally I have explored the disempowering effects of self- 
denigration, low self-esteem and of taking the shameful position in case of real 
attack. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: 
Conclusions 
As stated in the Introduction, this thesis aims at an investigation of shame; in 
particular it aims at providing a psychoanalytic and feminist reading of women's 
lived experience of shame. This final chapter will serve as a summary of the thesis 
with accompanying reflections on what conclusions I have reached and some 
recommendations for further work. I also intend to use it to comment briefly on some 
of the epistemological issues raised by the research. 
I have argued that shame is not a 'thing' out there which can be clearly defined, 
observed or measured like the objects of investigation in the natural sciences; nor is 
it exclusively the product of intrapsychic conflicts. Shame is constructed and 
negotiated culturally and historically, both inter and intra-psychically. Last, but not 
least, what we end up learning about shame through research is fundamentally 
affected by the epistemological framework and the methodology employed to 
investigate it. In other words, theoretical frameworks and the epistemological 
underpinnings of the instrument of investigation will construct what we see and the 
boundaries of where we can go in our research. 
Epistemological questions run throughout this thesis and take different forms. In 
chapter one, for example, the question of what theoretical models either allow us or 
prevent us from seeing is explored in relation to Freud's concept of shame and the 
changes it underwent throughout the development of his metapsychology. I argued 
at that point that the theoretical boundaries of Freud's framework prevented him from 
developing an understanding of shame connected to the self. because the theory did 
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not provide the language necessary to make sense of certain phenomena, they became 
invisible. This contributed to researchers then believing that those phenomena, as far 
as Freudian metapsychology was concerned, did not exist. 
This dynamic highlights two things: a) that language constructs reality and b), the 
need in research to make visible what is invisible, or has not found words to be 
expressed. The latter consideration directed my research toward attempting to make 
III visible the tinks between women s experience of sharne and wider social issues. 
This is one of the main reasons why shame is of such interest to me: it is mostly 
invisible. The experience of shame is suffered in silence and isolation. It is a secret 
pain rarely shared that disempowers and undermines one's sense of self-esteem. This 
is why it is such a powerful means of social control, due to its capacity to regulate 
behaviour from within. 
In this thesis I have tried to investigate how that process takes place for women and 
how they account for it. Going beyond the personal experience, I have tried to 
reconnect the participants' accounts to the historical context to which we belong; this 
was done from the feminist standpoint that views our patriarchal society as unequal 
in terms of gender. 
Shame is a very complex phenomenon. I started by stating the impossibility of any 
simple definition of shame. Instead, I listed the shame family of feelings and 
attributed the problem of definition a) to the fact that people feel many different 
things at the same time, b) they feel, think and speak differently about the same thing 
at different times and c) say and think different things about the same phenomenon 
in different contexts. This, to me, would be a very good indication that there is no 
unitary thing called shame nor is there a unitary shameful subject. Furthermore, it 
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confirms, in the words of Harr6 and Secord (1972: 299) that, "most human social 
behaviour is linguistically mediated and is thus not directly observable in the sense 
that a physical movement might be. " These shifts, contradictions and negotiations 
became the object of inquiry of the discursive analysis carried out on the semi- 
structured interviews. In that analysis I identified five themes which I will now 
discuss briefly in turn. 
in the first theme 'Shame and the ideal' (chapter six), 1 looked at how shame is 
constructed within the theme of ideals and failing to meet them. I have questioned 
the assumption that these ideals are either 'out there' in society, or that they are a 
personal intrapsychic product. My starting point was that ideals are in no way 
'neutral' and I explored how ideologically charged ideals affect women's lives. I 
have also looked at the process of self-regulation involved in taking the position of 
shameful. 
In chapter seven I explored the theme of 'Femininity and Shame' and looked at the 
constructions of femininity used by the participants to explain and justify their 
representations of themselves as shameftil. I have argued that this way of accounting 
functions as a practical ideology and contributes to the reproduction of female 
stereotypes seen as actual practices taking place in real time and real places. 
In the theme 'Withdrawal as a Defence Against Shame' (chapter eight) I continued 
to explore the function of practical ideology in women's accounts of avoidance when 
presented as a protective activity to prevent exposure of their shameful self. Through 
a discursive analysis I have attempted to show how by positioning themselves as 
shameful, women can both conform and resist oppression at the same time. 
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The theme 'The Shameful Self behind the Fagade' in chapter nine continues some 
of the themes explored in the previous chapter. Continuing the examination of 
strategies employed by the participants to protect themselves from shame, I focused 
on the technique of hiding behind a fagade. I have explored the dualistic split used 
by the participants to describe themselves as having a 'true self' which is shameful 
and inadequate and a public self which, though competent and successful, is 
constructed as a 'fagade'. In exploring this theme I looked at possible alternative 
subject positions and suggested some reasons for their neglect. 1 also looked at the 
function performed by the facade/true self split. 
Finally, in chapter ten I explored the theme 'Shame of the Victim' and looked at 
some consequences of women taking the position of shameful as discussed in 
previous themes. I argued in this chapter that positioning themselves as shameful has 
implications for the women's sense of self and self-esteem particularly in the event 
of attack. 
Discursive Analysis: a critique. 
There are a number of limitations to the qualitative study examined in this thesis. The 
first is one shared with any form of discourse analysis: the findings cannot be 
representative (Parker and Burman 1993). The constructive nature of the analysis by 
definition prevents it from being representative, even though the different subject 
positions are nevertheless drawn from common social resources and, ultimately, the 
political objective of discourse analysis is in re-making the link with these wider 
social and historical constructions to examine the effects of their ideological action. 
Therefore my analysis can only be seen as a tentative, initial step in that direction. 
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Further research should be based on interviewing a larger number of people with the 
aim of exploring more in depth the various shame themes. 
Another limitation of this study is that it did not pay particular attention to issues of 
class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation or disability, as the focus here was mainly 
on issues of gender. All of the above are building blocks for contemporary social 
discrimination, hence the importance of exploring their role in the construction of the 
shameful subject. Some of these issues were touched on in this thesis (ciass in 
chapter ten, ethnicity and race in chapter seven), but there was no clear discussion 
of these issues in the analysis. This was partly due to a need for brevity and 
selectivity, but mainly those issues were not present in the text because they were not 
made part of my interview schedule from the beginning. This confirms how any 
research allows only a pre-selected part of reality to become visible at the expense 
of others. In view of this, further research should be carried out to explore 
experiences of shame with race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, class and disability as 
their focus. 
A third recommendation for further studies is connected to the clinical understanding 
of the experience of shame, which could explore whether the socially constructed 
shameful subject is taken into consideration in clinical settings or whether the 
exclusive study of shame as an intrapsychic affect further strengthens the ideological 
construction of shame as a personal issue. 
Some Epistemological and Political Reflections 
There are also certain epistemological issues highlighted by this research that I feel 
would require further investigation. For example, as discussed in chapter four, post- 
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structuralism rejects the notion of a reality pre-existing language and as a 
consequence it also rejects claims that language can access hidden meaning in the 
psyche of the subject (Parker and Burman 1993). This has serious implications for 
any attempt to simultaneously analyze a text both discursively and psychoanalytically. 
For example, as a discourse analyst, I repeatedly stressed that my readings did not 
claim any privileged insight into the participant's psyche (see chapter five). However 
this was problematic for a psychoanalytic reading, as I had to neglect the participants' 
biographies (essential to any psychoanalytic understanding), despite their continuous 
reference to their pasts and their discussion of shame in historical terms. 
This touches on another problem which I addressed briefly in chapter nine: the 
relation between history and change in a modernist and post-modernist framework. 
I looked at how psychoanalysis is at the same time a modernist and a post-modernist 
approach; post-modern in the sense that it rejects the notion of a unitary subject and 
views the self as a constantly negotiated product, intra and inter-psychically. At the 
same time, it rests heavily on a notion of personal history and concepts of self- 
development and change, i. e. progress (Frosh 1991). And yet post-modernism abhors 
notions of progress and history. " 
These issues are of crucial importance for anyone embarking on a discursive analysis 
which aims at political change. In my case, however, they became central because 
of my problematic, multiple positioning as social-constructionist academic researcher, 
psychoanalytic psychotherapist and feminist. As a discourse analyst I explored the 
20A similar Position has been taken by Hollway (1989), who 
despite advocating the 'death of the subject, has 
maintained in her analysis the existence of a core self, a 
temporal continuity for the core self and the uniqueness of 
the individual. For a critique see Widdicombe 1992. 
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constructive nature of language and its role in the constitution of subjectivity, which 
implies acceptance of epistemological relativism. 
And yet, as a woman committed to feminist struggle within a patriarchal society, and 
as a psychotherapist engaged in relieving pain and enhancing patients' self- 
development and progress, I still operate within a mainly realist, modernist 
framework. In my daily practice as a psychotherapist I am constantly confronted with 
the pain of shame in patien& ýreal' existence; this has been a constant reminder of 
the necessity for a practical application of what we research. The tensions created by 
my multiple identities have often been problematic, but have ultimately been pivotal 
in my choice of objectives in this research and kept me anchored to my need for this 
research to be not just an abstract enterprise, but an attempt to contribute to some 
change in women's 'real' everyday existence. 
In chapter nine I have aligned myself to Habermas (1987) in that I adhere to the 
notion of a negotiated construction of reality and self, without giving up the idea that 
there still exists the possibility for collective action and ideals of progress, change 
and transformation. It is in a similar way that I consider my identity as a feminist 
researcher: I believe that the category of 'woman' is neither cohesive nor unitary, but 
socially and politically constructed. However I also believe that there is a common 
experience of oppression and the possibility of challenging that oppression within the 
diversity of women's experiences. 
However shifting and fragmented, however constructed, there is a history which has 
oppressed women, as there are dynamic and socially interactive ideological practices 
which affect the way we live on a daily basis. I believe that we are all involved and 
we are all implicated; we do not have a choice as to whether we are a part of history 
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or not. We do, however, have a choice as to whether we collaborate with these 
practices or oppose them. 
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APPENDIX I 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
General: State of mind/emotional state of par-ticipant. 
I would like you to tell me how things have been for you in the last 6 months. 
A. SELF ESTEEM 
I. General questions on participant's life 
Quality of social interaction/ areas of supplies of well-being/sense of self-worth 
How old are you 
Do you work, study.. 
Do you like it, importance etc 
Relationships 
Friends 
Interests/activities 
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SELF-SCALES 
2. Perceived quality of life / role performance 
Would you say you are very satisfied with your life, contented or dissatisfied. 
2.1 
Positive 
In what areas do you feel your life is alright 
Is there anything you would really like/dream to happen in your life? 
Negative 
What are the areas you don't feel satisfied with and would like to change? 
3. Evaluation of self attributes 
Would you say that you like yourself a lot, a little bit or not at all 
Positive 
What are the aspects of yourself and your personality -appearances, qualities etc. - that 
you like. 
Are there any aspects of yourself as a woman that you like/dislike or are particularly 
conscious oP 
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-prompts on body and neediness- 
Negative 
What are the aspects of yourself you don't like 
4. Discrepancy between ideai-self and actual self 
I wonder if you could think of a situation in which you did not like yourself 
4.1 Image of mental state 
- Could you describe your feelings 
- What kind of things did you think of yourself 
- Do you wish you had behaved differently? 
- How do you wish to have appeared? 
Ideal self 
5. Models/ideals 
Some people have told me about having a secret dream about something they would 
like to achieve or someone they strongly admire and would like to be like 
Do you have anything like that? 
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5.1. 
What are the things you would like people to think of you 
What are the things you would definetely not like people to think of you. 
6.1nadequacy 
Are there any areas in your life or in yourself in which you feel inadequate? 
is there any area in which you feel inadequate because you are a woman? 
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B. SHAME 
General 
People seem to associate different experiences, feelings and meanings to 'shame'; 
I would like to discuss this with you. 
Maybe we can start from a recent situation in which you felt shame; it would be very 
helpful if you could tell me as much as possible about the feelings involved even it 
you are not sure they are exactly shame. 
(The situation described by the subject should contain the elements listed in the 
' shame scenario') 
THE SHAME SCENARIO 
-a reason and a cause 
- an audience/ shaming agent(s) internal and/or external 
- the affect is traumatic, although to a varying degree and can be experienced as 
momentarily incapacitating 
- the shame situation can be remembered for long time afterwards and the related 
affects can be re-experienced with the same intensity 
- different coping strategies and/or defences are employed 
- reparation is made, in reality or phantasy, through acceptance 
-shame is a complex emotional state and cannot be found in isolation 
(Prompts to elicit or clarify answers related to the points listed in the 'shame 
scenario') 
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1. A reason and a cause 
What do you think led you to feel so ashamed? 
2. Audience/shaming agent(s) internal and/or external 
Who did you think would have noticed? 
Was anybody there who would have noticed'? 
Who do you think it was that made you feel so unconfortable? 
(Bad/persecutory/critical objects) 
Is there anybody you wouldn't have liked to be there-some people say "I am glad 
my father/mother was not there" 
(Good/supportive objects) 
On the contrary is there anybody you could think of that would have helped you to 
feel better 
3. The affect is traumatic, although to a varying degree and can be experienced 
as momentarily incapacitating 
Did you think it limited you in any way? 
Did you find that what was happening interfered in any way with the way you were 
feeling before; did it change it in any way? 
Did you find that the experience interfered in any way with your thinking? 
Did you find that the experience left you in any way disoriented or confused? 
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4. The shame situation can be remembered for long time afterwards and the 
related affects can be re-experienced with the same intensity 
Would you say that this was a very intense feeling, on a scale of I to 5. 
Do you think you remembered constantly 
How often would this memory occur to you? (once a year/ monthly ... roughly) 
Would you remember with the same intensity as when it happened or you felt it 
changed in some other way 
5. Different coping strategies and/or defences are employed/defences 
Now I am going to ask you: How did you deal with that event at that time 
What do you think was your way of coping with the situation? 
What did you say to yourself.? 
What did you think of what had happened? (This often can take place after the 
event. ) 
Did you try to make yourself feel better 
6. Reparation is made, in reality or phantasy, through acceptance 
Is there anyway you can make yourself feel better? 
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What do you think in retrospect you could have done 
to stop yourself from feeling 
Was is there anything in that situation that helped you to feel better? 
What kind of thought you found would sooth the feelings you had in the situation? 
7. Emotional profile. Shame is a complex emotional state and cannot be found 
in isolation 
What was going on in your mind connected to that event which you think was linked 
to feeling ashamed? 
Can you describe in as much detail as possible the 
feelings you had at the time. 
What did you say to yourself? 
Did you feel frighthried, angry, inadequate, guilty, self-conscious, humiliated, 
depressed, anxious, upset, confused 
What about positive feelings: Did you feel excited, happy, curious, elated? 
Would you say you liked or dislike yourself at that moment? 
8. Existential shame 
Someone said ."I think of shame 
in situations when I am doubting about doing 
something wrong or anxious to look stupid. in all sorts of social situation that you 
don't know how to handle and being ashamed of not knowing what kind of things 
to say, and feeling ashamed because they are trivial things" 
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Do you know what this person meant? 
Is there anything in your everyday experience which you feel is reflected by this 
quote? 
9. Self-consciousnessfinadequacy 
Would you say that generally you feel self-conscious and/or are there any situations 
that make you feel that way 
Are there any areas of your life in which you feel 
inadequate. 
Are there any situations or people that make you 
feel inadequate. 
10. Self-esteem and gender 
Do you think that the fact that you are a woman/man have an influence on the 
feelings we are talking about? 
Are there any situations in which you feel particularly insecure or uncertain or could 
feel more inadequate because you are a woman ? 
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APPENDIX 2 
Hypotheses underpinning interview questions 
1. What is the correlation between self-esteem and shame? 
-CONTENT 
Does shame differ in people with high self-esteem and low self-esteem? 
Is there a difference in the content of the shame 
experiences reported? 
The measure of self-esteem is provided by questions 
A 1, A2, A3. 
These question focus on how rich and satisfactory the P. perceives her life to be and 
how much they like or dislike themselves. 
Hence people with high self-esteem will present a rich and fulfilling life, with a 
general sense of satisfaction about themselves and their lives. 
On the contrary people with low self-esteem are likely to dislike themselves, to 
distrust their capacities and are likely to feel generally dissatisfied with the way they 
are, with their 
jobs, relationships etc. 
(This is a descriptive and not causal definition) 
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Predictions 
With people with high self-esteem shame will be connected to an experience which 
threatens morality. This experience can be described as exposing the self as they are 
not normally. 
In other words they feel they have been caught doing something they feel is morally 
wrong and that would be judged wrong by society. In this experience they feel they 
have appear 
as being in a way they do not like, but that is is not how they really are. 
This I call shame experience which threatens morality. 
(In Psychoanalytic terms shame functions as reaction formation) 
Predictions 
With people with low self-esteem shame will be connected to an experience which 
threatens the ego/self. 
It will reflect a painful discrepancy between the way they would like to appear and 
the way they feel they really are. 
In this case P. feels they have appeared in the way they really are: inadequate, stupid 
etc, and it will be accompanied by a sense of experiencing the difference between the 
way they are and how they would like to be. 
-DEFENCES 
Is there a difference in defences? 
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By defence I mean any operation or strategy employed by the P. to deal with any 
situation likely to cause distress in order to return to a state of equilibrium disrupted 
by the occurrence of the situation in question. Examples of defences: avoidance, 
denial, rationalization, projection etc. The situations I am referring to are shameful 
situations. 
- COPING STRATEGIES 
Is there a difference in the 'strategies' people employ in order to deal/cope with 
a shaming situation? 
Do people with high self-esteem find it easier to cope and come to terms with the 
shame experience than people with low self-esteem? 
Predictions: yes 
Do they remember it for longer and with stronger intensity? 
Predictions: 
People with low self-esteem tend to get more affected 
by a shame experience, tend 
to remember it for longer time and with greater 
intensity. 
Furthermore there is a lesser capacity to accept the feelings and to minimize their 
impact. 
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How do people 'recover' from a shame experience and the difficult feelings 
induced by it; to what do they resort to restore their sense of being 'alright'? 
Predictions: 
People use two sources of 'well being': 
1. internal, through their'good introjects and a sense of acceptance of their 
shortocomings 
2. external, through important and supportive relationships and confirmation of their 
self-worth 
I will call them narcissistic supplies or supplies of well being. 
Predictions 
Being the two above mentioned elements weaker in people with low self-esteem than 
in people with high self-esteem, I expect the former to find it more difficult to 
recover from a shame 
experience. 
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2. What is the correlation between Shame and Ideal SelP 
The exposure to the discrepancy between Ideal-Self and actual-self produces 
shame and a lowering of self-esteem. 
Are there similarities between mental states when people experience shame and 
when are faced with the discrepancy between the way they are and the way they 
would like to be. 
Predictions: 
There is a high correlation between the two: 
a. in the content of the two experiences 
b. in the feelings experienced 
c. in the person's way of relating to themselves (self-denigration, self-acceptance, 
self-attack) - 
Is there a correlation between people with very high standards, high 
expectations and shame, and people with much lower expectations and less rigid 
standards? 
Predictions 
People whose ideal self contains high expectations (becoming president, famous and 
successful people) find shame experiences more humiliating than people w, th lower 
expectation, and find them more difficult to deal with) 
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3. Exploratory on shame 
Is it possile to make a differentiation between ideal-selftnarcissistic shame and 
reaction formation shame? 
Narcissistic shame 
The self is affected (by self I mean a sense of identity the subject feels describes 
them quite accurately). The shameful situation is preceded by positive feelings 
(excited expectations, well-being) -whether produced by actions or 
daydreaming/phantasies - followed by a sudden collapse of self-esteem and 
confidence. 
One of the feelings expressed more often by the S. is the feeling of humiliation. 
In Psychoanalytic terms I would describe it as the S. having received a narcissistic 
blow. 
EX: Khas invited the girl of his dreams to a competition. Confident to win he 
intends to impress her. 
In front of everybody he trips on his shoe laces. 
Ego-ideal/ unlovability shame 
Again the self is affected in such a way that, following the experience, the S. 
undergoes some reassessment of him/herself. 
The experience is preceded by negative feelings ( fear and anxiety of 'getting it 
wrong' or 'appearing stupid') and leaves the S. feeling unacceptable and unlovable, 
as well as stupid, inadequate etc. 
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At the core of this experience there is a feeling of contempt and dislike for what the 
person is and a strong desire to be somebody else, or deeply different. 
In Psychoanalytic terms I would describe this experience as connected to a 
discrepancy between what the person really is (actual self) and what the person would 
like to be (ideal self) 
Ex. 
Shame as reaction-formation 
This type of shame is more connected to 'social shame, i. e. to either actions or 
thoughts which are intimate and private and are not normally performed in public 
(which society would consider as wrong). 
These include sexual activities, the exposure of the body, performing of bodily 
functions etc. 
Ex. S. discovers at the end of the working day that she has been walking around with 
her skirt caught in her knickers. 
In Psychoanalytic terms in these experiences shame draws boundaries between 
private/public and is strictly connected with what is socially acceptable. 
The name reaction-formation signifies the function of shame as painful and 
distressing feeling in preventing people from crossing these boundaries, something 
that is unconsciously desired. 
Is there a collapse of self-esteem during a shame experience? 
Phenomenology 
What are the essential factors in the phenomenology of shame? (whether there is 
always a audience involved, whether the experience is traumatic etc 
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The 'shame scenario' provides a list of factors which I think are part of most shame 
experiences I want to explore which, if any, appear more frequently and if there is 
a correlation with different types of shame. 
Prediction: 
1 assume that a shaming situation contains: 
THE SHAME SCENARIO 
-a reason and a cause 
- an audience/ shaming agent(s) internal and/or external 
- the affect is traumatic, although to a varying degree and can be experienced as 
momentarily incapacitating 
- the shame situation can be remembered for long time after-wards and the related 
affects can be re-experienced with the same intensity 
- different coping strategies and/or defences are employed 
- reparation is made, in reality or phantasy, through acceptance 
GENDER DIFFERENCE 
Is there a gender difference in terms of types of shame, defences, experience and 
type of shame? 
If so, what does it consist of? 
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APPENDIX 3 
Instructions for raters 
General 
STATE OF MIND/EMOTIONAL STATE OF SUBJECT 
Get a general feeling of quality of S's life, a sense of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, 
relevance of people, activities, interests. 
Make a list of adjectives and, if possible, group them. 
(Later each subject will be rated on a scale of I to 5 for each group) 
SELF ESTEEM 
1. 
General questions on S's life 
QUALITY OF SOCIAL INTERACTION/ AREAS OF SUPPLIES OF 
WELL-BEING/SENSE OF SELF-WORTH 
Score the questions in this group on a scale of I to 5. 
Take into consideration not only the actual answer of yes or no, but the relevance it 
seems to have in S's life. 
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Score I if the answer is 'no' 
Ex: 
"Are you in a relationship? " 
"No" 
Score 5 if the answer is 'yes' and it sounds like it is a very important area or an area 
connected to very positive feelings. 
Ex: 
"Do you have friends? " 
"I have a large number of friends and acquaintances. My friends are very important 
to me. " 
Score 3 if there is obvious ambivalence attached to the answer 
Score 2 of the answer is 'yes', but there are no really good feelings attached to that 
area, but on the contrary some sadness or dissatisfaction or regret is attached to it. 
ex: 
"Do you like your job? Is it important to you? " 
"Yes, not a lot, but yes ... I don't love it. It is important because it pays the 
bills, it is 
my source of income, so in that sense it is important. " 
SELF-SCALES 
General guidelines 
Please bear in mind that since all the questions under 2 and 3 relate to evaluation of 
self attributes and performance, one would expect some overlap between all these 
scales. 
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The areas which keep being mentioned are obviously very important to S. and we 
can take to represent their value system. 
Mark the areas for a later comparison with areas of shame. 
There are two elements to be taken into consideration in this question: what the S. 
actually says and what transpires from the interview. Rate according to what you 
think they actually feel rather than to what they say they feel or think. 
Mark the statements and group them in areas. 
Count the statement. 
Ex: 
2. 
PERCEIVED QUALITY OF LIFE/ROLE PERFORMANCE 
Score on a scale of I to 5 
The emphasis in this scale if on a lack of self-acceptance - that is the S. unhappiness 
or dissatisfaction with her/himself and the kind of Person s/he is. 
Mark the statements of unhappiness about the kind of person the S. perceives 
her/himself to be. Count the statements. 
Group the statements in areas; also pay attention to the overall feeling and to the 
intensity of feelings according to the different areas. 
It is very important in rating this question that the feelings of dissatisfaction with the 
self presupposes the existence of an ideal self(what the S. would like to be) against 
which the subject is comparing her/himself 
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3. 
EVALUATION OF SELF ATTRIBUTE 
3.1 
Score using a scale from I to 5 
3.2 
Mark and count all the positive and negative statements S. makes about her/himself. 
Take into consideration the intensity of the statement and the relevance in S's life of 
the area mentioned. 
Score on a scale from I to 5, giving 3 if the negative and positive statements are 
similar in number, intensity and related to areas of equal importance, 5 if the positive 
statements greatly outnumber the negative, I in the opposite situation. 
Make a note of areas and feelings that seem particularly important. 
4. 
The content gives a picture of the areas in which the discrepancy is experienced as 
more wounding and more connected to S. value system. 
4.1 
From this question you will get the range of feelings S. feels when faced with a 
discrepancy between what s/he would like to be and what s/he really is. 
The feelings described during this process of 'self-evaluation' will give the S. 's 
mental state when faced with the discrepancy. 
Please make a list of feelings 
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5. 
IDEAL SELF 
Look for sentences like: Ishould be do this, I would like to be.., I wish I was 
wish I could do 
or for values or qualities mentioned as positive and important both in herself and 
admired people 
(I should be able able to do that-because it is professional 
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SHAME 
-a reason and a cause 
- an audience/ shaming agent(s) internal and/or external 
- the affect is traumatic, although to a varying degree and can be experienced as 
momentarily incapacitating 
- the shame situation can be remembered for long time afterwards and the related 
affects can be re-experienced with the same intensity 
- different coping strategies and/or defences are employed 
- reparation is made, in reality or phantasy, through acceptance 
-shame is a complex emotional state and cannot 
be found in isolation 
The above are the dimensions you are asked to score. 
For each of these dimensions you should ask yourself the following question: 
"Does this dimension appear in the example given by the subject? " 
Genereally you should be able to extract this information from the vignette; if not the 
prompts should help you to decide whether the answer is yes or no. 
Questions 1., 2., 3., are a 'yes' 'no' questions. 
The hypothesis which we want to test is whether and how often the various 
dimensions appear in shame situations. 
Score I if that particular situation applies, 0 if it does not. 
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Please fill the information in the list provided underneath; but please read beforehand 
the information provided in the following page. 
l a. What was the reason(s) 
lb. What was the cause(s) 
2. Was there an audience/ shaming agent(s) internal and/or external (yes/no) 
(if you feel that both apply please specify) 
3. The affect is traumatic, although to a varying degree and can be experienced as 
momentarily incapacitating 
(yes/no) 
Please rate from I to 5/9 
4. The shame situation can be remembered for long time afterwards and the related 
affects can be re-experienced with the same intensity 
(yes/no) 
4a. Was the situation remembered for long time? Please rate from I to 5/9 
4b. Were the associated feelings re-experienced with the same intensity? Please rate 
from I to 5/9 
5. Different coping strategies and/or defences are employed 
(yes/no) 
Please make a list of what you thought were the strategies and the defences employed 
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6. Reparation is made, in reality or phantasy, through acceptance 
(yes/no) 
7. Shame is a complex emotional state and cannot be found in isolation 
(yes/no) 
If yes, please make a list of the other feelings the S. had during the shameful 
experience. 
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I. Reason and cause 
For reason I mean the actual event that brought about the feelings; while the cause 
presupposes a deeper, unconscious conflict. 
Ex: 
Please note that although the reason is always present and easy to identify, the cause 
might have to be inferred from what the S. says. 
In rating this question you should ask yourself the question "What caused the S. to 
feel the way s/he did? " 
2. Audience/shaming agent(s) internal and/or external 
The majority of shameful situations take place in front of other people; however even 
when this is not the case the experience involves in some way an audience, 
sometimes experienced as a critical/attacking voice. 
3. The affect is traumatic, although to a varying degree and can be experienced as 
momentarily incapacitating 
In rating this question ask yourself the following questions: 
How did the S. react to this experience: was s/he affected to the extent of being in 
any way impaired (i. e. found it difficult to think, to speak, to extricate him/herself 
from the situation) 
Was the S. very distressed, confused, disoriented by the experience? 
Give 3 exarnples and rating (5 or 9 point scale? ) 
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4. The shame situation can be remembered for long time afterwards and the related 
affects can be re-experienced with the same intensity 
This question is split into two : 
4a. how intense was the feeling during the actual experience 
4b. how often and intensely the affects would come back when the experience was 
remembered 
in rating this part of the question ask yourself "How long was the S. affected by the 
experience? If you felt that s/he forgot almost immediately and when remembering 
it s/he did not find it traumatic, but even perhaps amusing, then the score would be 
low. 
If on the contrary the S. repeatedly remembered the experience and would 
re-experience the associated affects with the same intensity (i. e. some people feel 
themselves blush or sweating at the recollection of the event), then the score would 
be high. 
5. Different coping strategies and/or defences are employed/defences 
People react in various ways to shameftil situations; we can divide the reactions in 
two groups: 
1. the immediate strategy employed to deal with the situation while it is happening 
(i. e. some people need to physically leave, others pretend that anything has happened 
and carry on as normal, others try to divert the observer's attention by doing 
something else, for instance talk incessantly, some laugh ofthen pretending of finding 
it amusing, some get angry etc) 
2. As well as the above people also do something psychically to deal With their 
feelings, as it were to 'defend' themselves from them if they find these feelings too 
overwhelming or difficult to deal with. 
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This type of strategy is more difficult to identify because it happens unconsciously. 
You might find that some people are capable to look back and identify a particular 
defence mechanisms they adopted; but more often you will have to infer them from 
what the S. says. 
This is a list of the most frequently used 'defence mechanisms' 
6. Reparation is made, in reality or phantasy, through acceptance 
You might find that people talk to themselves while thinking back to a shaming 
situation. Please focus on what kind of thought they have or things they say to 
themselves that made them feel better about the situation. 
An example of what I mean by 'acceptance' are thoughts like "It o. k. " or "It is not 
the end of the world", "There was nothing else you could have done". 
The assumption is that this kind of thoughts is very important to counteract the 
critical/attacking thoughts like "How can you be so stupid! " or "You really made a 
fool of yourselff" etc. 
If you feel that the S. made him/herself feel better by thinking 'reparation' thought 
tick (yes) 
7. Emotional profile. Shame is a complex emotional state and cannot be found in 
isolation 
Shame is a complex emotional state, and cannot be found in isolation but rather 
connected to many other emotion. 
The aim of this question is to identify the feelings that more frequently appear in 
connection with shame, but also what type of feelings come up more for different 
types of people. 
Please make a list. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Section of interview with Paula. 
I B. [ ... ]Do you think there are things you wouldn't feel ashamed of if you were a 
2 man, or it doesn't make a difference? 
3 uhm, I suppose the obvious thing for a woman would be sex, feeling of dirtiness, but 
41 don't think I have ever felt that way, I think 20 years ago that example would have 
applied more to women to men 
B. What example? 
7 P. sex, before marriage because of the prohibitions and attitudes to men and women 
8 that it was a man's gain and woman's shame, no I can't think of things they would 
9 relate to me but wouldn't apply to men. I am thinking about being a victim of some 
10 sort, but it is the situation that goes behind it [.. ] I met him again and when I asked 
11 him if he remembered he looked as ashamed as I did\ 
12 B. What does a ashamed person look like? 
13 P. I think by defences, a refusal to face up to it, that you don't want to talk about it, 
14 to look at it... 
15. B. face up.. to do with the face maybe? 
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16 P. yes, I think that you blank out, see no evil, hear no evil, it makes you look as if 
17 you didn't have a clue, about not looking\ 
18 B. you were saying about being a victim.. 
19 P. yes I was thinking that sometimes when you are the victim of a crime you feel the 
20 shame instead the perpetrator of the crime, but then again I think because of the lack 
21 ot'control, but then is difficult, because if you are the victim you wonder whether 
22 you encouraged it in any way or whether you had any part in it 
23 B. yes other women have come up with this kind of thought about being attacked, 
24 sexually attacked or raped. 
25 P. but if the definition is right then it wouldn't fit, because often when people talk 
26 about shame they talk about whether their clothes were provocative, which presumes 
27 some kind of control, but again is not known control, it is unwittingly 
28 11 
29 B. Now, I would like to ask you few more questions, to get some general ideas. 
30 Some people have different ways of reacting to shame situations: some people 
31 withdraw from the situation try to make themselves invisible, others react becoming 
32 more challenging. How do you feel you react? 
33 P. running away, in all sorts of ways, either physically or as a youngster trying to 
34 make myself as small as possible, trying to disappear... 
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APPENDIX 5 
Sample of coding of semi-structured interview 
3-5 sex before marriage, "man's gain, woman's shame" 
9 no difference between man and woman 
14-15 DEFENCES. Intrinsic in shame: face 
17-18 DEFENCES: blank out (see no evil, hear no evil) 
20-24 shame of the victim: the victim feels the shame instead of the 
perpetrator. She thinks because of lack of control. 
IMPORTANT FOR WOMEN: one (I think she is referring to 
a woman) wonders whether she has done something to 
encourage it, or had any part in it. 
IMPORTANT FOR WOMEN: (talking about rape and sexual 
assault), women wonder whether their clothes were 
provocative. Paula, however, does not seem to connect this to 
problematic issues in women sexuality, 
but instead she connects it to clothing per se, which 
she thinks are under women's control. 
This she uses to question whether the shame felt by 
the victim can properly be called shame, since her 
definition of shame is of something unwitting. 
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However when I suggested that perhaps the shame has 
something to do with ".. something in you that brought it upon your 
self. ", (Implying that clothing is only an expression of that) she agrees. 
NB, THIS APPEARS IN OTHER INTERVIEWS 
37-39 DEFENCES/COPING STRATEGIES: running away, both 
physically and "-as a yongster trying to make myself 
as small as possible, trying to disappear. " 
This is very important, it connects with 
Lexistential shame, (women physically and mentally 
disappearing from situation which could expose to 
shame) and with 
2. women and their bodies particularly at the onset 
of puberty, trying to take as little space as possible. 
Connects to bodies, eatiniz, needs. 
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APPENDIX 6 
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTION 
B stands for Bruna. It refers to what I said in the interview. 
x stands for the initial of the participant's name (e. g. P stands for Paula) 
indicates a pause. 
II indicates that part of the transcript has been omitted 
(laughs) indicates that the participants laughed or giggled at that point. 
brackets containing a blank space indicate that the interview was 
inaudible at that point. 
brackets surround explanations which are not part of the transcript but 
are added to clarify the meaning of an utterance (e. g. "It (shame) feels 
like.. ) 
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indicate that the end of a sentence has been left suspended to indicate 
either doubt or invitation for me to respond or prompt. 
indicates the end of a sentence. 
Sounds fike 'ahm, 'uhmm', 'ehm' are transcribed phonetically. 
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